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ABSTRACT 
Shared platforms are a stable foundation for the integration of digital 
components by heterogeneous actors. These platforms are an emergent 
organizational form whose members seek interoperability of their IT systems 
through technological architectures constituted of a modular core, a 
standardized interface, and complementary extensions. Although extant 
Information Systems (IS) research on such platforms primarily emphasizes 
the social aspects of platforms, e.g., the economic dimension of platform 
members’ positions vis-à-vis competitors and complementors, there is a 
growing literature that also takes their material aspects into account. In this 
dissertation, my objective is to contribute to this trend in sociomaterial 
theorizing of platforms by undertaking an imbrication analysis of a twelve-
year shared platform initiative in the Swedish Road Haulage industry. Hence, 
I attempt to answer the following research question: “How do the 
participants’ coopetitive behavior and the platform’s technology architecture 
reciprocally shape the evolution of a shared platform?” My dissertation 
identifies three organizational forms that are likely to emerge in the evolution 
of a shared platform and assesses their respective implications for platform 
innovation. I conclude by articulating the contributions of my study to IS 
research and practice. 
Keywords: Coopetitive behavior, imbrication lens, organizational forms, 
technology architecture, shared platform, standardized interface 
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SAMMANFATTNING PÅ SVENSKA 
Delade digitala plattformar har potential att utgöra en stabil grund för 
integration av olika slags aktörer och deras IT system. Dessa plattformar är 
en allt vanligare organisationsform vars medlemmar eftersträvar 
interoperabilitet genom teknologiska arkitekturer, vilka består av en modulär 
kärna, ett standardiserat gränssnitt samt applikationer och funktionalitet. Den 
dominerande forskningen inom informatik betonar framför allt sociala 
aspekter relaterade till sådana plattformar, t.ex. den ekonomiska dimensionen 
som är avhängig medlemmars positioner gentemot varandra som både 
konkurrenter och samarbetspartners. Dock finns kompletterande forskning 
som på senare tid poängterat betydelsen av att studera tekniska aspekter och 
deras konsekvenser för plattformars utveckling och användning. Syftet med 
den här doktorsavhandlingen är att bidra med ny kunskap till en fördjupad 
socioteknisk förståelse för delade plattformar. Min analys baseras på ett 
flerårigt plattformsinitiativ inom den svenska åkeribranschen och följaktligen 
försöker jag besvara den här forskningsfrågan: “Hur formas utvecklingen av 
en delad plattform genom det ömsesidiga samspelet mellan konkurrerande 
aktörers samarbete och plattformens teknologiska arkitektur?” Det 
huvudsakliga resultatet från mitt forskningsarbete är tre specifika 
organisationsformer som både möjliggör och begränsar deltagande aktörers 
innovation under en plattforms utvecklingsprocess.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Technological platforms are an indispensable part of our contemporary 
economy in that they mediate the interactions among heterogeneous 
stakeholders, thereby making disparate systems interoperable (Ceccagnoli, 
Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012; Parker, Van Alstyne, & Jiang, 2017; Tan, Pan, 
Lu, & Huang, 2015). Such frictionless interactions are increasingly important 
in industries characterized by network effects (Besen & Farrell, 1994, p. 
118), i.e., where the value of a product increases based on the availability of 
complements and/or its adoption by others in the industry. By helping to 
make products compatible with those products bought by others, platforms 
play a key role in generating efficiencies and innovation (Boudreau, 2010; De 
Reuver, Sørensen, & Basole, 2017; Tiwana, 2015). Well-known examples of 
technological platforms include computer operating systems (Eisenmann, 
2008), videocassettes (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992), vertical 
(Markus, Steinfield, Wigand, & Minton, 2006) and e-commerce standards 
(Zhao, Xia, & Shaw, 2007), as well as social media (Zhu & Furr 2016). 
However, technological platforms are not merely digital artifacts; instead 
they are an emergent organizational form (Gawer, 2014) characterized by (1) 
a network of actors that innovate in the generation of value and compete for 
its appropriation (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011; Tiwana, 2015), 
and (2) a technological architecture composed of a modular core, 
standardized interfaces, and complementary extensions (Baldwin & Woodard 
2009; Le Masson, Weil, & Hatchuel, 2011; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush, 
2010). As Thomas, Autio, and Gann (2014) highlight, however, platforms 
differ in terms of their openness, i.e., the degree to which the development, 
commercialization, and use of the technology is made available to the public 
(Boudreau, 2010). 
1.1 Research Objective 
Prior research, however, suggests there are two theoretical perspectives on 
digital platforms (Gawer, 2014). The economic point of view sees platforms 
as double-sided markets and has yielded insights on platform competition 
(Eisenmann et al., 2011). The engineering perspective views platforms as 
technological architectures and has focused on platform innovation 
(Boudreau, 2010). These perspectives are rooted in different intellectual 
traditions with distinct assumptions and they have therefore focused on 
various directional forces that platforms respond to. Consequently, they have 
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not helped to explicate how platform competition and platform innovation 
interact. These forces cannot be understood in isolation because in reality 
they interact to shape the evolution of platforms with their ecosystems and/or 
across ecosystems (Gawer, 2014; Tiwana, 2015; Wareham Fox, & Giner, 
2014). That is, platforms often evolve in ways that combine innovation with 
increased competition that renders paradoxical tensions. There is therefore a 
need for integrative studies of shared platforms and the governance strategies 
enacted by platform leaders to nurture their ecosystems (Eisenmann 2008; 
Gawer 2014; Wareham et al. 2014). Indeed, such studies have to be sensitive 
to dynamic technological landscapes where emerging technology architecture 
shifts render consequences for coopetitive dynamics (Afuah 2000; Afuah 
2004; Bouncken, Gast, Kraus, & Bogers, 2010).  
Shared platforms, i.e., consortia that collaboratively design and manage 
technological infrastructures and rules that regulate the interactions among 
industry players, are often fraught with challenges. In particular, participating 
firms have to be convinced continuously of the platform’s value, while their 
position vis-à-vis competitors and complementors dynamically shifts as its 
architecture and rules evolve.  
Compared to proprietary platforms, which are typically developed, owned, 
and operated by a single firm (e.g., Apple’s IOS), shared platforms (e.g., 
Apache) are developed and operated by a collective of heterogeneous actors 
(Eisenmann 2008). While this implies that shared platforms are frequently 
industry-specific (Markus & Lobbecke 2013), I maintain that a key 
characteristic is that their development, ownership and/or operation is 
collective. Indeed, competition between cooperating organizations emerge 
because of a shared reliance on the same platform resources (Ingram & Yue 
2008). My definition of shared platforms therefore qualifies Markus and 
Loebbecke’s (2013). 
According to Cargill (2002), we can expect shared platforms to become a 
pervasive organizational form, as it is consortia composed of industrial 
players interested in solving a particular problem - rather than traditional 
standard development organizations (e.g., International Standards 
Organization) - that are increasingly creating standards for the IT industry. 
Moreover, Zhao et al. (2011) and Grøtnes (2009) maintain that most 
technology standards are adopted voluntarily (rather than mandated). This 
suggests that it is important to generate insight into the emergent 
organizational forms that are shared platforms. In particular, given that these 
platforms lack a central governing node, the nature of distributed governance 
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to incentivize their development is a pertinent issue worthy of further scrutiny 
(De Reuver et al., 2017).   
While there is surprisingly little research on shared platform design and the 
collaborative relationships involved (Chellappa Sambamurthy, & Saraf, 
2010), considerable attention has been paid to the cooperative development 
of the standards that form a necessary part of a platform’s technological 
infrastructure (Le Masson, 2011).  
Prior studies of such voluntary, consensus-based processes have examined 
questions such as how market power and intellectual property rights impact 
the resulting standard (e.g., Bekkers, Duyseters, & Verspagen, 2002; Rysman 
& Simcoe 2008), the importance of the working group’s chairperson’s 
technical expertise and personal networks within the standardization 
consortium (e.g., Fleming & Waguespack, 2007), and the role of cooperative 
relations outside of the standard development organization in the standard-
setting outcome (e.g., Leiponen, 2008). In addition, Zhao et al (2007) offer a 
three-stage process model of technology standardization where they highlight 
the trade-offs member firms face as they decide whether to participate in the 
consortium, actively engage in the development of the standard, and adopt it. 
Most of this past research on consortium-based standardization emphasizes 
social factors and fails to consider the role that platforms’ underlying 
architectures play in the process and its outcomes. This is unfortunate 
because changes in the platform’s core often have significant implications for 
the relationships among participants engaged in the development of the 
platform interface (Gawer, 2014). Furthermore, the modularity of the 
extensions (i.e., peripheral components) that third-party providers develop for 
a given platform largely shapes the platform’s innovation potential and its 
evolvability (Tiwana, 2015), which has implications for the positions shared 
platform members take vis-à-vis each other (Eisenmann, 2008; Eisenmann et 
al., 2011). 
1.2 Research Question 
In this dissertation, I am particularly interested in how the competition and 
cooperation among horizontally - and vertically - related platform members, 
i.e., coopetitive dynamics (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Afuah, 2004; Bouncken 
et al., 2015), are affected by shifts in the platform’s technological 
architecture. Applying imbrication theory (Leonardi, 2011), which explains 
how the social and technological aspects of organizational transformation 
interlock and become interwoven over time, the objective is to expand the 
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sociomaterial theorizing (Orlikowski and Scott 2008) of platforms (e.g., 
Barrett, Oborn, & Orlikowski, 2016) by focusing on shared platforms. Hence, 
the research question reads: “How do the participants’ coopetitive behavior 
and the platform’s technology architecture reciprocally shape the evolution of 
a shared platform?”   
This question acknowledges the emergent nature of shared platforms where 
neither participants’ interests nor technological capabilities are known a 
priori, but are assumed to evolve more or less dynamically over time (Le 
Masson et al., 2011). Indeed, this dynamism renders the development and 
management of this organizational form inherently complex and fraught with 
uncertainty (De Reuver et al., 2017; Leiponen, 2008; Wareham et al., 2014). 
My research explores the evolution of shared platform coopetition in 
dynamic technological landscapes where competitors cooperate to develop 
technology standards. Given this focus, I identify and conceptualize the 
tensions (Lewis, 2000) between platform partners, which I empirically 
examine through a twelve-year (2002-2013) historical analysis (Mason, 
McKenney, & Copeland, 1997b) of a shared platform initiative in the 
Swedish road transport industry. The aim of the shared platform was to 
develop a way to integrate data from embedded, mobile, and stationary 
technologies to better support processes including the costing of an order, 
inter-firm load sharing, and dynamic route optimization.  
The integration initiative, called the MSI (Mobile-Stationary Interface) 
project, involved IT vendors, road haulage firms, truck manufacturers, 
industry representatives, and action researchers. Its main outcome was a new 
shared platform for integrating the islands of incompatible proprietary IT 
systems that proliferated in the industry. In particular, I seek to explicate not 
only the ways in which coopetitive dynamics unfold in such settings, but also 
how technological shifts may culminate in intensified competition between 
actors, especially after a technology standard has emerged and cooperation 
within the industry has been stabilized. Indeed, academics and practitioners 
alike benefit from a better understanding of the nature of this tension and its 
potential consequences for ecosystem governance strategies. 
I rely specifically on theories of coopetitive relationships, shared platforms, 
and technology standards which provides me with an initial lens to explore 
the impact of technology architecture shifts on coopetitive dynamics in 
shared platform initiatives that integrate heterogeneous technologies by 
developing new technology standards. Based on an imbrication analysis 
(Leonardi, 2011), I identify and theorize three organizational forms as 
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archetypal of shared platforms and assess their respective implications for 
platform innovation.  
The findings of my study explicate not only the ways in which coopetitive 
dynamics unfold, but also how governance to reduce resource heterogeneity 
may culminate in intensified competition between cooperating actors after a 
technology standard has emerged. Based on these findings, I contribute to the 
platform literature by discussing the nature of the coopetitive dynamics that 
characterize shared platform initiatives where emerging technology 
architectural shifts challenge their governance strategies. In addition to these 
theoretical insights, my dissertation offers implications for platform leaders 
who seek to nurture innovation in their ecosystems. 
My dissertation progresses as follows. I commence with an introduction on 
the role and definitions of platforms. Next, I present the literature on shared 
platforms in chapter 3. I continue with a literature review of extant platform 
research in chapters 4 and 5, focusing on the two dominant perspectives (the 
economic and the technical) and their respective implications for managing 
this emergent organizational form. In chapter 6, I offer a comprehensive 
literature review on sociomateriality and highlight the important debates 
about this discourse in IS. Against this background, I outline the imbrication 
framework as my theoretical lens, which is followed by a presentation of the 
empirical setting in chapter 8. I initiate chapter 9 by giving a summary of my 
research journey to follow the tradition of dissertation-writing in Sweden and 
continue by presenting methods for data collection and analysis. Then I 
report on my empirical analysis summarizing the insights this analysis has 
yielded. I conclude the dissertation by articulating the key contributions as 
well as their implications for research and practice. 
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2 PLATFORMS 
Platforms appear to be of central importance in different industries especially 
in the technology sector. Facebook, YouTube, Uber, Etsy, Instagram, and 
Visa are examples of platforms shaping users’ daily lives. Many of these 
platforms have generated significant profits which has triggered an 
increasing interest in platform-powered businesses. Especially because these 
platforms have unlocked such economic value through unexpected resources, 
e.g., Airbnb has the highest growth in the hotel industry without owning a 
single hotel room (Reillier and Reillier, 2017). 
Platform-powered companies not only have made high profits but have 
become highly recognizable brands. Interestingly, many of them were 
established less than 20 years ago making them much younger than their 
traditional rivals. Among the top ten most valuable brands in the world, 
platform-powered companies top the list (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The top 10 most valuable brands in the world (US$ millions) 
The emergence of these business logics has disrupted the competitive 
landscape. It has lowered the entry barrier for niche actors and has 
highlighted the importance of many untapped resources. These changes have 
Figure 1 The top 10 most valuable brands in the world (US$ millions) 
Source: Millward Brown top 100 brands report 2018 
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introduced new actors and higher complexities to the markets. For actors, 
whether established or newcomer, cooperation has become inevitable in 
order to be able to tackle the complexity of the market.  
The introduction of new technologies has made the interconnection between 
different digital infrastructures possible. But to utilize the technology to build 
such infrastructure, stakeholders need to cooperate to establish standards, 
interfaces, and shared platforms. Such collaboration behooves industry actors 
to develop strategies to share information and expertise on development of 
such infrastructures but still be able to keep their competitive edge. The 
establishment of such relationships has introduced new challenges to 
practitioners. To tackle these challenges, deeper understanding and analysis 
of such settings is required (Eisenmann, 2008; Gawer, 2014; Wareham et al., 
2014; Saadatmand, Lindgren, & Schultze, 2017).   
Researchers have been paying considerable attention in studying platforms to 
shed light on the complexity of platform business model. Management 
literature alone has seen an increase of more than 180 times in the number of 
studies on platforms during the time span of 1992 to 2010 (Thomas et al., 
2014). This interest has resulted in studies analyzing the phenomena from 
different angles. In this chapter I present the current conceptualizations of 
platforms and I clarify the position of this dissertation in the literature. I start 
by a general review of platforms and continue by zooming into digital 
platforms specifically.  
2.1 Industry Platforms 
Platform studies do not use a unified terminology in identifying the “many 
types” of platforms (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Porch, Timbrell, & 
Rosemann, 2015). Instead they are represented with different definitions 
across literature, e.g., platform organization, platform technology, product 
platform, processs platform, etc. (Thomas et al. 2014; Rochet & Tirole 2003; 
Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; 
Armstrong, 2006; Evans, 2003).  
A historical view on platform literature shows that the definition of the 
platform has started to acknowledge the architectural aspects and it also has 
“diversified and opened up to conceptually exist beyond the boundary of an 
organization” (Porch et al., 2015, p. 11). This trend can be traced to the fact 
that platform literature in the beginning of 90s had a broader inclusive 
definition of a platform; while, recent studies are focusing more on 
digital/technological platforms. Studies on technology platforms 
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acknowledge the importance of the role of the architecture of the digital 
infrastructure shaping the platform.  
To solve the issue of lack of a unified view of platforms, Gawer (2009; 2014) 
presents an integrated and general theory of platforms. To do so, she 
categorizes platforms, based on the setting they are used for, into three main 
types: 1) Internal, 2) Supply-chain, and 3) Industry platforms.  
Internal platforms are platforms developed by a single firm for the internal 
use (Gawer, 2009; 2014). The main purpose of an internal platform can be 
boiled down to turning the structure of the firm’s products to a modularized 
design; hence, enabling the re-use of components across products. Different 
industries started to witness considerable profit by using internal platforms 
across products starting in 90s, e.g., the automotive industry (Cusumano & 
Nobeoka 1998; Bremmer 1999, 2000). The expected benefits of internal 
platforms are “fixed-cost saving, gaining efficiency in product development 
through the re-use of common parts, and … gaining flexibility in product 
design” (Gawer 2009, p. 49). 
Unlike Internal platform, a Supply-chain platform targets a group of firms 
along a supply chain. Every subsystem of a Supply-chain platform is 
developed by a different firm and the final result “forms a common structure” 
for the supply chain partners (Gawer, 2009, p. 52). An example of supply-
chain platform is Porsche and Volkswagen sharing a common platform for 
Porsche’s Cayenne and Volkswagen’s Touareg. The objectives and design 
principles of Internal and Supply-chain platforms are the same (Gawer, 2009; 
2014). 
Industry platforms can be designed and developed by one or more firms. The 
pressing issue in developing an industry platform is to leverage innovation by 
enabling external parties to contribute to the product and/or services offered 
by the industry platform. This is done through a well-designed technological 
structure as an interface to allow third parties to build product and services on 
top of the platform’s infrastructure (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013). The 
reason is to encourage innovation by collectively leveraging the platform’s 
value (Grover & Kohli, 2012; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012).  
In industry platforms, the platform owner needs to choose a proper strategy 
through applying “the right” designs rules. Therefore, an economic view of 
platforms alone does not suffice in theorizing and analyzing industry 
platforms (Gawer, 2014).  Industry platform studies cannot ignore the 
affordances and constraints of the underlying technology shaping the 
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architectural leverage (Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014). The importance of 
external innovation in industry platform highlights the priority of designing a 
generative digital infrastructure to uplift the heterogeneous complementary 
offerings (Tilson, Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010). 
Thomas et al. (2014) present the platform studies in four literature streams (or 
categories): organizational, product family, market intermediary, and 
platform ecosystem. After reviewing the literature in platform research they 
realize that a prominent concept studies point at without conceptualizing it is 
leverage and the architecture; which Thomas and his colleagues bring up as a 
necessity in each platform. They underscore the role of the architecture in 
understanding the evolution of platforms. However, leverage and architecture 
are only studied in the platform ecosystem literature stream (Thomas et al., 
2014).  
It is however difficult to separate the platform literature in to the four 
categories mentioned above (i.e., organizational, product family, market 
intermediary, and platform ecosystem) because platforms are multifaceted 
social, economic, and technical phenomena. Thus researchers need an 
integrated body of literature to analyze them. Thomas et al. (2014); however, 
admit the overlaps of the different categories of platform studies. These 
overlaps are present in definitions of different types of platforms in IS 
literature as well. Coherent synergistic means of understanding platforms are 
a necessity in extending current thinking on platform evolution (McIntyre & 
Srinivasan 2017; Sun, Gregor, & Keating, 2015; Porch et al. 2015; Thomas et 
al. 2014).  
Another categorization of platforms is presented by Gawer and Cusumano 
(2014) in classifying platforms as internal and external based on the scope in 
which the platform is developed and used including inside or outside a firm. 
However industry platforms that promotes complementarity and external 
innovation are highly growing (Chesborough, 2006), making it difficult to 
spot a solely internal platform. Instead internal and supply chain platforms 
are evolving into industry platforms in order to amass external innovation 
resources (Gawer, 2009). These changes propose their own challenges and 
governance practices to the platform owners (Eisenmann, 2008). The 
trajectory of these changes shapes the evolution of a platform (Thomas et al., 
2014). 
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2.2 Digital Platforms 
During 90s many digital innovation products and services, e.g., Microsoft 
were discussed as industry platforms. Researchers and industry analysts 
prescribed that technology products needed to evolve into platforms 
(Cusumano, 2010). A product was characterized as largely proprietary while 
a platform was seen as a “technology or service that is essential for a broader, 
interdependent ecosystem of businesses” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008, p. 28).  
This definition, however broad, encouraged studies and developments of 
technology platforms (i.e., digital platforms).  
Here, I focus on how different scholars see the definition of digital platforms 
by identifying three dominant streams .These school of thoughts have varied 
stances on the way they approach the definition of digital platform and the 
role of the technology and competition on the platform evolution. 
The first view, which I refer to as the economic one, focuses on the economic 
aspects of platforms. The term platform in this stream characterizes digital 
platforms as double-sided markets (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Here a digital 
platform is understood as a mediator between different actors whose only 
transaction conduit is the platform. Taking into account its socio-technical 
structure is key to comprehensively understand the ways in which it evolves 
over time (Gawer, 2014). Viewed from an economic perspective, digital 
platforms represent one of the three elemental business models for generating 
value (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998).   
Frequently referred to as platform markets (Eisenmann et al., 2011), these 
organizations - at a minimum - bring together buyers and sellers in a two-
sided network (Eisenmann, 2008). Increasingly, however, platforms represent 
multi-sided markets, adding additional parties who derive value from the 
network effects generated by these business models. Positive cross-side 
network effects (i.e., the larger the number of buyers, the more attractive the 
platform is to sellers) and negative same-side network effects (i.e., the less 
competition there is among sellers, the more likely sellers are to join the 
platform) are seen as key to the platform’s value (Parker & Van Alstyne, 
2005) in the economic perspective. 
In addition to balancing these two sets of network effects, other economic 
concerns that are addressed in the platform literature include switching costs, 
determining which side of the market pays for the platform’s services (i.e., 
money versus subsidy side), growing fast especially when winner-take-all 
dynamics are in effect, and enveloping platforms with overlapping user bases 
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(Eisenmann, 2008; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Zhu & Furr, 2016). A key 
objective of managing platforms is to develop and maintain distributed 
innovation to support ongoing value creation or generativity (Zittrain, 2006). 
The second view describes platforms as a technological infrastructure that 
allows the disparate systems of two or more organizations to communicate 
more or less seamlessly with each other (Langlois, 2002). This is the 
nomenclature adopted by both Tiwana et al. (2010) and Wareham et al. 
(2014), who refer to the combination of the (technology) platform and the 
actors who complete it as the “platform ecosystem” (For more details see 
chapter 4). 
Finally the third view urges on marrying the two schools of thoughts above 
and uses an integrative model to be able to fully analyze the phenomena. 
Given my focus in this dissertation in exploring the intertwining between the 
technological and the social in the evolution of a shared platform, I follow 
the third group and rely on Gawer’s (2014) view of platforms as emergent 
organizational forms (also Le Masson et al. 2011) and define them in terms 
of two defining features: (1) a network of actors that innovate in the 
generation of value and compete for its appropriation of value (Eisenmann et 
al., 2011; Tiwana, 2015), and (2) a technological architecture composed of a 
modular core, standardized interfaces, and complementary extensions 
(Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Le Masson et al., 2011; Tiwana et al., 2010). 
These dimensions capture the architectural and economic perspectives of 
platforms respectively.  
To be able to study platforms from the above mentioned generative point of 
view, one need to thoroughly understand the two first views namely the 
economic market and the technological architecture view of platforms. 
Therefore, I introduce the literature of these two views in chapters 4 and 5. In 
chapter 4, I delve deeper into the economic view of the platform and I 
specifically focus on theories on cooperation between competitors shaping a 
platform and on governance aspects of such group of actors. In chapter 5, I 
take a closer look at the previous works on technology architecture of 
platforms and attend to the related theories, i.e., technology standards and 
modularity.  
Before deeper discussions on the mechanisms of the two different classical 
views of platforms, I need to get more specific on platform definitions. The 
platform I study in my dissertation is not a classic proprietary platform but it 
is a shared platform. In chapter 3, I introduce previous literature on shared 
platforms and glance through the discussions around them. To underscore the 
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importance of shared platforms in this study, I have given shared platforms a 
chapter of its own instead of bringing it up as section 2.3 here. 
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3 SHARED PLATFORMS 
 
During the course of the evolution of a platform, involved firms can play two 
different roles: provider and/or sponsor (Eisenmann, 2008). Platform 
sponsors are the parties who deal with modifying the platform’s technology 
and determine who can take part in the platform network. Being in direct 
contact with the users, Platform providers are the forefront of the platform 
from the user’s perspective. These roles can be taken by different actors but 
“… sometimes, a single company plays both roles” (Eisenmann, 2008, p. 33) 
which are called Proprietary platforms, e.g., Apple Macintosh. 
In contrast to proprietary platforms, in shared platforms “multiple firms 
collaborate in developing the platform’s technology and then compete with 
each other in providing differentiated but compatible versions of the 
platform” (Eisenmann, 2008, p. 33). With a Joint Venture platform, a single 
firm provides a platform that has been developed by multiple firms, e.g., 
CareerBuilder. In a Licensing platform, the platform’s technology is 
developed by a single firm and then licensed to several other firms to serve as 
the providers. The main difference between these different types in the 
typology Eisenmann (2008) provides is ownership of the produced value; if a 
single firm take all the added value as in the Proprietary type or “share the 
spoils” as in the Shared kind (p. 35).   
In the IS literature, platforms that have multiple firms involved in their 
evolution in different forms are presented as business community platforms 
or shared digital platforms (Markus & Bui, 2012; Markus & Loebbecke, 
2013). Business community platforms are designed to facilitate business-to-
business interactions. These platforms are designed and developed to 
facilitate data and process interoperability between different organizations in 
a particular industry community, e.g., stock exchange platforms (Markus & 
Bui, 2012; Markus & Loebbecke, 2013). Business community platforms have 
also been formulated and presented as Interorganizational coordination hubs 
(ICH) (Markus & Bui, 2012).  
 
Shared digital platforms, however, are more general than business 
community platforms. These platforms streamline the processes and data 
exchange within or between organizations and are developed to be used by 
multiple firms simultaneously, e.g., Amazon’s cloud based hosting services 
(Markus & Loebbecke, 2013; Loebbecke, Thomas, & Ullrich, 2012). These 
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platforms standardize and commoditize digital business processes (Markus & 
Leobbecke 2013). Here the word “shared” is used to underline the multiple 
simultaneous use of the platform other than the multiple development or 
ownership of it. The very broad scope of the definition of shared digital 
platform turns this definition into an umbrella term. Eisenman (2008)’s 
definition of shared platforms also falls under the shared digital platform 
category presented by Markus and Leobbecke (2013).  
 
The discussion of proprietary vs. shared aspect of a platform is usually tightly 
linked to the degree of openness. Openness degree of a platform is 
determined by the restrictions on participation in development, 
commercialization and use of a platform (Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et al., 
2009). These restrictions are determined by the architectural design of the 
platform (Boudreau, 2010; Thomas et al., 2014). Compared to proprietary 
platforms, where the core is typically developed, owned and operated by a 
single firm (e.g., Apple’s IOS), shared platforms (e.g., Linux operating 
system, Apache servers) rely on a core that is developed and operated by a 
collective (Eisenmann 2008). With shared control over the platform core, 
contributors are less likely to be turned off by the risk of proprietary platform 
owners enacting usury practices, e.g., raising prices or restricting access to 
the core.  
Openness in proprietary platform refers to the degree third party actors are 
able and allowed to contribute to the platforms as complementor developers 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009; Boudreau, 2010). It also refers to the degree certain 
complements are allowed to be part of the core structure of the platform 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009). This opening process and the possible actions for 
the platform sponsors are described as vertical strategy by Eisenmann and his 
colleagues (2009) elaborating strategic moves to regulate complementor 
developments and envelopment (i.e., absorbing third party components) 
(Eisenmann et al., 2011).  
In shared platforms, however, the openness is defined as the level of allowing 
additional rivals in the development, commercialization and use of the core 
structure of the platform (Eisenmann et al., 2009). Here the strategies of 
opening are illustrated as horizontal strategy which is focused on deciding to 
either increasing/decreasing the degree of the interoperability with the rival 
platforms or inviting more/less rivals as the sponsors of the platform. To do 
so, other parties are invited to develop the core of the platform collectively 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009; Gover & Kohli, 2012).  This rather radical choice is 
particularly attractive if the platform sponsor faces an increased pressure 
from supply/ demand side and/or the rival platforms for open standards to 
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avoid lock-in (West, 2003). The need for open standards has been the 
primary reason for the emergence of many open-source platforms 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009). The degree of openness although is subject to 
change over time as the platform matures (Boudreau, 2010), this can often 
result in a blend of the both worlds leading in hybrid governance models 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009).  
Despite the attraction of shard platforms, Boudreau (2010) found that the 
strategy of opening a previously proprietary architecture was not effective at 
increasing the innovation and the generativity of the platform. Instead, 
making a proprietary platform accessible to more third-party developers 
increased innovation five-fold (Boudreau, 2010). While this research 
provides insight into the effectiveness of different openness strategies of 
established platforms, we gain little insight into the implications of 
participating in the development of a shared architecture from the beginning. 
In my dissertation, I rely on Eisenmann (2008)’s definition of a shared 
platform. He defines such platforms as consortium of firms that set standards, 
share infrastructure costs, and rely on a common platform to communicate 
with each other (Eisenmann, 2008). These platforms are an increasingly 
common organizational form as firms seek to develop industry-specific 
interoperability through standardized interfaces. Cargill (2002) highlights that 
consortia, composed of industrial players interested in solving a particular 
problem (rather than traditional standard development organizations such as 
the ISO) are increasingly creating standards for the IT industry. Furthermore, 
Yates and Murphy (2014) point out that most industry standards are 
developed by private standard setting organizations (rather than government 
regulators or individual firms) and adopted voluntarily (rather than 
mandated). This highlights the importance of generating insight into the 
emergent organizational forms of shared platforms. 
Even though Le Masson et al. (2011, p. 273) note that “surprisingly little 
research has been done on [shared] platform design and the collaborative 
relationships involved”, there is nevertheless considerable research on the 
cooperative development of the standards that form a necessary part of a 
shared platform’s infrastructure. This  research on “voluntary consensus 
standards setting processes” (Yates & Murphy, 2014) examines such 
questions as how market power and intellectual property rights impact the 
resulting standard (e.g., Bekkers et al., 2002; Rysman & Simcoe, 2008; 
Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 2006), the importance of the working group’s 
chairperson’s technical expertise and personal networks within the 
standardization consortium (e.g., Fleming & Waguespack, 2007), and the role 
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of cooperative relations outside of the standard development organization in 
the standard-setting outcome (e.g., Leiponen, 2008). Also, Zhao et al. (2007) 
develop a three-stage process model of consortium-based standardization in 
which they highlight the trade-offs participating firms face as they decide 
whether to take part in the consortium, actively engage in the development, 
and adopt the resulting standard. Schilling (2009) looks into different 
pathways to achieve dominant design, different technology strategies and 
different control mechanisms in standard making in technology platforms. 
However, most of this research on collaborative standardization emphasizes 
social factors (e.g., knowledge assets and relationships between actors) and 
fails to consider the role that technology (e.g., architecture) plays in the 
process and its outcomes. This is problematic because changes in the 
technology’s infrastructure have implications for the relationships among 
participants engaged in the development of the platform standard (Gawer, 
2014). 
Given the nature of shared platform, in the next chapter (i.e., Platform as 
Markets) I focus specifically on an economic view of platforms that are 
developed by a consortium of competitors. In chapter 5, I go through the 
architecture of platforms in a broader perspective under by going through 
modularity under section 5.2. I also give technology standards a special focus 
in section 5.1.   
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4 PLATFORMS AS MARKETS 
Zhao et al. (2011) highlight that a key economic issue with platforms 
revolves around participants’ incentives: why do consortium members spend 
time and money participating in the development of a technological core and 
standard interface, when these are likely to be made freely available to non-
participants? While this research identifies key reasons behind why firms join 
a standard-setting industry consortium (e.g., perceived benefit of the 
standard, perceived benefit of collective action), it falls short of identifying 
how these perceived benefits change over time as the participants’ relative 
positions in the consortium and the emerging industry shift. 
Analyzing the changes of competition and cooperation between platform’s 
industry actors is a viable way to understand the underlying causes of these 
changes. I introduce coopetition, its different modes in this chapter, and 
coopetition governance strategies in this chapter.  
4.1 Coopetition Modes 
Coopetition is a promising way of operationalizing the dynamics of a firm’s 
position within the platform-developing consortium and the industry. 
Coopetition captures situations where cooperation and competition among 
industry players occur simultaneously (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 
2010; Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). It breaks with the classical assumption that 
relationships between firms are fairly static and either cooperative or 
competitive in nature (Walley, 2007). Viewing cooperation and competition 
as a duality rather than a dualism has proved a powerful strategy for 
theorizing collective action in intra-firm (Tsai, 2002) and inter-firm networks 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).  
The concept of coopetition is an oxymoron of cooperation and competition 
that refers to situations where competitors cooperate to gain competitive 
advantage (Bengtsson et al., 2010; Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Chen, 2008; 
Nalebuff, Brandenburger, & Maulana, 1996). It breaks therefore with the 
traditional assumption that relationships between firms are either cooperative 
or competitive in nature (Walley, 2007). Viewing cooperation and 
competition as a duality rather than a dualism has proven to be a powerful 
strategy for theorizing collective action in firm networks (Tsai, 2002) as well 
as inter-firm networks (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). Therefore, coopetition is 
seen as a promising way of operationalizing the dynamics of a firm’s position 
within the platform-developing consortium and the industry (Gawer, 2014). 
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The studies on coopetition has increased since Raymond Noorda employed 
the term  in 1992 to describe Novell's business strategy (Bengtsson & Kock, 
2014) which was later used in strategy literature by Nalebuff and 
Brandenberger (1997). However, despite the popularity of coopetition 
especially in technology focused industry sectors (Gnyawali & Park 2009; 
Chin, Chan, & Lam, 2008) the literature on cooperation has not become 
entangled into the literature on competition still. This means that the intricate 
interplay between cooperation and competition is still under-researched 
(Hoffman, Lavie, Reuer, & Shipilov, 2014; Luo, Rindfleisch, A., & Tse, 
2007; Bengtsson, Kock, Lundgren-Henriksson, & Näsholm, 2016). Indeed, 
studies of coopetition in shared platforms can carefully explore the intricate 
interplay between these two modes and theorize the different patterns of their 
coevolution. Of particular interest is to identify what are the antecedents, 
mechanisms, and consequences that drive their interplay and how they shape 
platform processes (Gawer, 2014). 
Coopetition can emerge in different forms based on the intensity of 
cooperation and the intensity of competition in the relationship between 
firms. Bengtsson et al. (2010) reinforces that coopetition needs to be seen as a 
phenomenon there the relationship between competition and cooperation is 
not linear but it needs to be seen on a continuum. Consequently, “the 
implication is that co-opetition is described as ranging from strong 
competition to strong cooperation” (Bengtsson et al. 2010, p. 199). These 
changes of coopetitive behaviors are called coopetition dynamics by 
Bengtsson et al. (2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Coopetitive inter-firm relationships (Bengtsson 
et al. 2010) 
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Outlining a conceptual framework for defining and studying coopetition, 
Bengtsson et al. (2010) maintain that coopetitive relations imply that two 
firms are cooperating on one activity and competing on another. For example, 
in the early 2000’s, mobile phone manufacturers Erikson, Nokia, Sony and 
Samsung cooperated in an effort to develop the Symbian operating system 
that Internet-enabled mobile phones. Despite this collaboration, the handset 
manufacturers nevertheless remained rivals in the products they offered 
customers. Given that coopetition implies two activities (e.g., R&D and 
sales), Bengtsson et al. (2010) visualize this inter-firm relationship in a two 
dimensional space (see figure 2) that is characterized by two continua: 
competition and cooperation. 
Bengtsson et al. (2010) highlight that for coopetition to be productive; the 
forces of competition and cooperation need to be balanced. Too little 
competition is associated with inertia and even collusion as firms lack the 
incentive to innovate while too much competition generates a level of 
hostility and confrontation that makes any kind of cooperation between rivals 
virtually impossible. Similarly, too little cooperation (i.e., distant, arm’s 
length contracting) fails to generate the trust needed for firms to share 
information and knowledge, while too much collaboration undermines 
knowledge production and innovation due to group-thinking (i.e., over 
embeddedness). Thus, for coopetition to avoid the potentially negative 
consequences of competition and collaboration, the two forces need to remain 
in tension, albeit in a way that the imbalance between them is minimal. It is 
this productive conflict between the forces of cooperation and competition 
that Bengtsson et al. (2010) label dynamic coopetition (indicated by the circle 
in figure 2). 
Simultaneity of a cooperation and competition is the cornerstone of 
coopetition and can emerge as vertical or horizontal coopetition (Dowling et 
al., 1996); However, to get the maximum innovation performance out of an 
interfirm relationship a firm ought to form both vertical and horizontal 
linkages (Teece, 1998). Different studies have examined the effects of the 
interaction of these key pillars of coopetition. These studies have mainly 
focused on examining the intensity of cooperation and competition in the 
success of interfirm relationships. Success in this context is defined as 
generating technological innovations as the outcome of coopetitive 
relationship (e.g., Park et al., 2014) with a special focus on value creation and 
value appropriation theories (e.g., Lavi, 2007) and common stakes (e.g., 
Akpinar & Vincze, 2016). Some researchers conclude that the most fruitful 
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coopetitive relationship emerge when competition and cooperation are 
simultaneously at a high intensity. Gnyawali et al. (2008) believe that 
intensive cooperation in coexistence of intense competition result in higher 
innovation performance. While others believe the simultaneous intensified 
competition and cooperation result in extreme conflicts and disagreements 
leading to many tensions (Bengtsson et al., 2010).  
Coopetition can change dramatically overtime; these changes are referred to 
as coopetitive dynamics. Although these dynamics determine win or lose in 
such relationships, they are not fully analyzed in the literature. The acute 
need for explaining coopetitive dynamics is widely recognized. Existing 
studies on coopetition rely on the game theory, the resource-based view, and 
the network approach (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). These approaches are used 
to analyze the levels of competition and cooperation between coopetitors but 
fall short in analyzing the changes. Theoretical informed frameworks are 
needed to explain these dynamics to contribute to understanding of the field. 
 
My conceptualization of coopetitive relationships and subsequent empirical 
analysis is consistent with the conceptualization of coopetition and the 
frameworks developed in the literature (Park et al., 2014; Bengtsson et al., 
2010; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997; Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). This 
conceptualization is shown in figure 3. Strong cooperation in an interfirm 
relationship with weak competition results in cooperation dominant 
relationship. The high trust that underlies this coopetitive mode creates strong 
and stable bonds, which makes innovation – with its disruptive implications – 
more challenging.  
 
Similarly, a strong competition in combination with weak cooperation results 
into a competition dominant relationship. Since the rivalry among firms is 
high and competing firms are primarily motivated by distinguishing 
themselves from others, actors are inclined to protect rather than share their 
ideas. Even though innovation is spurred in this coopetitive mode, it is 
unlikely that a meaningful synergy of innovative ideas is produced, thus 
limiting its impact to make the industry as a whole – and all the players 
within it – better off (Park et al., 2014).  
When both cooperation and competition are weak the relationship lacks 
dynamism (Bengtsson et al., 2010; Bengtsson & Kock, 2000) causing a static 
coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2010). A static coopetition is too weak to 
generate enhanced technological progress (Park et al., 2014) and bring about 
monopolistic rent-seeking behaviors (Lado et al., 1997). When industry 
actors lack the motivation to upgrade their market position (low competition) 
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and knowledge exchange with other actors is limited (low cooperation), it is 
unlikely that innovation will occur (Park et al., 2014).  
Focusing on a synergistic view on competition and cooperation, Lado et al. 
(1997) proposes a fourth behavior type in interfirm interactions called 
syncretic behavior. This coopetition mode entails an aggressive but at the 
same time cooperative relationship where firms seek extra rents in a 
relationship with high degree of competition to stimulate knowledge 
development, market growth, and economic rents but eschew tensions 
through frequent collaborations. Lado et al. (1997) build their argument 
partly on Roehl and Truitt analysis of American, Japanese and French 
ventures concluding that “open, stormy marriages” resulted in more 
productive relationships (Roehl & Truitt, 1987, p. 87). In the similar vein, 
Park et al. (2014) suggest that the combination of high competition and high 
cooperation fosters a balanced interaction that enhances innovation 
performance. However, this mode creates highly paradoxical dynamics as 
strong competition inhibits cooperation, and vice versa.  
Toggling between the two extremes (high cooperation at one time or on one 
initiative, and high competition at another time or on a different initiative) is 
one way of managing the contradictory nature of coopetition. Another 
approach, as stated earlier, is to seek extra rents in a highly competitive 
relationship in order to stimulate knowledge development, market growth, 
and economic rents, and to rely on high cooperation to manage the 
competitive tensions (Lado et al., 1997). While this coopetitive mode is 
conducive to the generation of innovation, its performance as a mechanism 
for materializing ideas that will make the entire industry better off, is uneven.  
In light of each coopetitive mode’s limitations with regard to innovation, 
Bengtsson et al. (2010) advance a fifth coopetitive mode, labeled dynamic 
coopetition that emphasizes the combinability of moderate degrees of 
competition and cooperation respectively. With firms seeking to distinguish 
themselves from others in some areas and working together with others in 
order to improve infrastructural aspects of the industry, this mode of 
coopetition is deemed the most productive with respect to innovation. 
Bengtsson and her colleagues believe that interfirm relationships 
characterized by high levels of competition and cooperation are truly difficult 
to sustain damaging innovation and knowledge exchange processes widely 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010).  
Overall, the dynamic interplay between cooperation and competition remains 
under-researched (Hoffmann, Lavie, Reuer, & Shipilov, 2014) and the 
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evolution of shared platforms provides a unique opportunity to explore this 
phenomenon (Gawer, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To be able to evaluate the intensity of cooperation and competition, I follow 
Bengtsson et al. (2010)’s conceptual model of pillars of cooperation and 
competition. Competitive relations are defined in terms of symmetry of 
product, intensity of competition and hostility, while cooperation relations 
are evaluated in terms of complementarity of product, trust, and tie strength 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010).  The definition of these six coopetition elements is 
presented in table 1. 
In my analysis, I look at the strength of cooperation and competition by 
scrutinizing the strength of each constituent component mentioned above 
(Table 2 and table 3). Based on these criteria, cooperation (and competition) 
scores were deemed strong if all its components score high; it scores weak if 
at least two of its components score low; and it scores moderate if two of its 
components score high (For more details refer to Appendix 2). These dyadic 
scores were then averaged to derive a coopetition score for the entire MSI 
network in each phase. This allowed me to trace the coopetitive dynamics 
over the course of the platform’s evolution and to explore the reciprocal 
relationship between the material agency of the architecture and the human 
agency of the MSI participants.  
 
Figure 3 Coopetition mode conceptual model 
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Table 1 Coopetition key elements 
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4.2 Governance Strategies 
If a firm has come to depend on its coopetitor’s capabilities, however, 
obsolescence of their capabilities can also result in lower performance for the 
firm. That is, collaborative relationships with coopetitors, which are usually a 
source of competitive advantage, can become a handicap when a technology 
architecture shift renders coopetitors’ capabilities obsolete (Afuah, 2000). 
This means firms ought to pay attention not only to the impact of the shift on 
their capabilities, but also to the impact of the shift on their coopetitors 
(Afuah, 2004). 
A central advantage of coopetition is achieving shared technical innovations 
by using the pool of technological capabilities of partners and swaying the 
knowledge asymmetries. This is particularly lucrative because competitors 
are confronted with many same problems to solve because of the same 
Table 3 Competition strength based on its key elements 
Table 2 Cooperation strength based on its key elements 
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customer base. On the other hand, their quest in finding the right 
technological capabilities to solve the same problems makes them perfect 
technological complementors in a shared platform setting. Thus, the benefit 
of such shared efforts is vital to innovation processes (Bouncken et al., 2015).  
 
However, the similarity of the market situation and customer groups make 
coopetitive relationships difficult at best. This is even more relevant in 
industries highly affected by shifting in technologies. The conditions of such 
industries turn technological capability into the most important competitive 
edge. Thus, competitors would be less eager in disclosing their capabilities 
and bring their knowledge to a shared project to their competitors which 
results in a complicated dynamism in the coopetitive relationship (Baumard, 
2009). This complexity is rarely captured in longitudinal empirical studies. 
The lack of such studies is very visible in theoretical implications for 
academics and useful management recipes for practitioners governing such 
efforts. 
 
Shared platform initiatives that face technology architecture shifts when 
developing technology standards are excellent milieus for advancing the 
current understanding of the evolution of coopetitive dynamics and their 
respective implications for platform governance strategies. The variety of the 
technologies and stakeholders involved in shared platform initiatives 
constitutes a complex and rapidly changing ecosystem (Wareham et al., 
2014). Such ecosystem needs to encompass heterogeneous groups of 
technology vendors and user organizations without fragmenting, and 
platform initiatives that evolve into rival, homogeneous groups are less likely 
to develop a new technology standard that wins industry acceptance (Markus 
et al. 2006).  
Although platform literature acknowledges coopetition (e.g., Mantena & 
Saha 2012; Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014), coopetitive dynamics in 
shared platform literature have not yet been exploited. This is a gap addressed 
in this study. I believe in the potentials of the coopetition and shared platform 
literature to complement each other; this is because shared platforms are 
mainly established between partners who simultaneously compete and 
cooperate with each other (Eisenmann, 2008). They cooperate in contributing 
to the shared platform development and maintenance but compete in 
attracting more customers and taking a bigger share of the market (Bengtsson 
& Kock 2000). This has similarities to coopetition’s main assumption, that is; 
firms cooperate to create value but compete in obtaining the bigger share of 
the pie (Nalebuff et al., 1996). 
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Despite a long history of standardization research on development barriers, 
switching costs, diffusion patterns, and network effects (Backhouse et al. 
2006; Chen & Forman, 2006; Weitzel, Beimborn, & König, 2006), many 
shared platform initiatives fail. Lack of adequate governance that leads to 
coopetitive relationships becoming competition-dominant is to blame for 
such failures (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Saadatmand & Lindgren 
2016). Recent research has therefore called for studies of coopetition 
evolution (Bouncken et al., 2015) and platform governance (Eisenmann, 
2008; Eisenmann, 2011; Tiwana, 2015; Wareham et al., 2014). For example, 
Wareham et al. (2014) point out that a better understanding of changing 
maturity levels of governance strategies would help explicate the ways in 
which coopetition in shared platform evolves. Here Gawer’s (2014) 
integrative framework offers a theoretical foundation that allows me to 
explore how decisions about platform scope and degree of platform openness 
interact and why they affect platform innovation and competition. Indeed, 
such exploration may reveal what are the drivers and consequences of 
changes in the degree of openness of platforms as they evolve over time. 
Coopetition is considered a strategic choice to leverage interoperability and 
developing shared platforms. In the technologically-intense ecosystems data 
plays an excruciating role in leveraging competitive advantage for the firms 
and helping them make data-informed decisions. However, firms today are 
finding themselves more and more in overlapping ecosystems. Thus, to make 
their data more meaningful they cannot only rely on their own data but they 
need to obtain or collect data from their ecosystem and the ecosystems they 
find their firms at the intersection of. To do so, firms today need to engage 
and invest in collaborative efforts that focus on developing standards and 
platforms that promote interoperability. They need to engage in developing 
data structures and communication standards with other firms in different 
market position and ecosystems to be able to exchange data. The idea is 
sound: Individual firms should not engage in wheel-reinvention processes; 
they need to be able to adapt their own system modules to be able to 
communicate with their partners.  
However adopting such standards and, minimally or largely, altering the 
business processes to compromise for the standard is easier said than done. 
Heterogeneity of actors that need to design, develop and/or adopt such 
standards makes the process complicated. The dynamism of the competition 
landscape constantly affects the incentives of collaborations and vice versa. 
By the same token, technology asymmetry (Mantena & Saha, 2012) and 
power imbalance in these stormy partnerships (Markus & Loebbecke, 2013) 
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do not reduce the complexity of governing and adopting these intermediary 
systems.  
This complexity calls for a well thought out managing strategy to dampen the 
turbulence of coopetitive relationship and turn it into a fruitful collaboration, 
i.e., dynamic coopetitive relationship (Bengtsson et al., 2010). One should 
also have in mind that the paradoxical nature of coopetition makes it prone to 
tensions in different levels: inter- organizational, intra-organizational and 
inter-individual (Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014).  
To date, the research on managing coopetition is limited to the dyadic 
relationships between two firms.  In this context, three management strategies 
are identified (Fernandez et al., 2014): separating the collaborative and 
cooperative activities by making different parts of the organization 
responsible for each relationship type (e.g., cooperation in upstream activities 
such as R&D and competition in downstream activities such as sales and 
marketing); outsourcing the management of coopetitive relationships to a 
third party (e.g., a customer or trade union); and learning to integrate the 
collaborative and competitive logics of a coopetitive dyadic relationship by 
learning paradoxical management principles (e.g., making long-term 
commitments and building trust).   
How these strategies of separation and integration might be applied within a 
dynamic network of platform participants is not clear however. The 
separation crowd mainly looks at the competition as the dominant mode of 
relationship in activities closer to the customer and cooperation as the 
strategy for activities far from customers (e.g., Gnyawali & Park, 2011); 
while, the integration advocates do urge on simultaneous coexistence of both 
modes in all activities. The latter mode is been called hybrid mode by Oshri 
and Weeber (2006).  
Dealing with firms in multiple roles, if not managed, may actually increase 
uncertainty, reduce stability, and create real costs to the firms involved 
(Dowling et al., 1996). Coopetitive relationships occur when technological 
development is accelerated in collective collaborations with competitors 
(Von Hippel, 1987). Dowling et al. (1996) suggest that coopetitive 
relationship are common in industry sectors that technological change is 
rapid; although, the presence of industry standards are of huge help for 
coopetition to survive technological waves (Sahaym, Steensma, & Schilling, 
2007). It is not clear how technology capability asymmetry affect these 
relationships however.  
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Even though the definition of coopetition offered by Bengtsson et al. (2010) 
focuses on the relationships between two firms, industry dynamics 
nevertheless play an important role in creating inter-firm coopetition 
(Nalebuff et al., 1996). Specifically, how the value net of customers, 
suppliers, complementors and competitors align to add value to a focal firm 
shapes the landscape that affords and constrains the firm’s ability to form 
coopetitive relationships with other actors in the network. 
It is important to note that industry-specific, shared platform initiatives create 
the quintessential conditions for coopetitive dynamics as horizontally-related 
competitors cooperate with each other, and new coopetitive dynamics 
between vertically-related complementors are likely to emerge. Shared 
platform development projects, especially longitudinal ones (Bengtsson et al., 
2010), are thus particularly conducive for learning more about coopetitive 
dynamics and ways of managing them so that the tensions between 
cooperation and competition among platform members remain sufficiently 
imbalanced to be productive. A key risk of shared platforms is that they 
encompass heterogeneous groups of technology vendors and user 
organizations whose divergent interests threaten to fragment the ecosystem, 
thus devolving it into rival, homogeneous groups that are less likely to 
develop a new, integrative technology (Wareham et al., 2014). 
There are two schools of thoughts regarding coopetition strategy: One 
focuses on stakeholders and the other on the activities. In the actor school of 
thought coopetition is seen as a game that consists of different kinds of 
players. To gain value, every player constantly tries to balance the the costs 
by constantly adjusting the level of cooperation and competition. In this 
viewpoint, researchers try to understand the dynamic of coopetition by 
analyzing the network structure, the position of each actor in the network, 
and its effect on value proposition for the specific actor types. Here the 
coopetition is a constant repositioning of the actors there they decide how to 
change the degree of competition with stakeholders they cooperate with to 
gain extra rents. This stream of research in coopetition focuses on the 
network configuration of the value chain from different angles (Bengtsson & 
Raza-Ullah, 2016): these studies mostly focus on the network from the focal 
firm’s point of view (e.g., Ritala et al., 2014).  
The activity school of thought shifts the focus from the network 
configurations to the dynamics of the relationships between the actors. 
Studies in this category magnify the dyadic relationships of coopetitors in 
quest for analyzing and understanding the paradoxical interaction between 
firms that compete and cooperate at the same time (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 
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2016). The paradox in such interactions results in tension-filled relationships; 
especially, in cases that the only value proposition solution is “sleeping with 
the enemy”. A fine grained analysis is needed to understand the micro 
foundations of coopetition between two firms to be able to fathom the 
underlying causes and mechanisms of the tensions. To fill up this lacuna 
studying the evolution of coopetition over a longitudinal project is frequently 
encouraged (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Hoffman et al., 2014). 
The two schools of thoughts give different understanding of different levels 
of the coopetition; however, literature on coopetition lacks an integrative 
model to analyze coopetition on different levels. Such holistic view on 
coopetition is discerned as an effective analysis to prevent coopetition 
failures (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016). 
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5 PLATFORMS AS ARCHITECTURES  
Digital infrastructures of platforms are large, heterogeneous, and complex 
information systems (Hanseth & Lyytinen 2010; Hanseth & Monteiro 1997; 
Henfridsson & Bygstad 2013; Tilson et al., 2010). Recognizing the 
sociomaterial nature of infrastructures (Ciborra et al., 2000; , 1995), Star and 
Ruhleder (1996) highlight the interdependence between technology 
components and social actors and how they mutually shape and reshape the 
infrastructure. The heterogeneity of a digital infrastructure can thus be traced 
to how different actors appreciate and interpret complex technology 
components based on their perspectives and interests (Gal, Lyytinen, & Yoo, 
2008; Yoo, Lyytinen, & Yang, 2005). Digital infrastructures usually have no 
fixed boundaries and they evolve continuously and unexpectedly (Ciborra et 
al., 2000). 
The existing infrastructure, or the installed base, conditions how they evolve 
(Star & Ruhleder, 1996) and other factors than technical superiority shape the 
process through complex dependencies between technical and social 
elements (Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010; Hanseth & Monteiro, 1997). 
Accordingly, Lyytinen and Yoo (2002, p. 379) suggest digital infrastructures 
are “technically heterogeneous, geographically dispersed, and institutionally 
complex without any central coordination mechanism.” This systemic 
characteristic (Sahay, Monteiro, & Annestad, 2009) implies that a change in 
any component generates non-linear translations and challenging negotiations 
(Pipek & Wulf, 2009; Yoo et al., 2005). 
I precede the discussions on the architecture of the digital infrastructure of 
platforms by focusing on technology standards given the importance of 
standards in shared platforms. Next, I go through the literature that focuses 
on the modularity of the platform architecture design. Given the central role 
of interfaces in modular designs the discussion of standards comes up under 
modular section again. I conclude this chapter by point at connections 
between the architecture design and the strategy decisions in platform 
development. 
5.1 Technology Standards  
Standardization efforts seek to achieve conformity across players within an 
industry platform by reducing complexity, improving coordination, and 
ensuring interoperability and stability (Braa, Hanseth, Heywood, 
Mohammed, & Shaw, 2007; Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010; Hanseth, Jacucci, 
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Grisot, & Aanestad, 2006; Hepsø, Monteiro, & Rolland, 2009). Formal and 
dedicated standard development organizations (SDO) are institutional arenas 
for such consensus building and overruling of heterogeneous interests (de 
Vries, 1999). However, SDOs are not well suited for standardizing 
technological systems in complex and rapidly changing environments (Weiss 
& Cargill, 1992). In these cases, informal and ad-hoc industry consortia may 
facilitate swift exploitation of commercial possibilities through coordinated 
standardization efforts (e.g., Markus et al., 2006). In any case, standards are 
“limited set[s] of solutions to actual or potential matching problems directed 
at benefits for the party or parties involved, balancing their needs and 
intending and expecting that these solutions will be repeatedly or 
continuously used during a certain period by a substantial number of the 
parties for whom they are meant” (de Vries, 1999, p. 13). As such, they apply 
to a variety of entities, including products, processes, services, materials, 
equipment, systems, interfaces, protocols, functions, methods, and activities. 
Horizontal IT standards cover specifications of hardware, software, and data 
communication to enable technological interoperability (Chen & Forman , 
2006; Garud et al., 2002). They define how different components should 
work together to increase system utility (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993) and 
to provide incentive for developing complementary assets (Teece, 1986). 
They also allow for substitution of components as more advanced solutions 
become available, thus reducing the risk of system obsolescence. In contrast, 
vertical IT standards provide semantic representations of business processes, 
descriptions of non-functional requirements, definitions of data structures, 
specifications of document formats, and desired functionality of information 
systems for particular industries (Malhotra, Gosain, & El Sawy, 2007; 
Markus et al. 2006; Steinfield, Markus, & Wigand, 2011; Wigand, Markus, 
& Steinfield, 2005a; Wigand, Steinfield, & Markus, 2005b). 
Bala and Venkatesh (2007, p. 341) note that these conceptual standards “not 
only specify and define the structure and format of business messages 
through a common language but also orchestrate the message exchange 
choreography, i.e., the sequence of steps required to execute an atomic 
business process among trading partners”. As such, they describe procedures 
and practices that should be followed to achieve a desired outcome. Extant 
studies of vertical IT standardization address collective action dilemmas 
(Chang & Jarvenpaa, 2005; Markus et al., 2006; Reimers & Li, 2005; Zhao et 
al., 2005), standards adoption in organizations (Damsgaard & Truex, 2000; 
Bala & Venkatesh, 2007; Hanseth et al., 2006), extended enterprise 
arrangements (Beck & Weitzel, 2005/2006; Reimers & Li 2005; Zhao et al., 
2005), standards adoption in organizations (Damsgaard & Truex, 2000; Bala 
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& Venkatesh, 2007; Hanseth et al., 2006), extended enterprise arrangements 
(Beck & Weitzel, 2005; Malhotra et al., 2007), and industry effects 
(Christiaanse & Rodon, 2005; Gogan, 2005; Steinfield et al., 2005; 
Wareham, Rai, & Pickering, 2005; Wigand et al., 2005b). Most of these 
studies focus on regulatory standards that help industry players seamlessly 
integrate existing business processes mediated by IT. 
So far, we know little about vertical standards in domains where generic 
behaviors do not exist. Instead of streamlining existing business processes, 
these anticipatory vertical IT standards define new procedures and practices 
for information and infrastructure sharing (Lyytinen & Newman, 2008) to 
“guide the emergence of new technologies and consequently indicate far 
ahead in advance of the market’s ability to signal the features of products that 
users will demand” (David, 1995, p. 29). Recent IS research suggests these 
standards play an increasingly important role in relation to embedded and 
mobile technologies (Andersson, Lindgren, & Henfridsson, 2008; 
Henfridsson & Lindgren 2005; Lindgren, Andersson, & Henfridsson, 2008). 
However, anticipatory vertical IT standardization involves novel principles 
for institutionalized industry practices and new solutions that convey possible 
future worlds (Andersson et al., 2008; Lyytinen & Newman, 2008). Such 
innovation efforts are highly uncertain because they require significant 
changes in individual and collective socio-technical capabilities. They 
therefore typically unfold as non-linear, emergent, and path-dependent 
processes of design, negotiation, and sense-making on multiple levels 
(Lyytinen & Newman, 2008). 
5.2 Modular Systems 
Baldwin and Woodard (2009) define platform structure as a modular 
technological architecture that consists of stable core components 
complemented by variable periphery components. Interfaces and/or protocols 
facilitate communication between these components within a standardized 
architecture (Langlois, 2002; Langlois & Robertson, 1992). Indeed, their 
mediating role is even more important when a digital platform is open and 
generativity is of particular concern (Boudreu, 2010), because they serve as 
architectural control points between modules and layers (Baldwin, 2008; 
Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Wareham et al., 2014). As such, by helping 
platform owners to control granting access to complementors, these 
interfaces/protocols provide a key governance mechanism to reconcile 
paradoxical tensions in shared platform initiatives (Wareham et al., 2014). 
Such governance is necessary to involve actors who take different sides of a 
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digital platform, thus contributing to its overall performance and positive 
progression (Hagiu & Wright, 2015). While there have been studies of this 
type of actor involvement, however, most of them concern rather 
homogenous platform situations. This is unfortunate because shared platform 
initiatives in many industries often rely on heterogeneous milieus 
characterized by actors who simultaneously engage in cooperation and 
competition (Wareham et al., 2014).  
Tiwana et al. (2010) highlight also that a platform’s technological 
architecture comprises three components: (1) a core, (2) interfaces, and (3) 
(third-party) modules that expand the platform’s functionality. This 
definition draws on Baldwin and Clark’s (1997) general principles of 
modular systems design, which advocate that systems have modules whose 
design parameters are hidden (i.e., encapsulated core modules) and visible 
design rules that facilitate inter-module interaction (i.e., specified interfaces). 
According to Baldwin and Woodard (2009), the core is the hidden layer of 
the platform architecture, while the interface, which is typically seen as the 
standard in an integration initiative, is overt and easily discernable. The 
initiatives reported as standardization studies might thus be more accurately 
described as platform development efforts.  
The architectural core, which serves as “one component of or subsystem of 
an evolving technological system when it is strongly functionally 
interdependent with most of the other components of the system” (Gawer and 
Henderson 2007, p. 4) acts as a mediating device by transferring messages 
between disparate platform users (e.g., buyers and sellers) thereby 
coordinating their efforts (Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999). According to 
Gawer and Cusumano (2008, p. 29), the core “should perform at least one 
essential function … or solve an essential problem within an industry”. At the 
very minimum, the architectural core needs to offer brokering services such 
as user registration, message addressing and message validation in order to 
coordinate traffic between platform participants who would not otherwise 
interact. 
The core is made accessible to third-party modules through an interface, 
which comes to serve as a standard of interoperability for platform players 
(Boudreau, 2010). The specifications of these standardized interfaces govern 
component interaction (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009) by acting as a “treaty 
between two or more sub-elements” (Baldwin & Clark, 2000, p. 73).  
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implemented through a variety of technologies such as XML and APIs, 
interfaces force module developers to format their input and output 
parameters in ways that other modules can send message to and receive 
messages from them. As boundary resources that allow the platform provider 
to maintain control over the services of the core while encouraging the 
development of extensions, interfaces represent powerful mechanisms for 
platform governance (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013). The architecture’s 
interfaces and the degree of core-extension coupling thus represent sources of 
strategic tension between platform providers and extension developers 
(Tiwana, 2015) as they set the communication rules. 
An interface glues the different components of a quasi-decomposable system 
design provided different component developers are required to conform to it 
(Sanchez & Mahony, 1996). This conformability of interface is achieved if it 
is clearly specified, unambiguous, stable, well documented, and standardized 
Table 4 Criteria for conformability of the platform interface 
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(Tiwana, 2015; Sanchez & Mahony, 1996). Table 4 illustrates the definitions 
of each of the criterion of interface conformability. To aid conformability, 
platform providers may offer configuration tools, such as software 
development kits, and templates to help third-party developers make their 
technologies compliant (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Wareham et al., 
2014).  
Evolvability of a platform is dependent on the interface. It is the interface that 
allows the platform to evolve both at the core and at the periphery level. To 
do so the interface needs to be designed properly so it reflects the governance 
mechanisms of the platform owner. If conformable, the interface will reduce 
the standard tension (Wareham et al., 2014). As a result of conformability the 
changes of the core will be communicated correctly and thoroughly to the 
extension developers. This signals stability to complementors which 
encourages increasing eagerness in joining the platform ecosystem.  
The modularity of a platform’s architecture is desirable in that it increases the 
expandability and flexibility of this organizational form. Platform modularity 
is achieved when core and periphery components are highly independent, i.e., 
loosely coupled (Sanchez & Mahony, 1996). For this, modules must be 
designed to be more general, reusable and re-combinable. In contrast, 
extension modules that are highly specific to core modules, that is, have high 
synergistic specificity (Schilling, 2000), generate a tightly coupled 
architecture. While a higher degree of synergistic specificity typically 
provides a more uniform user experience (as different modules are 
specifically designed to work together), lower synergistic specificity 
encourages innovation by stimulating generativity (Schilling, 2000; Wareham 
et al., 2014). 
Lower synergistic specificity is caused by increased modularity (Schilling, 
2000). Technological changes call for increased modularity in different layers 
of service, context, network, and device of a platform (Yoo, Boland, 
Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012) to increase complementarity and intensifying 
competition necessary to get broader dynamic coopetition. This increased 
modularity invites diverse new comers to contribute to the platform 
periphery. Therefore, increased modularity is not always encouraged by 
incumbents with the dominant design in the industry. Stronger 
complementors prefer to keep their positions by enforcing locking effects. 
When a strong incumbent has difficulty covering all customer join forces 
with their complementors and offer a bundled software package (Schilling, 
2000).In an industry with high heterogeneity of customer demands increased 
modularity is necessary to serve customers. Therefore customer demand is a 
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necessary trigger for breaking the inertia and adopting a modular system 
(Markus et al., 2006). 
In an industry with many proprietary solutions, customers need interfaces 
that glue these software packages together. For example in the case of MSI, 
an order handling system and an environmental report generator needed to be 
able to communicate with each other to fulfill the haulers’ needs. This need 
produces niche actors offering interoperability solutions. In face of 
technological change and transitioning to increased modularity standard 
interfaces are designed. Increased modularity, thus, will threaten these niche 
actors’ business models as well. 
Indeed, shifting coopetitive relationships between diverse actors affect the 
technology architecture of the platform and vice versa. There is therefore a 
need for studies that carefully scrutinize such intricate socio-technical 
dynamics with the ambition to contribute to the understanding on the ways in 
which platform competition and platform innovation interact over time. A 
useful theoretical lens to study platforms is Gawer’s (2014) integrative 
framework in that it puts the actors of a platform initiative center stage. More 
specifically, it conceptualizes platforms as evolving organizations or meta-
organization that is characterized by (1) a network of actors that innovate in 
the generation of value and compete on the for its appropriation of value 
(Eisenmann et al., 2011; Tiwana, 2015), and (2) a technological architecture 
composed of a modular core, standardized interfaces, and complementary 
extensions (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Le Masson et al., 2011; Tiwana et 
al., 2010). 
Competition during platform innovation processes emerges usually through 
technology architecture shifts (Gawer, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014; 
Saadatmand & Lindgren, 2016). At the same time, cooperation between 
stakeholders of different structural types, typically having diverging interests, 
is key to leveraging platform performance (Eaton, Elaluf-Calderwood, 
Sorensen, & Yoo, 2015; Wareham et al., 2014).  Such cooperation is, 
however, impossible without managerial interventions (Saadatmand & 
Lindgren, 2016). This highlights the centrality of proper governance of 
technological platforms and their ecosystems. That is, the platform leader 
should seek to preserve the alignment of interests of ecosystem members to 
increase their incentives to innovate in platform enhancing ways (Gawer, 
2014; Wareham et al., 2014). Here one pressing issue concerns the 
establishment of coopetition among actors, leading to concurrent cooperation 
and competition (Hargrave & Ven de Ven, 2006; Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).  
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6 SOCIOMATERIALITY 
Gawer (2014) highlights that extant research on technological platforms tends 
to focus on either the economic or the architectural dimensions of platforms 
(exceptions include Tiwana, 2015; Eaton et al., 2015; Wareham et al., 2014). 
Such a bifurcated view of platforms makes it difficult to understand the 
interaction between the social and technological aspects of platforms as 
organizational forms. In particular, changes to the technological 
infrastructure frequently generate competitive tensions within and across 
platforms (Gawer, 2014). 
In order to integrate the social and technological aspects of platforms in my 
study, I engage in sociomaterial theorizing (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008) by 
highlighting not only that technology has agency and that it is thus capable of 
generating shifts in the coopetitive dynamics of a platform, but that the social 
and the material (i.e., hardware and software) are deeply interwoven in the 
platform’s evolution. I therefore adopt the theory of imbrication (Leonardi, 
2011), which offers a conceptualization of how the social and the material 
become interlocked over time. Below I explain the background and 
motivation to choosing imbrication theory for my analysis. 
6.1 Conceptual Foundation 
Sociomateriality (without any intervening hyphen) is a concept not specific 
to IS. It has been discussed in diverse fields, e.g., sociology of science and 
technology, theoretical physics, and feminist studies. The concept implies 
that material aspects and social aspects do not have meanings in isolation 
(Barad, 2003; Barad, 2007; Cecez-Kecmanovic, Galliers, Henfridsson, 
Newell, & Vidgen, 2014).  Sociomateriality consists of the words socio- and 
material: Latour (2005) states that the word sociality is derived from the 
Latin word “sequor” which means to follow and this is related to the word 
socialis with the meaning companion. The social word in sociomateriality 
refers to the relations between people and things and institutional structures 
and norms that shape these relations.  
The word material refers to whatever that constitutes the matter (Barad, 
2003). There have been however debates on what “material” really is in the 
context of technology organizational studies. These discussions stems from 
the fact that when it comes to the physical technology it is not difficult to 
point out to the “material” part of it; when we talk about for example a 
wooden table we can easily state that it is made of wood as the material but 
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when we speak of a digital technology like a SQL database it is not so 
straight forward what the material is, following the same logic. In 
organizational studies, Orlikowski (2007) believes material is:   
“…entailed in every aspect of organizing, from the visible 
forms – such as bodies, clothes, rooms, desks, chairs, tables, 
buildings, vehicles, phones, computers, books, documents, 
pens, and utensils – to the less visible flows – such as data and 
voice networks, water and sewage infrastructures, electricity, 
and air system.” (Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1436)  
Basically Orlikowski believes “material” is whatever that is left in the office 
when the human working with it has left. To make the definition of 
“material” clearer, Leonardi (2012) focuses more on this property of 
continuity. He believes that “materiality” refers to: 
  
“… those properties of the artifact that do not change from one 
moment to the next or across differences in location.” 
(Leonardi, 2012, p. 29)   
 
I believe his explanation makes the definition of “materiality” more tangible. 
Looking into examples of “material” in sociomaterial studies give a better 
illustration: Volkoff, Strong, and Elmes (2007, p. 843) in their study of 
enterprise resource planning software described this system as having 
“material aspects” like algorithms and features that only users that were 
assigned special roles were authorized to use them or Orlikowski (2000, p. 
406) in her study of groupware software presented it as a technology with 
“material properties” and she provided examples for those “properties”, e.g., 
Electronic Communication, Text Editing, etc. (p. 414).  
 
Leonardi (2010) argues that if we foreground the fact that things are “made of 
matter”, then we tend to foreground the affordances inscribed in artifacts and 
the environment. Treem and Leonardi (2012) emphasize that everything that 
is made up of material has an affordance or multiple affordances through 
which they can have multiple results; this is in line with Gibson (1979)’s 
definition of affordances for objects. They formulate materiality as a feature 
of technological artifact. This technological artifact described as software or 
hardware feature is connected to the human by the affordances (Treem & 
Leonardi, 2012).  
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6.2 Organizational Studies 
Orlikowski (2007) pointed out that in organization studies the agency of the 
technology is avoided and the focus is merely on social interaction by 
emphasizing the agency of the human factors; while, in reality the social and 
material are not separable. The social dynamism affects the design of the IT 
artifact. It is the human agency that affects the affordances and 
performativity1 of the technology while in many organization studies 
researchers tend to treat technology as a tool that does not have agency and 
has happened to the individuals which they need to use and there are different 
ways of using them. They defined ways to affect the routines of organizations 
by the effects it has on human based on how the human uses it or avoids to 
use it (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Leonardi, 2010).  
This line of thinking simply believes that technology does not have any 
agency. On the other hand, studies that take the technology into account 
analyze the social and material aspects completely separately and conclude 
on the parallel studies of technology and people. However, the social is not 
separated from the material and neither is material from the social. Therefore 
the movement of sociomateriality started to inspire researchers to study social 
and material in an intertwined manner instead of studying these phenomena 
in isolation. Here however the challenge for scholars has been to understand 
this composite reality in practice (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014). 
Studies that focus on the intertwined phenomena of material and social stem 
from the works of Barad (2003) and Pickering (1995). Barad (2003) bases her 
work on the physicist Niels Bohr’s work and presents sociomateriality as a 
novel way to look into quantum entanglement. Her work follows Pickering 
(1995)’s ideas on focusing on the fact that the phenomenon we observe is 
entangled with the apparatus for observation and with us as observers. In his 
work, Pickering (1995) explains this entanglement by arguing that quarks 
exist as a result of a series of physical experiments and the experiments are 
designed to observe the quarks. 
Different adaptations and developments of sociomaterial views do not follow 
the exact same paths, however. Suchman (2007) believes that there is no 
material or social agency but a sociomaterial agency and therefore it is the 
                                                   
1 The notion of performativity can be traced back to Austin’s speech act 
theory, where a verbal utterance has performative effects i.e., is part of doing 
an action. For example, a couple is married when the registrar utters the 
words “I hereby declare you man and wife” (Austin, 1962)  
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sociomaterial that should be chosen as unit of analysis not only the social or 
the material. Following agential realism Suchman (2007) criticized that 
human and technology are studied separately in Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI) field and instead called for analyses that look into human and 
computer as mutually constituted. Inspired by works of Barad (2003), Doyle 
(1997) and Haraway (1991), she sees the intertwining of human and material 
as sociomaterial assemblages and argues that: 
“Agencies – and associated accountabilities– reside neither in 
us nor in our artifacts but in our intra-actions.” (Suchman, 
2007, p. 285) 
 
She consequently sees human and technology inseparable. Orlikowski (2007) 
expresses the same criticism toward organizational studies and calls for 
analyzing organizations by looking at technology and human as sociomaterial 
constitutive entanglement. This entanglement is described by her as: 
  
“There is no social that is not also material, and no material 
that is not also social.” (Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1437)   
 
To explain this entanglement she uses Google’s PageRank algorithm as an 
example. She elaborates that this algorithm counts the visits to a page; this 
rank determines the place of this webpage in google result when the user is 
searching for a content related to this page. Simply the higher the rank the 
higher the place of the webpage in the search result. The place of the 
webpage in the result page is not static but changes over time based on how 
many “clicks” it gets. The algorithm also makes exceptions based on the 
regulations of the country the search is being done from, e.g., the Chinese 
google is obligated to censor political pages from the opposition (Orlikowski, 
2007). These dynamics, Orlikowski (2007) argues, make the search results 
sociomaterial: 
 
“These temporally emergent results are not dependent on 
either materiality or sociality, nor on some interaction between 
them (to the extent that these are seen as distinct domains). 
Rather the performance and results of a Google-based search 
are sociomaterial.” (Orlikowski,  2007, p. 1440) 
 
This perspective of interlocking forces helps explain that smartphones’ 
physical and functional features do not only materialize ideas of instant and 
ubiquitous communication, but also produce users who check their messages 
constantly and feel compelled to respond to them immediately, whether 
during or outside of work hours (Orlikowski, 2007). While such new 
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smartphone-enabled communication practices imply that users exercised their 
agency in appropriating the technology in this way (as opposed to resisting 
it), a sociomaterial lens nevertheless highlights that “technological actors 
constitute us even as we try to constitute them” (Introna & Hayes, 2011, p. 
110). 
Inspired by Barad (2003), Orlikowski follows the same thinking as Suchman 
(2007) and call for studies of entanglement of social and material focusing on 
bringing forth the sociomaterial nature of subjects of studies in organizational 
works. While Sassen (2002; Latham & Sassen, 2005) and Leonardi (2011) 
presents the notion of imbrication to study the overlapping nature of human 
and material agencies arguing that social and material become sociomaterial 
when they are interlocked (I will give deeper explanations of the imbrication 
in the next chapter). 
The challenge for IS scholars has always been to be able to analyze the real 
examples of practice via sociomateriality theory and understanding and 
analyzing “the recursive intertwining of humans and technology in practice” 
(Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1437). Mutch (2013) blames the agential realism view 
of sociomateriality for this shortcoming stating that removing agency from 
social and material makes it difficult to study sociomateriality in practice; 
while Leonardi (2013) believes that agential realism approach suits some 
studies, e.g., the case of TripAdvisor (Orlikowski & Scott, 2015) but it can be 
an ill fit for other studies, e.g., the case of CrashLab (Leonardi, 2011). 
Therefore, Leonardi (2013) and Jones (2014) suggest critical realism as an 
alternative choice for studies of sociomateriality. A sociomaterial framework 
based on critical realism perceives an organization structure in two realms of 
action and structure there realm of structure points to materiality and realm of 
action points to the social aspect of the organization. These two different 
realms are not separated but “imbricated” into each other. Over time these 
imbrications represent a cumulative entanglement of social and material. In 
chapter 7, I explain agential and critical realism more comprehensively. 
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7 IMBRICATION FRAMEWORK 
The sociomateriality Barad presents follows agential realism. She believes 
human and material are entangled and any distinction the researcher makes to 
them to separate them is an “agential cut” (Barad, 2003, p. 815). Following 
Barad’s line of thought agential realism sees agency in the relationship of 
human and material but because this deeply entangled relation can be too 
complicated to analyze researcher makes “agential cuts” to ease the 
observation. This solution however has not solved the problems researchers 
are faced in applying agential realism while analyzing sociomaterial 
phenomena.   
 
7.1 Agential Realism or Critical Realism 
  
Three main problems with agential realism are pointed out mainly by Mutch 
(2013) followed by Leonardi (2013):  
 
1. Lack of explanatory power that leads to more descriptive studies     
instead of deeper empirical analysis. 
2. It poses problems in analyzing real life cases because people in 
practice rarely perceive social and material as “interpenetrated 
entities” as they are presented in the agential approach (Leonardi, 
2013, p. 66).  
3. Agential approach does not consider time which poses problems in 
analyzing change and evolutions in organizational structures. This 
can be because the root of sociomateriality comes from Barad’s work 
on physics; in physics applying any process theory might not be 
necessary or of interest while time and analyzing changes with a 
process theory is in the core of organizational studies. 
 
To solve these problems that stem from the agential realism view, critical 
realism is prescribed (Mutch, 2013; Leonardi, 2013). Critical realism, in 
contrast with the agential view, believes that social and material are not 
intertwined but are separated and get entangled in relationship with each 
other affected by human activity. Consequently, critical realism does not take 
away the agency from the human and/or the technology. This negates the 
belief agential realism pursues that social and material are interpenetrated 
independently from human activity over time. Agential realism makes no 
distinction between social and material while critical realism approach to 
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sociomateriality treats materiality as an independent entity (Mutch, 2013). 
Leonardi (2012) defines material and social in critical realism approach as:  
 
“…whereas materiality might be a property of a technology, 
sociomateriality represents that enactment of a particular set of 
activities that meld materiality with institutions, norms, 
discourses, and all other phenomena we typically define as 
‘social’.” (Leonardi, 2012, p. 34) 
 
With regard to analyzing the social and material relationship Leonardi (2013) 
explains: 
 
“Social and material agencies are distinct from one another, 
and it is only once they become imbricated in particular ways 
that they can then reconfigure technology's materiality and 
organizations' communication patterns” (p. 70). 
 
Leonardi believes that critical realism gives the researcher tools to analyze 
the sociomateriality by giving her the temporality and the possibility to be 
able to look into the development of the imbrication over time; this is how 
she can see the effect of different agents of material and social through the 
imbrication to be able to draw conclusions. The agential realism sees 
sociomateriality only in the realm of action which makes it difficult to 
analyze the organizing when looking into the empirical from this point of 
view (Leonardi, 2013/2012). To solve this problem critical realism looks into 
both action and structure realms: It puts materiality into the structure realm 
and social in the action realm and the communication between two is seen as 
what Leonardi calls imbrication, or in other words: 
 
“… actions' slow but cumulative entanglement with structure 
(and vice-versa).” (Leonardi, 2013, p. 72) 
 
Researchers find sociomateriality a rather philosophical approach (Leonardi, 
2013) and still struggle to apply the method to analyze the sociomaterial 
nature of IS organizations (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014). One of the 
reasons is that there are not so many empirical accounts on analyzing 
organizations by focusing on the sociomaterial aspects of the IT and 
decisions in the organization. Leonardi (2011) however offers a detailed 
analysis of the case of CrashLab there a computer simulation technology for 
automotive design was used to show the recursive intertwining of technology 
and people in practice in form of imbrications. His imbrication framework 
suggests that when technology helps human to gain her vision technology 
manages by its affordances to change human’s routines; on the contrary, 
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when technology does not help human to get to her vision this constraint 
cause human to change the technology instead. 
 
In his analysis of the case of CrashLab, Leonardi (2011) follows a critical 
realism approach and gives agency to both human and material in compare to 
agential realism that sees the agency merely in the relationship of the two. He 
believes that critical realism and focusing on affordances and constraints of 
the technology help him to analyze the two competing forces of 
sociomateriality separately and bring that analysis to studying their 
relationship to be able to understand the evolution trajectory of CrashLab.  
 
In analyzing MSI one of the most pressing issue is time because the evolution 
and changes over time plays a crucial role in how the coopetition and 
technological shifts unfolded therefore a methodology with temporal aspect 
was necessary. Further, during the analysis of actors and technology 
comprising the platform it was key to be able to analyze the human reactions 
to technological shifts and how technology contributed to moving the 
initiative toward the collective consensus and diffusion. In the MSI case both 
actors and the technology had agencies before entanglement was formed. 
Therefore I find critical realism and imbrication account in particular suitable 
for my study. 
 
7.2 The Imbrication Framework 
The word imbrication has its root in the structure of imbrex and tegula 
(Figure 4).  
“Each tegula (a) overlaps the one below it and its raised lateral 
borders tapering in to nestle between its lower tile's upper border. 
Each curved imbrex (b) covers the side ridges of the joints formed 
between adjacent tegulae. Some imbrices are not shown in order to 
reveal the details of the tegular joints.”("Imbrex and tegula," 2017) 
Imbrication is the technique of interlocking the imbrex and the tegula to 
make tenacious and robust roof coverings in ancient Greek and Roman 
architecture (Leonardi, 2011).   
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Inspired by Imbrex and tegula shapes, Leonardi (2011) represents the social 
or organizational routines as the imbrex and the technology as the tegula in 
each imbrication pattern. He explains the interlocking pattern by vividly 
illustrating how the social (i.e., organizational routines) changes the 
technological settings and how the new affordances of the “changed” 
technology recalibrate the organizational routines.  
In imbrication social and material are encouraged to get examined separately 
but related to each other via social actions. Technology, in imbrication form 
of sociomateriality, is seen as the result of “social, economic, political, and 
cultural dynamics” (Latham & Sassen, 2005, p. 14) which Leonardi (2011) 
calls human agency. Leonardi (2013, p. 72) presents imbrication as two 
different realms of “action” and “structure” that are related to each other in an 
imbricated manner resulting in “cumulative entanglement”.  
Giddens (1984) defines agency as the “capacity for action”. Human uses its 
agency toward realizing her goals and intentions through cognitive processes. 
Human uses its goals as the motivation and manipulates its environment to 
achieve them. She monitors the environment frequently to determine if her 
goals are met (Leonardi, 2011). While one of these tools for the human to 
alter her environment is the technology, technology has agency that “cannot 
be reduced to human intentionality” (Leonardi, 2011, p. 150). In imbrication 
theory, just like actor-network theory (Latour, 2005), the technology agency 
is treated equivalent to human agency. In the same vein, Taylor, Groleau, 
Heaton, and Van Every (2001, p. 71) believe that the agency of the material 
                                                     Figure 4 Imbrication of Imbrex and Tegula 
                               ([Untitled illustration of imbrex and tegula ]. Retrieved August 2, 2017 
                                         from http://sidingcontractors.us/roofing-materials/imbrex-tegula/) 
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should not be seen as a “complement” to the main agency, i.e., the human 
agency but it has to be given its own.   
One of the main believes in imbrication is that the social precede the material 
by explaining technology as “outcome of the social” (Latham & Sassen, 
2005, p. 14) and that human agency shapes and chooses the technology based 
on her need (Leonardi, 2011). It, however, does not mean that this school of 
thought treats technology as passive and manipulated by the social. 
Imbrication treats technology as a strong agency which allows the social to 
achieve its vision and shapes the empirical phenomena through getting 
interlocked in sequences of interaction with the social. Latham and Sassen 
(2005) emphasize developing analytical tools that pay more attention to the 
technology is the way to understand complexity of sociomaterial phenomena. 
Imbrication theory maintains that when human and technological agencies 
are put together into an overlapping arrangement (i.e., imbricated), they 
create technologies and routines. Routines (i.e., “sequential patterns of social 
action” (Leonardi, 2011, p. 148)), and technologies, in turn, imbricate to form 
an infrastructure that will determine whether the technology is seen as either 
affording or constraining the ability of users to exercise their agency. For 
example, in light of established norms of consultative selling, sales associates 
in an insurance marketplace found it difficult to pursue their goals of 
maintaining embedded relationship with their customers when self-service 
technology was implemented (Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004). Thus, in the 
context of the sociomaterial infrastructure of consultative selling, self-service 
technology constrained human agency (i.e., the sales associates’ goals). 
Leonardi (2011) in his analysis of CrashLab gives a thorough imbrication 
analysis of how the interlocked sequences between the organizational 
dynamics and technological adjustments shaped CrashLab over the years.  
His work so far is the only imbrication work with tangible detailed analysis 
of the empirical relying on imbrication thinking. In his work he shapes the 
analysis in sequences of “Human to Material” and “Material to Human” 
representing social that changes the material and vice-a-versa.  
An imbrication perspective seems well-suited to analyzing the longitudinal 
nature of the empirical setting I explore in my dissertation. The theory of 
imbrication maintains that human agency (i.e., the ability to act with 
intentionality, motivation and rationality) and technological agency (i.e., “the 
capacity for nonhuman entities to act on their own, apart from human 
intervention” (Leonardi, 2011, p. 148)) form the building blocks of practice.  
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Human agency, following her incentives, uses the affordances technology 
offers to achieve her goal. This does not mean that the technology has one 
specific affordance or set of affordances designed specifically to gain a 
predefined goal but it projects different set of affordances for different 
contexts. A very simple example to further elaborate can be Microsoft Word; 
this technology can be used to write an essay, present the items of a 
warehouse in a table, or draw illustrative diagrams. It is the human that 
chooses the affordance that leads her to her goal. This example shows that the 
affordance of the technology can change across contexts while the materiality 
is untouched.  
In the imbrication framework when an existing material agency affects the 
human by shaping new routines, it is shown as material to human or  
materialhuman. This specific affordance gives human a new agency. The 
action of the human choosing a specific affordance in the technology is 
defined as human to material or humanmaterial. By choosing that specific 
affordance, human gives material a new agency. The new material agency 
changes the human routine and social interactions. What is important to take 
into consideration is that an imbrication is not the result of its current changes 
either human to material or material to human but it is the result of the 
history of imbrications that has occurred prior its existence (Leonardi, 2011). 
In addition to identifying the conditions under which technologies become 
either affordances or constraints, the theory of imbrication maintains that 
configuration of human and material agency at any given point in time, will 
determine whether people will change the technology or change their 
routines. Specifically, when the technology is regarded as an affordance, that 
is, an action possibility for a specific user in a specific context (Gibson, 
1979), a sequence of imbrications that changes what people do is set in 
motion. In contrast, when the technology is perceived to be a constraint, a 
sequence of imbrications that changes the technology is generated. 
This pattern of how technology and human agency interact must, however, be 
understood in light of imbrication theory’ key assumption that technology - 
not just routines - are flexible. This flexibility is not just a matter of the 
technology’s materiality (e.g., the modularity of its architecture), but also an 
organizational “context where people can have it modified to fit their needs 
in relatively short order” (Leonardi, 2011, p. 149). The MSI case study of a 
shared industry platform’s development thus meets the theory’s boundary 
conditions. 
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8 RESEARCH SETTING 
My research is based on a twelve-year (2002-2013) shared platform initiative 
within the Swedish road haulage industry that led to a new technology 
standard for integration of stationary enterprise systems with emerging 
embedded and mobile technologies. From the outset, the project was 
designed as action research based on established traditions within the IS 
discipline (Baskerville & Myers, 2004; Lindgren, Henfridsson, & Schultze, 
2004; Mathiassen, 2002; McKay & Marshall, 2001; Susman & Evered, 
1978).  
In what follows, I introduce the problem setting in which the project unfolded 
by offering an explanation of the IT support for Swedish Haulers, IT 
implementation problems for them, The vision of a shared platform, MSI 
initiative and the Development process. This background of the case serves to 
illustrate Swedish road haulage industry before and during the shared 
platform initiative in general, and the importance of initiating a shared 
platform in particular. It also gives an overview of the MSI initiative and the 
sequence of events. The four upcoming sections are designed to prepare the 
reader for the detailed analysis that I will present in chapter 10. 
In the late 1990s, the Swedish road haulage industry consisted mainly of 
small local firms with deep-rooted traditions (Andersson & Lindgren, 2005). 
Statistics from the Swedish Road Haulage Association (hereafter SRHA) 
suggested that up to 90 percent of its members operated five or fewer 
vehicles. The European Union’s open market policy had just allowed foreign 
road haulers to increase their market share in Sweden. As a result, increased 
competition from Danish, German, and Polish firms lowered profit margins 
and large global firms like Danzas and Schenker strengthened their market 
positions. 
8.1 IT Support for Road Haulers 
Stationary planning systems and mobile phones had for long been used to 
manage road transport. However, Swedish road haulage firms believed 
embedded and mobile technologies could help them coordinate better to cope 
with the increasing competitive pressures. Fueled by trade press articles and 
white papers, these companies anticipated increased digitalization would 
improve mobile resource evaluation, facilitate seamless transport data 
management, and rationalize dispatcher-driver communication. IT vendors 
and truck manufacturers also promoted increased digitalization as the next 
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step towards sustainable business processes in haulage firms. Referring to 
their R&D investments, they predicted most firms would soon rely on these 
new digital opportunities.  
However, there were few available accounts of how assemblages of 
embedded, mobile, and stationary technologies had led to productivity gains 
or improved sustainability. In fact, at industry conferences and seminars, the 
SRHA complained about low penetration of advanced distributed technology 
among its members. Primary interviews with road haulers also clearly 
indicated that infrastructure initiatives often faced complex challenges 
because of the heterogeneous and distributed nature of technologies, 
organizations, and practices. Apparently, it was hard to transform these socio-
technical assemblages, and many firms felt they wasted their money. As a 
result, there was decreasing willingness to make proactive IT investments 
amongst small road haulage firms.  
Hence, road haulers continued to rely on fragmented infrastructures that 
prevented productive combination of embedded, mobile, and stationary 
systems. This ‘mobile-stationary divide’ was reinforced by several players: 1) 
truck manufacturers offered embedded solutions dedicated to their brand; 2) 
vendors offered stationary solutions based on proprietary interfaces and 
standards; 3) contractors of haulers provided mobile and stationary solutions 
dedicated to their specific information management needs, and 4) The SRHA 
propagated a lightweight solution without integration capability to other 
available IT systems. If small haulers wanted to move from heterogeneous 
portfolios of IT solutions to integrated digital infrastructures they had to deal 
with different interfaces and standards and negotiate with many different 
technology users and providers. That meant they needed to engage in many 
data interchange activities manually to get the systems to work. Moreover, 
they needed to understand how strategic decisions and contextual factors 
would shape the complicated process of aligning interests to achieve a 
dominant technological design. It all had contributed to the extremely slow 
IT adoption among haulers. 
Road haulage firms typically consist of mobile field operations and stationary 
headquarters. Digital infrastructures for such organizations therefore contain 
embedded, mobile as well as stationary computing resources (Andersson & 
Lindgren, 2005; Lindgren et al., 2008). The corresponding technological 
realms are commercial telematics, nomadic devices, and administrative 
enterprise planning. Embedded systems serve different purposes for various 
users. Services that utilize vehicle data to display feedback metrics on the 
performance of the vehicle for the driver may, for example, raise awareness 
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of fuel consumption. Management responsible for fleet performance can use 
the recorded digital traces of fieldwork to minimize the cost of a transport 
assignment in terms of time and fuel expenditure. Stationary systems help 
dispatchers remotely coordinate assignments via displaying the positions of 
each truck and by communicating associated information to drivers via 
integrated mobile systems. Embedded GPS-based positioning systems enable 
dispatching and in-vehicle navigation services. Table 5 presents a summary 
of classes of IT support in road haulage firms. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2002, Vehco (a start-up in embedded technology) approached Viktoria 
Institute to discuss research collaboration aimed at digital infrastructure 
innovation within the Swedish road haulage industry. Vehco competed with 
truck manufacturers’ telematics services and wanted to refine its core 
competence, namely leveraging technology embedded directly into vehicles 
to support management of small road haulage firms.  
Table 5 Classes of IT support in road haulage firms 
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By teaming up with Viktoria Institute’s Telematics Group and its expertise in 
digitalization of transport practices, Vehco hoped to generate breakthroughs 
on how to develop digital infrastructures for small road haulers by integrating 
embedded technology with mobile and stationary technologies. As a result, 
Vehco and the Telematics Group initiated the MSI action research project. 
The project started with interventions into selecting road haulage firms and 
continued to enroll multiple stakeholders to increase the efficiency and 
sustainability of road hauling operations through standardized usage of IT. 
These actions sought to reveal the involved politics and to maximize the 
innovation potential by scrutinizing how actors had generated and shared 
knowledge to develop digital infrastructures in the past. In the next section, I 
explain how a typical scenario in a hauler’s work looked like in the beginning 
of the MSI project. 
8.2 Implementation Problems 
In a typical scenario a hauler that owned a number of trucks (varied based on 
the size of the hauler) would be assigned a transport job. If a hauler had 
enough resources it would initiate the transporting process by assigning the 
task to the right truck/driver. This assessment and task dedication happened 
largely manually at the time (late 90s and beginning of 2000s). A person 
called the dispatcher would assess the suitability of a truck for the task based 
on a manual calculation she would do and she would delegate the job to the 
driver mostly by phone or a walkie-talkie.  
The high point of technology use in such process was the use of Excel at the 
time. If the hauler realized it did not have the resources to cover the task; in 
some cases it would outsource to a similar kind of hauler that did similar kind 
of goods transport. Although such haulers would be direct competitors they 
would do each other such “favors” in order to avoid losing their customers. 
This pairing could happen simply out of acquaintance of different haulers or 
a hauler would get such available hauler’s information from SHA(Swedish 
Hauler Association). 
Some haulers, however, were not allowed to do such exchanges with any 
hauler available. These haulers were part of a Logistic Broker (LB), e.g., 
DHL and were bound to work only with haulers that were members of the 
same LB. These haulers could not use the available software packages on the 
market but they had to rely on their internally developed software especially 
tailored for the LB. Figure 5 illustrates the haulers relationship and their use 
of software packages. 
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The entire transport process from door to door engaged different digital 
infrastructures that more often than not were disintegrated burdening the 
haulers’ office staff with data converting between different software, making 
the process error-prone at best. Integration projects had started between some 
companies. Although in the beginning of the MSI, integration projects made 
it easier for IT vendors to communicate, but they were isolated leaving 
haulers with different software packages that covered different part of the 
transport work process. In the next section, I continue the explanation of the 
initiative by Vehco and Viktoria. I give an overview of the MSI vision and 
industry actors’ motivations.  
Figure 5 Systems integration in haulers 
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8.3 Shared Platform Vision 
Vehco’s effort to establish collaboration with the Telematics Group was well 
aligned with Viktoria Institute’s agenda to pursue design-oriented applied 
research within the transport industry. As a spin-off from Chalmers 
University of Technology, Vehco was still seeking funding for R&D 
activities and its shared platform strategy seemed feasible and attractive for 
the industry. A series of meetings about possible venues of joint interest 
resulted in a partnership to kick-start R&D efforts into digitalization of 
Swedish road transport.  
Although Vehco had a number of customers, the MSI project needed to 
engage a broader group of road haulers. The SRHA was a natural partner and 
contacts to them provided a deeper understanding of the actual state of IT use 
within the industry. Road haulers could rarely afford to develop custom built 
systems, so they typically adopted various off-the-shelf solutions. This was 
problematic especially for small firms. While these solutions did not cover 
the wide variety of business activities in road haulage, the consequential 
heterogeneity in technologies and vendors required IT competencies most 
firms did not have. As a result, the MSI project decided to focus on helping 
small road haulage firms address their socio-technical struggles.  
Initially, the researchers analyzed available IT solutions and core vendor 
competencies, which turned out to be more complicated than anticipated. In 
fact, stationary technology vendors tried to include mobile resources (drivers 
and vehicles) and embedded technology vendors (including truck 
manufacturers) increasingly embraced traditional stationary domains. Based 
on visit to the annual trade fair and numerous meetings with technology 
vendors and truck manufacturers, the researchers distinguished between three 
types of systems: embedded, mobile, and stationary. Interestingly, the 
vendors were technology-focused and promoted their solutions relative to 
competitors rather than in terms of hauler requirements and added value. It 
was therefore difficult for small haulers to identify gaps and overlaps 
between different solutions, effectively hampering attempts to combine 
solutions.  
The next critical step was to analyze the status quo in road haulage firms. 
Supported by the SRHA and Vehco, the researchers interviewed managers 
from 20 road haulers about their IT experiences. The problem of lock-in 
effects kept surfacing in these conversations. On one hand, fleets with 
vehicles from multiple manufacturers were common and integrating different 
embedded and mobile components with the stationary systems was 
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prohibitively expensive for small firms. On the other hand, although vendors 
were confined within their own technological paradigm and unable to 
comprehend wider design challenges, they actively promoted their solutions 
outside their core competence to increase market shares. This led to a 
persistent problem within the Swedish road haulage industry with failed IT 
implementation projects as haulers attempted to implement services offered 
by embedded, mobile, and stationary technology vendors in parallel.  
Based on this initial understanding of the socio-technical factors that 
contributed to the mobile-stationary divide in road haulage firms, the MSI 
project concluded that IT vendors and haulage firms should meet to discuss 
industry concerns. This resulted in two seminars organized by the SRHA, 
Vehco, and the Viktoria Institute during fall 2002 to discuss insights from the 
researchers’ interactions with IT vendors and road haulage firms. The 
seminars were fairly well attended but did not stimulate collaboration 
initiatives and innovation. 
In parallel, the researchers (including MSc students) engaged in small-scale 
shared platform service prototyping activities with Vehco. Ultimately, they 
sought to inform an agenda for integrating embedded, mobile, and stationary 
systems in the road transport industry. Drawing on previous studies, they 
developed a number of prototypes, which was designed to couple on-line 
readouts on fuel consumption embedded within vehicles with stationary 
transport data. Despite its somewhat limited design, the prototype rendered 
much interest when presented at industry conferences and seminars. 
However, some technology vendors criticized that the design of the service 
was restricted to a single system vendor (and a particular road haulage firm), 
but still they expressed willingness to participate in a continued R&D effort. 
Hence, the local interventions at Vehco created opportunities to pursue a 
larger, more sustainable shared platform initiative. A key goal would, on one 
hand, be to help vendors abandon prevailing technology-driven approaches in 
favor of ones oriented towards meeting hauler needs and expectations. On the 
other hand, it was important to strengthen the position of small road haulage 
firms by helping them implement assemblages of embedded, mobile, and 
stationary technologies in more flexible ways. The initiative therefore had to 
accommodate the heterogeneous interests of technology vendors and road 
haulers alike. 
The fragmentation of IT support for road haulage firms was a result of 
institutionalized vendor behavior. Most of them were reluctant to share and 
rethink their business strategy and that undermined their ability to participate 
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in some form of collective action. In that situation, it was virtually impossible 
to initiate cooperation between competing vendors that promoted different 
and in many respects incompatible IT solutions. A critical next step was 
therefore to expand the platform initiative to start changing the relationships 
and structures that kept different technology vendors apart. Over a period of 
six months, the MSI project focused on this challenge through explorations 
with IT vendors, road haulage firms, and truck manufacturers. finally, an 
ecosystem of dominating industry players was in place. Besides Viktoria 
Institute and Vehco, the founding members were Hogia, NL Partner (was 
acquired by Locus Scandinavia in late 2005), Scania, and Volvo. All actors 
believed the arrangement was necessary to establish the inter-organizational 
processes required for continued industry digitalization. The platform 
initiative was formalized in a researcher-client agreement to secure 
commitment and specify roles and responsibilities.  
A government agency (VINNOVA) provided funding for the collaboration 
through the project “Value-Creating IT for Road-Haulage Firms” As a first 
step, the partners decided to focus on reuse and reconfigure architectural 
knowledge from already established projects that aimed at integrating 
embedded, mobile, and stationary technologies into coherent digital 
infrastructures. The researchers identified seven ongoing integration projects, 
and the other platform members provided access to their most advanced cases 
of heterogeneous technology integration, in effect transcending the long-
standing tradition of vendors black boxing their integration procedures. The 
considered projects were generally quite modest in terms of technological 
innovation, and it became clear that simply reusing and reconfiguring 
architectural knowledge from different vendors would have a limited effect. 
In fact, all projects had failed to successfully integrate the involved 
heterogeneous technologies because of lack of knowledge sharing suggesting 
that no single vendor had the capacity to develop a comprehensive digital 
infrastructure of embedded, mobile, and stationary systems. Although some 
platform members still preferred to work on their own, most of them realized 
their inability to handle technologies outside their core competency, 
especially in situations involving technology embedded into vehicles. Hence, 
the discussion of lessons across integration projects had started to move 
competing vendors towards closer cooperation. 
The researchers’ continued analyses of the integration projects showed how 
proprietary interfaces both supported and inhibited cooperation amongst 
vendors and haulage firms. The fact that the IT vendors had created the 
interfaces suggested they realized a need to develop digital infrastructures 
that integrated components from diverging sources. Although the vendors 
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would not be able to control such development to strengthen their 
competitive positions, the interfaces expressed a readiness to engage in 
efforts to support systems integration. But, the different proprietary interfaces 
also adversely affected cooperation opportunities. These interfaces were 
published by stationary vendors to allow their embedded and mobile 
counterparts to connect to their solutions. So, embedded and mobile vendors 
had to comply with the interfaces if they wanted to help haulers establish 
integrated digital solutions. Reflecting the technological frames and market 
strategies of the vendors of stationary technology, the interfaces offered 
elaborate support for the stationary systems. In contrast, they provided 
virtually no support for mobile and, particularly, embedded technology and 
they were therefore at the heart of the mobile-stationary divide that 
effectively separated relevant actors. Further explorations suggested that 
vendors of embedded technology also adopted protective strategies to 
maintain their competitive positions. Several road haulage firms were not 
able to evaluate truck performance via their PC-based fleet management 
systems because inclusion of vehicle sensor data, such as fuel consumption, 
was hindered by proprietary interfaces. As a result, it was difficult to promote 
sustainable transport solutions. Insight into these problems with proprietary 
interfaces further stimulated the members of the platform initiative to create 
better knowledge sharing opportunities amongst vendors and road haulers.  
In addition, the researchers also sought to maintain the commitment from the 
SRHA and to enroll select individuals with requisite architectural knowledge 
about the digital infrastructure challenge. The researchers therefore attended 
a number of meetings with the SRHA IT forum to discuss socio-technical 
issues related to technology integration. Although the expert groups within 
SRHA appreciated the insights from the researchers, the interactions did not 
lead to intensified support from the SRHA. However, the researchers still 
believed a skillful and experienced digital infrastructure person without any 
ongoing commitments to the involved partners could potentially play a vital 
mediating role. They had for a while attempted to identify such a person, 
when a former telematics manager at Scania unexpectedly contacted them. 
He was at the time running his own business, ASN IT & Management, 
offering education about transport process innovation through standardized 
systems integration to individual road haulage firms and regional road 
haulage associations. Given his interest and background, he was invited to 
join the shared platform initiative to guide the platform group toward a 
proper architecture choice. 
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8.4 MSI Initiative 
Historically, the lack of standardized interfaces for integration of embedded, 
mobile, and stationary IT systems has undermined Swedish road haulage 
firms’ attempts to innovate digital infrastructures (Andersson & Lindgren, 
2005; Lindgren et al., 2008). While lock-in effects of proprietary interfaces 
created gaps between social and technical elements within firms, they also 
hindered inter-organizational partnership arrangements. As a result, it was 
difficult to reduce CO2 emissions by improving fleet utilization and 
implementing flexible logistics operations.  
To break with the dominating proprietary agenda, the rationale behind the 
reported shared platform initiative was that assemblages of embedded, 
mobile, and stationary technologies (paired with behavioral improvement) 
have the potential to curb some of the environmental impacts of road 
transports (Andersson et al., 2008) and facilitates digitalization of road 
haulers’ workflows. Consisting of highly heterogeneous social and technical 
components with complex dependencies, however, such assemblages must be 
managed through well-defined standardized interfaces between constituent 
layers (Tilson et al., 2010). Accordingly, in the MSI project the developed 
interface can be classified as a vertical technology standard to allow transport 
processes within and across individual road haulage firms to achieve desired 
outcomes. These standards prescribe data structures and definitions, 
document formats, and business processes for particular industries (Malhotra 
et al., 2007; Wigand et al., 2005ab). Bala and Venkatesh (2007, p. 341) note 
that such standards “not only specify and define the structure and format of 
business messages through a common language but also orchestrate the 
message exchange choreography, i.e., sequence of steps required to execute 
an atomic business process among trading partners”. 
The MSI project  was initially led by the Viktoria Institute, a research-
focused consulting organization whose customers included mostly 
transportation companies and automobile manufacturers. The transport 
industry network on whose collaboration the Viktoria Institute relied, 
consisted of nineteen technology vendors (Addmobile, Barkfors, Consafe 
Logistics, Cybercom Group, Gatespace Telematics (Later changed to 
Makewave), DPS, Halda, Hogia, IBS, Prolog, NL Partner (Later changed to 
Locus Scandinavia), MobiOne, Mobistics, Pocket Mobile, Systeam, Netlink, 
Transics, Transware, and Vehco), two truck manufacturers (Scania and 
Volvo Trucks), a number of road haulage firms, and TRB, a consulting 
organization owned by fifteen Swedish transport organizations (see table 6 
for a classification of the actors in the MSI project). 
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Table 6 Stakeholders in the shared platform initiative 
Actor category Actor names 
Embedded 
technology 
providers 
Truck 
manufacturers 
Scania, Volvo Trucks 
Vehicle 
Telematics 
Drivec, Gatespace Telematics, 
Transics/BNT, Vehco 
Mobile technologies providers Barkfors, Consafe Logistics, 
CyberCom, DPS,  Halda, 
MobiOne, Mobistics, Pocket 
Mobile, Systeam 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
system providers 
Hogia, IBS, NL Partner (later 
Locus Scandinavia), Prolog, 
Transware, NetLink  
 
The industry actors brought considerable experience with embedded, mobile, 
and stationary technology to the project. The action researchers brought 
previous experience with design-oriented action research (Lindgren et al., 
2004) and embedded and mobile computing (Henfridsson & Lindgren, 2005).  
Following Avison et al.’s (2001) classification of authority and control, the 
project structure was staged with shifting power dominance between the 
participants. Although the researchers initiated the project, the authority was 
assigned to a team consisting of practitioners and researchers once the Client-
Researcher Agreement (Davison, Martinsons, & Kock, 2004) was signed. 
The project was coordinated by different researchers, but as the project 
progressed control was increasingly dominated by industry interests. While 
the project spanned over almost twelve years (2002-2013), I have included its 
aftermath by extending the study period to the summer of 2016. 
The potential reduction in fuel consumption was the main environmental 
benefit directly associated with the MSI shared platform. It was recognized 
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that fuel consumption and associated CO2 emissions can be reduced in three 
distinct ways (Andersson and Lindgren 2005): 1) enhanced driving behavior 
(e.g., minimized idling time); 2) optimized route guidance; and 3) improved 
cargo planning (e.g., fully loaded trucks). These measures could enable road 
haulage firms manage their truck fleets to become more environmentally 
friendly. By the same token, these actions promised to generate new digital 
options and associated business opportunities for technology vendors as the 
innovation orientation of the action research sought to anticipate tomorrow’s 
needs to help create a technologically superior industry standard (Andersson 
et al., 2008). Accordingly, the developed MSI standard as part of the MSI 
shared platform (Table 7) can be classified as a vertical IT standard to allow 
transport processes within and across individual road haulage firms to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
The insights gained from analyzing ongoing attempts to integrate technology 
in road haulage firms provided a valuable foundation for future actions. 
Specifically, it had created an organizing vision that cooperation across 
competing vendors and road haulers was needed to overcome technological 
lock-in and counterproductive business strategies. Specifically, it was 
assumed that increased networking and sharing based on public debates 
would make the haulers a more potent group of actors. At this point, the 
action researchers believed the platform initiative could stimulate a “best of 
breed” technology market and they therefore started to enroll additional 
vendors into the network. The goal was to expand the ecosystem so that it 
represented the main part of IT vendors operating in the Swedish road 
haulage industry at the time.  
In 2004, a telematics manager from Volvo presented his vision for the future 
of the road haulage industry in which he asserted that the emerging 
digitalization had reached a point of no return. Well aware of Volvo’s own 
problems to build business around embedded technology in its vehicles, he 
predicted that the already limited IT investments made by road haulers could 
be reduced even more. What was required was a market place for service 
innovation that would operate based on modularized digital infrastructures 
enabled by standardized interfaces. As he was impressed with how the 
platform initiative had developed its activities and participation, he suggested 
the timing was right to pursue an effort to create the foundation for such a 
market place. All involved parties appreciated Volvo’s call for standard 
development and it was particularly important that some of the stationary 
technology vendors agreed a standardized industry interface could help 
resolve the tensions surrounding integration of embedded, mobile, and 
stationary systems.  
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The platform initiative sought more support from the SRHA, but it turned the 
invitation down due to competence and resource shortages. The leadership 
triggered a renewed search for key individuals that could help move the 
standardization efforts forward. This led to explorations between the action 
researchers and several individuals with established industry relationships 
and sympathy for the shared platform agenda. One such individual was a 
PhD candidate of the Logistics & Transport research group at Chalmers 
Technical University who was acting as the IT coordinator of TRB Sweden. 
Enrolling him into the initiative provided access to relevant knowledge about 
digital infrastructure within the Swedish road haulage industry and it created 
an important formal link to TRB and many road haulage firms. Thus, the 
standardization effort started to move forward and the vendors became 
increasingly enthusiastic. They knew TRB had successfully represented the 
road haulers in political negotiations about environmental regulations and 
transport policies and they therefore believed the extended initiative was a 
viable arena for development of an industry standard. 
The shared platform initiative was now focused on promoting transport 
innovation through integration of embedded, mobile, and stationary systems 
and with the specific objective to develop the MSI standard (Table 7). As a 
result, they formed the MSI standardization group led by one researcher and 
composed of technical staff from the member vendors. A key task for the 
group was to specify a common business terminology for system-to-system 
communication of transport activities. The researchers’ analyses had shown 
that existing stationary vendor interfaces lacked specifications outside the 
stationary context such as fuel consumption metrics and working hour data. 
While this partially explained why these interfaces rarely supported practical 
integration efforts within road hauler firms, it also meant that the 
standardization group could not rely on the existing interfaces. As a result, 
the ASN IT & Management representative took initiative to analyze the 
Pharos mobile standard, which targeted business processes for larger 
contractors of haulers rather than small haulage firms. Although it would add 
a new level of complexity to rely on the Pharos mobile standard, one 
important conclusion was that the MSI standard should be based on XML to 
maximize its diffusion potential. Fortunately, some of the involved vendors 
had used XML to specify their interfaces and more were in the process of 
adopting XML. The standardization group therefore decided to develop the 
new technology integration standard based on XML. 
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In the next section, I continue by giving an overview of the development of 
the MSI. 
8.5 Development Process 
The development of the standard accelerated from early 2005. The 
researchers realized these efforts would put the cooperative spirit within the 
platform initiative to test. They therefore decided to host all meetings on 
neutral ground. The vendors, especially those with little previous experience 
of cooperative development efforts, appreciated the Viktoria Institute as the 
physical meeting place. To spur further interactions among ecosystem 
members, the researchers launched a “Mobile-Stationary Online 
Development Forum”. It generated less activity than expected, but the 
Table 7 The MSI shared platform 
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discussions nevertheless led to important design decisions. During spring 
2005 there were important interactions across vendors and haulers with a 
commitment to overcome the negative impact of proprietary interfaces. The 
platform initiative had grown strong enough to resist diverging pressures.  
Still, the stability of the initiative was put to test when Hogia, the dominating 
stationary technology vendor, threatened to leave the standardization effort. 
During a meeting in September 2005, Hogia representatives abruptly 
declared they were investigating whether the current interface prototype 
posed an infringement of intellectual property rights related to their 
proprietary interface, and they called for immediate halt of any development. 
Hogia’s behavior was surprising and threatened to derail the entire process. 
As development was halted, the rest of the platform members analyzed 
Hogia’s claim and how to respond. They concluded there was no substance 
behind the claim. The researchers worked closely with the TRB 
representative to author an open letter signed by all remaining members. The 
letter declared the initiative’s intent to go on with the standardization process 
and invited Hogia to a meeting to reconcile differences. Meanwhile, Hogia 
put pressure to have the Viktoria Institute withdraw from the standard 
development. Hogia had a minor share in Swedish ICT (SWICT), the 
research group owning Viktoria, and used this to spur debates between senior 
managers from both sides of the issue. Eventually, Hogia distributed a letter 
to the platform initiative declaring it had left the initiative, publicly 
denouncing legal action, and referring to a company history of a self-
developed open interface and a commitment to applied research. The 
remaining members viewed this reply as arrogant and it galvanized their 
continued cooperative efforts. The TRB spokesperson’s active role 
throughout this process had eventually made TRB the de facto industry 
representative. 
At the time of the Hogia conflict, LBC Frakt Värmland (a member 
organization of TRB) had decided to invest in a more advanced digital 
infrastructure that would integrate embedded, mobile, and stationary 
components from competing vendors. The managing director as well as the 
IT manager, who both had attended MSI project meetings, saw the emerging 
standard as aligned with their decisions and they actively pushed to move the 
standardization process forward. Well aware of the huge interest among IT 
vendors to get the contract (the investment was large), LBC Frakt stated they 
expected the eventual vendor to guide the integration effort based on the MSI 
standard. As a result, the standardization effort turned into serious business. 
The standard was assessed and revised six times in light of proprietary 
 63 
interfaces and ongoing integration projects. Three revisions were particularly 
important:  
•To support management of working hours, initial designs included inter-
system communication between fleet management monitoring services and 
data from vehicle sensors. However, network members found it difficult to 
conceptualize the required mapping and management of working hours was 
removed from the standard.  
•Incorporating sensor data from embedded systems could give mobile and 
stationary vendors competitive advantages. Hence, concerns from embedded 
vendors resulted in a compromise to only include embedded data relevant to 
transport assignment. While fuel consumption was included, high-resolution 
data used for other purposes such as vehicle maintenance and engine 
development were excluded.  
•A context schema was developed to support terminology that reflected firm-
specific local conditions. Based on this mechanism, the MSI standard could 
adapt to specific business terms in any given communication. However, this 
triggered a discussion of who was responsible for defining and managing the 
schemas. In the end, it was agreed to assign this responsibility to the 
stationary vendors. 
During the summer of 2006, IBS and Vehco tested the MSI standard in one 
setting (LBC Varberg) and Locus and Vehco tested it in another hauler (LBC 
Frakt Värmland). The researchers played an important role in designing the 
test through guidance on how to secure reliable and valid test results. Both 
assessments suggested the interface required new workflows because of 
changes in relationships between mobile and stationary vendors. Also, the 
standard implied a shift away from stationary dominance as all involved 
actors now had to negotiate the content and structure of critical business 
information. As a result, the stationary vendors understood that the MSI 
standard positioned their systems as part of larger infrastructures with other 
important components. 
During the same period, the platform initiative got funding from SWICT to 
transform the activity into a commercial standardization consortium. MSI 
was a showcase that SWICT marketed as exemplar applied IT research and 
all network members realized the standard would soon require more 
sophisticated principles for development, maintenance, and diffusion. In 
August 2006, the MSI members presented lessons from the test cases at the 
largest conference event in the Swedish road haulage industry, emphasizing 
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how the interface standard clarified roles and relationships among IT vendors 
and helped specify the requirements for combining heterogeneous 
technologies into a coherent digital infrastructure. This led to considerable 
attention from trade press, road haulage firms, and IT vendors and made the 
shared platform initiative well known across the industry.  
In late summer 2007, the platform initiative was formally transformed into a 
commercial standardization consortium financed via member fees. The 
primary task of the ‘The MSI Group’ was to develop, maintain, and validate 
the industry standard. The consortium was structured into a board of 
directors, a strategy team, and a technical committee. The researchers were 
actively involved in founding the consortium with particular focus on 
developing a strategy for intellectual property rights to avoid incidents 
similar to the one with Hogia. The reorganization meant TRB took over 
leadership in MSI development from the researchers. As the MSI Group 
stabilized and attracted new members, including Barkfors, Consafe Logistics, 
Cybercomgroup, and Pocketmobile, it came to represent a critical mass of the 
Swedish road haulage industry. 
The researchers now turned their attention towards diffusion of the MSI 
standard. The researchers applied for funds to help the MSI Group turn the 
standard into a dominant design. The positive image of the MSI Group meant 
it was relatively easy to attract funds. VINNOVA supported the project 
“Network Innovation through Vertical Standards” to develop specific lessons 
on how collective action can lead to service innovation enabled by vertical 
technology standardization. Also, SWICT funded the project “Sustainable 
Transports” to create new knowledge on how researchers can support digital 
solutions for environmental sustainability. 
 
To spread across the industry, the MSI standard had to be adopted and used 
by vendors and haulers to improve business processes. However, the vendors 
were considerably more pleased with the standard because of its focus on 
innovative solutions based on new industry practices. As a result, some IT 
vendors approached the MSI Group in spring of 2009. As an example, 
vendors focused on route optimization technology found the standard created 
a whole new world of digital opportunities because it enabled cooperation 
and information exchange between distinct socio-technical networks. The 
standard allowed these vendors to see how their solutions could become part 
of larger digital infrastructures and it gave them a vocabulary and thematic 
structure they could use in negotiations with potential partners and 
customers.  
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The MSI Group members found the standard made their lives better and 
easier. The shared infrastructural understanding meant that the cycle time of 
integration projects could be reduced without compromising quality. This 
was even true in situations where the MSI standard was not used. Following 
interactions with vendors that now promoted the standard, Hogia realized 
integration practice were changing. Facilitated by TRB and the researchers, 
they therefore returned to the shared platform initiative. This was interpreted 
by some as an indication of successful standard diffusion on the supply side. 
During the same period, two haulage fimrs, Lantmännen and LBC Frakt 
Värmland, decided to implement digital infrastructures based on the MSI 
standard. This was an important step forward given the limited attention 
received from road haulage firms so far. 
 
Several vendors signaled interest in taking on the assignment at LBC Frakt. 
However, their offerings typically reflected use of proprietary interfaces. The 
managing director of LBC Frakt therefore sent a letter to the MSI Group, 
officially criticizing its members for undermining the standardization effort 
(this was depicted as ‘the revolution in Värmland’ in the trade press). 
Although LBC Frakt was disappointed with the vendors, they appreciated the 
MSI group had developed into an official industry forum in which these 
issues could be addressed. They eventually selected two vendors on the 
mobile side and Locus Scandinavia for the stationary part of the digital 
infrastructure. During the integration process, the flexibility offered by the 
MSI context schemas caused considerable debate. Eventually, LBC Frakt 
concluded the standard provided too little guidance and decided to rely on 
Locus’ proprietary interface because it had first-hand experience with it. Still, 
they were determined to support the shared platform initiative and decided 
Locus’ interface should be MSI-adapted through a project involving LBC 
Frakt, Locus, and TRB. The outcome was a solution for transport order 
management.  
 
Informed by the LBC Frakt case, the MSI Group revised the standard to 
facilitate its diffusion into road haulage firms. The strategy was to modularize 
the standard into a set of core modules, and the LBC Frakt solution served as 
basis for the order module. At this point, however, the MSI Group faced 
considerable challenges when Hogia announced they had recruited TRB’s 
MSI developer. Although this enhanced Hogia’s innovation potential, the 
researchers had to once again take leadership in the MSI group. During the 
spring of 2010, the researchers engaged individually and through the MSI 
group to implement the modularization strategy. The researchers teamed up 
with InnovationLab. Its combined computer science and informatics expertise 
paired with logistics competence proved valuable in designing a resource, a 
route, and a quality module in addition to the order module.  
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The MSI Group members wanted the modules to be designed to support 
environmental sustainability. As the group lacked the required expertise, they 
engaged a PhD in environmental informatics from Chalmers University of 
Technology that at the time ran his own business, eco2win. In June 2010, the 
group initiated the development of the core modules together with DPS 
(vendor of route optimization technology) and Volvo. The development 
process took almost two years of iterative development with feedback from 
most MSI Group members. In late 2012, the four modules were handed over 
to the MSI Group. Finally, during a meeting in May 2013 the MSI Group 
decided to dissolve the platform initiative and its members got back the rest 
of their membership fees. Virtually all the actors, however, payed tribute to 
the shared platform initiative and they continued their search for architectural 
solutions and strategies consistent with the MSI standard. 
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9 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section I give a brief account on my research journey. Subsequently, I 
describe the methodology I used to analyze the archival and primary data of 
my project and elaborate how the data collection was organized. 
Leonardi’s (2011) imbrication framework is then applied to provide a 
detailed analysis of not only the ways in which technology architecture shifts 
shape coopetitive dynamics in such settings, but also how coopetitive 
dynamics between actors affected the choice of the architecture.  
This analysis creates the foundation for developing theoretical contributions 
to the platform literature by discussing the nature of the coopetitive dynamics 
that characterize shared platform initiatives where emerging technology 
architectural shifts challenge their governance strategies. In addition to these 
theoretical insights, my dissertation offers implications for platform leaders 
who seek to nurture innovation in their ecosystems. 
9.1 My Research Journey 
In November 2011, I started to work as a research assistant and a software 
developer at the University of Borås. Since then I have worked on the MSI 
project that ended in year 2013. During this last stage of the project, I 
actively participated and collected data in all workshops, meetings and 
interviews which gave me an opportunity to observe the network dynamics, 
and to contact and communicate with actors to gain better understanding of 
their views, motives, and even tensions between the partners. I documented 
all the empirical insights in observation notes and through my programming 
expertise; I gained useful insights into the architectural design of the 
platform. After completion of the MSI, I did complementary interviews with 
the main actors in May 2016 to carefully discuss events described in 
contradictory documents and the aftermath of the project. 
In February 2014, I got enrolled as a Licentiate student on half pace at the 
University of Gothenburg and was funded by the University of Borås (since 
2014, I started to work as an Adjunct Professor on half pace at the School of 
Library and Information Science at the University of Borås. I taught technical 
courses at two programs: Bachelor of Web programming and Master of 
Digital Libraries. I also supervised Bachelor theses during spring 2016). I 
presented my Licentiate draft at the Pre-Lic seminar in June 2016 and 
68 
defended my Licentiate in November 2016. After I defended my Licentiate I 
started my doctoral dissertation work at the University of Gothenburg under 
the direction of Professor Rikard Lindgren (primary advisor) and Associate 
Professor Ulrike Schultze (secondary advisor). 
During my doctoral program, I took higher education courses at different 
universities. Among them was the Open Innovation course at ESADE 
business school in Barcelona. The course was lectured by Henry Chesbrough 
and Wim Vanhaverbeke and I received valuable feedback on my work. 
Although, Open Innovation did not last as part of my dissertation, acceptance 
to this course played an important initial role in my academic training. I 
specifically got acquaint with Technology Management field’s prominant 
articles and conversations related to my work.  
While my dissertation is in traditional monograph format, I have presented 
parts of my findings at both major and local conferences and workshops. I 
presented my progress in yearly doctoral conferences at the University of 
Borås and University of Gothenburg. In 2014, I presented an extended 
abstract as the first author together with Rikard at the OASIS pre-ICIS2014 
workshop and I got useful feedback from scholars and mentors of my session 
Professor Cathy Urquhart and Professor Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic. In 
2015, I together with Rikard sent an initial analysis of coopetition in the MSI 
project to the Journal of AIS (JAIS) Theory Development workshop that got 
accepted. I later presented the full-fledged analysis in a complete paper, 
which I wrote as the first author together with Rikard, at the Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 2016. In 2017, I 
presented the imbrication analysis of MSI in ICIS2017 as the first author 
together with Rikard and Ulrike (For more details on my presentations refer 
to Chapter 13). 
During my doctoral program, I have been invited to prominent doctoral 
consortia in the Information Systems and Technology Management fields 
(ECIS2016, OCIS2016, and ICIS2016). My session mentors at ECIS2016 
were Professor Tina Blegind Jensen and Professor Jonathan Wareham. And 
at ICIS2016, I got helpful feedback from the students and my session’s 
mentors: Professor M. Lynne Markus and Professor Mary Beth Watson-
Manheim. I unfortunately could not participate in OCIS DC as part of 
AoM2016 because my visa was delayed.  
In May 2016, I spent a month at Cox Business School at Southern Methodist 
University (SMU) to work with Ulrike. As a result of this visit, I put parts of 
my dissertation in three different papers to: ICIS2017 (accepted), Information 
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Systems Research (ISR) (invited to resubmit), and Research Policy (under 
review) as the first author together with my two advisors. Finally, I defended 
my dissertation draft at my trial seminar on 9th of November 2017. My 
opponent was Professor Ioanna Constantiou who gave me constructive and 
useful guidance to improve my work. 
9.2  Historical Method 
Lack of contextual understanding makes re-analyzing of secondary 
qualitative data challenging (Corti, 2007). This challenge, however, is viewed 
as a blessing in disguise since it gives the researcher distance from the data 
and results in a less biased analysis (Glas, 1963; Heaton, 2004). The other 
discussed advantage of re-using other researchers’ data is lowering the 
research cost (Corti, 2007; Glas, 1963; Heaton, 2004).  
Despite the encouragements, there are very few researchers in IS that use data 
collected by others. This scarcity can be traced to problems surrounding this 
method of data gathering and analysis. Methodologically, analyzing such data 
brings more complexity to the researcher’s desk. Ethically, using such data 
can be challenging since human objects gave consent to use the data for a 
research other than the project at hand and finally credibility of such data 
should be carefully scrutinized.  
Besides methodological and ethical problems, however, lack of norms and 
standards in making data available from one research to the other should not 
be neglected (Corti, 2007). Indeed, qualitative researchers can benefit from 
clear standards and frameworks to regulate re-use of data. 
The data from the years I have been part in the project is not secondary but 
the rest of the data for this study is primarily secondary and also of historical 
nature dating back to more than a decade ago. This makes this data eligible 
for both secondary and historical analysis. These two analysis methods have 
many overlaps. Both have special focus on how to use and interpret data that 
is not gathered by the researcher.  
Historical analysis, however, pays closer attention to handling a larger 
amount of data; how to organize, how to validate and when to stop collecting 
more data are center stage. Therefore, in order to be able to analyze and 
categorize the data seen in table 8 I used Historical Analysis (hereafter HA) 
framework (Mason, McKenney, & Copeland, 1997ab). Mason et al. (1997ab) 
have presented this framework for IS researchers inspired by historical 
analysis frameworks done by historians and social scientists. This framework 
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offers a comprehensive guideline through all steps of analysis from 
understanding the data to writing the narrative via the selected lens. I 
followed what Porra, Hirschheim, and Parks (2014) calls Interpretivist 
historical analysis relying on Walsham’s (1995) work on interpreting 
qualitative material. 
In what follows I give a summary of my data collection process, followed by 
a closer look at HA by presenting its importance and background in IS. I then 
go through each step HA offers to analyze historical data. For each step, I 
explain its nature and clarify how I have conducted it in my project. I 
conclude the method section with what was learned through applying Mason 
et al.’s (1997ab) framework and what challenges I faced.  
The data collected in this project originate from numerous data sources 
including semi-structured interviews, board, project, and work meetings, 
workshops, e-mails as well as strategy and technical documents (Table 8). In 
addition to these main sources, I have read and analyzed numerous industry 
presentations, project applications, press releases, popular press articles, 
module and standard specifications, use case and test case descriptions, and 
my own observation notes.  
The three most important sources of data are project meetings, work 
meetings, and interviews. In total, 30 project meetings were held over the 
twelve-year effort. Typically chaired by the researchers, the meetings helped 
coordinate the project and mobilize support for the research agenda. The 
recorded and transcribed material from these meetings provided detailed 
description on the group dynamic. 75 work meetings were held with member 
organizations. These meetings primarily concerned the technical 
development of standard prototypes and modules. Most of the meetings were 
recorded and transcribed for later data analysis. Finally, 136 formal 
interviews were performed, recorded, and transcribed. Respondents included 
technology vendors, developers, drivers, dispatchers, and haulage firm 
managers. The interviews lasted 80 minutes in average and covered different 
themes relevant to IT development and use in the road haulage setting (Table 
8). 
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By relying on imbrication framework (Leonardi, 2011) for analyzing shared 
platform coopetition dynamics and architectural changes I make sense of the 
imbrication patterns of social and technology agencies of MSI through the 
years. Given this ambition, I first extracted a timeline with the main activities 
and events (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
Table 8 MSI data sources 
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This analysis led to the identification of three major technology architecture 
shifts, which serve as a baseline for the key phases that make up the narrative 
of my case interpretation (See timeline in Figure 7). Each phase consists of 
an imbrication pair showing the reciprocal effects of coopetitive dynamics 
and technology architecture on each other (See imbrication in Figure 8). 
Before going through HA steps in my dissertation project, I present a brief 
background on studying history and origin of historical analysis in IS. I 
proceed by presenting HA steps under the Process steps rubric. 
History is one of the cornerstones of any field. IS is not an exception 
therefore the study of history in the field has been emphasized in the 
discipline through various callings for further research to enrich the history of 
the field. Joseph Schumpeter, the economist and historian, suggests any field 
of scientific research needs to produce four kinds of knowledge to be 
qualified as a “discipline” : (1) empirical data, observations and facts, (2) 
theories and paradigms, (3) ethics, and (4) history (Mason et al. 1997a, p. 
258). Study of history is necessary to make meaning of the other three 
knowledge forms over time. However, IS knowledge production is heavier on 
the first two (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Porra et al., 2014).  
Scrutinizing the interplay of social and economic factors of using IT over 
time is an important field of research in IS. However, longitudinal studies 
Figure 6 MSI timeline 
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that look into such factors through analyzing changes over an extended 
period of time are needed. This scarcity of research on continuity is even 
more noticeable when it comes to research on aligning interests of a group of 
heterogeneous actors with different perceptions of reality.  
IS is a somewhat young discipline. Study of history is therefore not as 
regulated and rich as it is in sociology, history or not even management. 
Disciplines with stronger historical works have their own approach and 
frameworks to conduct the study of history in the field, all inspired by 
historians’ works. In IS the only established framework is the framework 
introduced by Mason et al. (1997ab) consisting of seven steps (Mason et al. 
1997ab). Through their framework, Mason et al. (1997ab) hold IS 
researcher’s hand through the analysis process; beginning from narrowing the 
researcher’s focus until writing the transcript based on the pile of 
historical/archival data. Mason and his colleagues apply their framework on 
historical account on Bank of America (Mason et al., 1997ab) that gives 
better insights on how to use the framework.  
Not so many IS researchers have followed Mason and his colleagues’ 
footsteps. Porra, Hirschheim, and Parks (2005) are the only IS researchers 
that have done an historical work that is published by top journals in IS after 
Mason et al. (1997 ab). They used Mason et al.’s (1997ab) framework on an 
historical account of Texaco corporate oil company’s Information 
Technology functions (Porra et al., 2005). They also provided a rich four 
layer framework including paradigm, method, approach and techniques in 
HA (Porra et al., 2014).  
The IS community’s interest is growing in understanding the historical 
context of IS phenomena. Studying the evolution of IS phenomenon not only 
helps us understand the events happened in the past that affected the IS 
phenomenon but it affects the future by learning failure and success 
parameters of previous endeavors (Mason et al. 1997a; Porra et al. 2014; 
McKenney et al. 1997). Deeper understanding of the IS changes is argued to 
help IS scholars to have a sound knowledge of the field and the field’s origin 
and identity (Bryant, Black, Land, & Porra, 2013).  
Bannister (2002), however, believes that historical works in IS are not 
radically different from other popular research types produced in the field. In 
contrast, Bryant et al. (2013) and Oinas-Kukkonen and Oinas-Kukkonen 
(2013) believe understanding historical methods and techniques is a valuable 
asset for any IS researcher to be able to interpret previous research. Indeed, 
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observing continuity with the right tools is of great importance in studies that 
evolves around scrutinizing use of technology. 
Historical analysis studies (e.g., Porra et al., 2014) and longitudinal studies 
(e.g., Gregory, Beck, & Keil, 2013; Sun, 2013; Ranerup, 2012; Bhattacherjee 
& Premkumar, 2004; Venkatesh & Brown, 2001; Webster, 1998) can be 
perceived as very similar since they both look into events over time. But a 
fundamental difference is that in HA researchers let the events and data guide 
the study while in longitudinal studies theories set the guidelines for research 
design and data collection (Porra et al., 2014; Mason, 2002).   
Mason et al. (1997a) were inspired by HA in other disciplines including 
history, sociology, and management disciplines. They coined their framework 
as “an historical analysis” pointing to the fact that for each step they have 
elaborated the ways they can be done based on interpretive guidelines. 
However, each step can look differently and the researcher can choose other 
qualitative approaches common in IS (e.g., critical or positivist (Myers 
1997)). On the contrary, Porra et al. (2014) call their take on HA “The 
historical analysis” because they go through different paradigms (e.g., 
functionalism), approaches (e.g., pragmatic) and methods (e.g., case study) 
that are familiar to IS researchers. 
9.3 Process Steps 
Different disciplines approach the process of forming a narrative out of 
historical or archival data with different assumptions and interpretations. 
Consequently, historical analysis is presented in different steps across courses 
of studies: e.g., Scientific HA has three steps (Grigg, 1991), marketing HA 
has five steps (Golder, 2000), consumer HA has three steps (Smith & Lux, 
1993), etc.  
In IS, the qualitative method of historical research is presented in seven steps: 
(1) focusing questions, (2) specify the domain, (3) gather evidence, (4) 
critique the evidence, (5) determine patterns, (6) tell the story, and (7) write 
the transcript (Mason et al.,1997a). Below each step is introduced thoroughly 
and explained in relation to this study’s empirical context.  
To find patterns, I have iterated between data and theory to find the right 
thematic quotes for each step of the analysis. By following Historical analysis 
I needed three rounds of coding which I explain below. Later, while 
elaborating my analysis based on HA I will refer to these coding rounds 
again. 
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Before starting the analysis in the first round of analysis, I read the data that 
was categorized by type (e.g., funding applications, interviews, workshop 
presentations, etc.) and year. I coded the data to get an overall picture of the 
industry and the development of the project through the years. Of special 
interest in this stage was to understand how haulers (users) worked, how 
different types of IT providers worked and to get an overall picture of the 
project.  
After this analysis round, the results were communicated with the project 
leader of MSI to validate the results and consult the possible inconsistencies 
in the timeline or events brought up in different data sources. Besides, the 
results of each coding round were analyzed in relationship to the literature. 
The first analysis round resulted in a timeline mentioned before (Figure 7).  
In the second round, I specifically looked into coopetitive dynamics by 
looking into relationships between project partners. The result of this phase in 
conjunction with the understanding from round one resulted in list of 
coopetition relationship pairs showing the coopetitive dynamics between 
partners (Appendix2). This understanding helped shaping coopetition 
diagrams (Figures 9-11). 
In the third round of analysis, I focused on architecture of the core and 
interface of the platform. As a result of the first round, I had an overall 
picture of which technologies were important to the development of MSI 
platform through the years. Developer notes documents were of great help in 
this process to deepen my knowledge on the architecture of MSI. The results 
of this round were illustrated in architecture diagrams (Figures 9-11). 
After these rounds, I saw the need to do complementary interviews with some 
key actors to be able to have a clearer picture of the last stage of the project 
and the post-MIS era. In my quest for the available partners who were 
interested to collaborate, I managed to conduct interviews with 1) The 
transport and logistics manager at Volvo, 2) The (former) managing director 
of Vehco and 3) TRB’s representative in the project who presented the 
customers. I went through the three previous analysis rounds for 
complementary interviews as well and justified the previous analysis results 
accordingly. 
Finally, in the last analysis round, the reciprocal relationship between 
coopetitive dynamics and architecture shifts and also the governance 
decisions that guided the initiative through the changes were in focus. At this 
stage, the timeline was further developed by subdividing the events into three 
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phases, each labeled according to the architectural design underlying the 
emerging standard: Open Services Gateway initiative (OSGi), Web Services 
and Business Process Modules (Figure 7). The events of each of these phases, 
as well as the state of the technology and industry players before and after the 
MSI platform initiative were then analyzed in isolation.  
For each of the three phases the platform architecture and the actions of the 
platform participants were analyzed in detail in order to identify both human 
and technological agency, as well as their interaction in each stage. Each of 
the three MSI development phases began with human agency, i.e., the intent 
to develop a new technological infrastructure for the MSI platform and ended 
with a new architecture as a result. The end state of each stage of the MSI 
platform’s evolution was captured diagrammatically in terms of an 
architectural diagram and a coopetition map inspired by Bengtsson et al. 
(2010).  
Using Leonardi’s (2011) representation of the imbrication of human and 
material agency, I read the empirical data again and analyzed the 
relationships between the social and technological factors. After much back-
and-forth between the imbrication model and the data, a stable picture of the 
MSI platform’s evolution as a sociomaterial organization emerged (Figure 8). 
The analysis rounds and thematic quotes of each round are illustrated in table 
9.  
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 Figure 7 MSI completed timeline 
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Figure 8 MSI imbrications 
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Table 9 Description of the Coding Stages of my study 
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In what follows, I explain my analysis in detail based on HA steps presented 
by Mason et al. (1997a). 
9.3.1 Focusing questions 
The researcher should initiate the analysis by having some general questions 
in mind before approaching the data (Mason et al., 1997a). The general 
assumption at this phase of the history writing is that "material must precede 
the thesis" (Tuchman, 1981, p. 9). This step is for historians to shape open-
ended questions (Oinas-Kukkonen & Oinas-Kukkonen 2013) before going 
forward. At this stage, the questions can be vague and serve as a simple 
guidance. This step has been known to take a long time to accomplish 
(Mason et al., 1997a; Mason et al., 1997b; Porra et al., 2005; Porra et al., 
2014) mainly because the historians need to approach the “never-ending” 
evidence to some extent to be able to reach the questions.  
For this study, I approached the material to simply fathom the network 
dynamics and how the Swedish road haulage industry had changed over the 
course of the MSI project. My involvement in the last phase of the MSI 
project was helpful in this step. By using Leximancer, I developed an initial 
theme analysis to understand dominating themes in the data. I described my 
initial understanding of the material in an extended abstract titled 
“Technology Standardization for Transport Efficiency: On the Greening of 
Frames”. I wrote the extended abstract as the first author together with Rikard 
which was accepted and presented at the OASIS pre-ICIS 2014 workshop.    
As the result of the process explained above my overarching question 
became: “How do the participants’ coopetitive behavior and the platform’s 
technology architecture reciprocally shape the evolution of a shared 
platform?”  
9.3.2 Specify the domain 
The questions produced in previous step determine the domain for inquiry 
and dictates several methodological presupposition (Mason et al., 1997a, p. 
312). The domain in this study is the shared platform. I analyze the network 
of actors that are part of designing the platform, the architecture of the 
platform and the connections between these two. To be able to design the 
core and standardized interface of the platform, a varied heterogeneous group 
of actors were invited to this initiative resulting in dynamic relationships in 
the group. 
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Historically, Swedish road haulage firms did their work by help of pen and 
paper; their workflow spanned from getting an order, dedicating the task to a 
driver, determining the most appropriate route to delivering the goods. By the 
beginning of the millennium, software vendors and truck manufacturers 
initiated projects on digitalizing the process. They managed to digitalize 
some part of the workflow but the result was fragmented in general. There 
were important problems inhibiting the digitalization work: firstly, there 
existed various software for different parts of the workflow (e.g., order 
handling to handle orders or route optimization to find the viable route) but 
these software were not integrated with each other, so haulers had to do the 
data converting from and to different software manually which given the low 
IT competence these companies had was not a hurdle to ignore. Secondly, in 
addition to the problem mentioned earlier, multiple software options were 
available for each part (e.g., there were three main software vendors offering 
order handling software package at 2003). Consequently, haulers would end 
up with different customers demanding different software for performing the 
same task.  
The ultimate problem was that truck manufacturers produced digital 
platforms that worked only for their truck brand which made transport 
management more complicated for haulers. The MSI project provided the 
industry with an arena where these different actors could gather and help to 
develop a standard. This data exchange standard would make it possible for 
different platforms to communicate with each other and integrate. Finally, the 
result of the effort would provide haulers with a comprehensive system for 
the first time in the history of the industry. 
The preamble above makes it clear that to study the cooperation between 
competitors (i.e., coopetition), having the network as the main domain was 
necessary.  
9.3.3 Gather evidence 
Timeline is a typical technique historians use to organize evidence by 
dividing the storyline into relevant time periods and name them (Marwick, 
2001).  In interpretivist IS histories, evidence gathering processes ascribe to a 
social relativist perspective, which suggests that evidence is considered to be 
an interpretation of the events by the authors of the documents (Porra et al., 
2014). Among all data sources, Interpretivism considers interviews to be the 
most important source of understanding the actors’ interpretations of actions 
and events that have taken place (Walsham, 1995). 
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In the MSI project, the data was mostly categorized by the type of the 
documents, e.g., fund applications, project meetings, technical meetings, 
interviews, etc. However, to be able to extract the timeline of important 
events, I needed to categorize the data into years. The challenge I faced in 
this step was that many of the interviews, observations and even meeting 
notes did not have enough introductory information including the date. 
Therefore, I wrote a C#.Net application which went through all the files and 
categorized them by the creation date and language of the files in different 
folders. I took the language into consideration to separate Swedish and 
English material for each year to be able to feed thematic software with my 
material (Such software, e.g., Leximancer are language sensitive). 
By use of Atlas.ti, I coded the material to delve deeper into the data to 
understand how the haulers’ ecosystem and work processes functioned before 
and during MSI project. I coded the material to understand the competition 
situation in the network and to understand the different actor types. At this 
stage, I was particularly interested in different events that had affected the 
MSI project. I also was interested in the name of actors and more info on 
their companies. To complement the material for some of the actors, I 
searched for the information on the company online. The result is presented 
in the timeline in figure 6 and table 9 shows the coding process in more 
detail. 
To make sure I get a correct picture of each actor involved, I looked up news 
related to each company for the period of time the company was involved in 
the MSI project. Where applicable I collected technical information on the 
company’s product. When it came to the technologies used in developing 
MSI platform I looked for scholarly papers, official documentations and 
presentations of the technology during the years the technology was used in 
MSI, e.g., I collected all articles on OSGi between 2002 and 2005 (I included 
2005 because it takes time for studies to get published after the study is 
conducted) I vetted out the 20 most cited papers among them I chose those 
that were helpful to complement my understanding of the use of OSGi in the 
MSI. I then grouped them in a hermeneutic unit in Atlas.ti software and 
coded them. For each technology, I also looked up code examples online and 
read technical forums like Stackoverflow when needed. 
9.3.4 Critique the evidence 
The gathered evidence needs to be critiqued and evaluated in this step.  
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“Some will be false, some contradictory, much irrelevant, and most of it 
will be incomplete. Given questionable or untested evidence, several 
analytical processes can be called into play” (Mason et al., 1997a).  
Historians examine different sources and make conscious decisions on which 
material to use (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). These decisions are heavily 
influenced by the reliability of the material. If a combination of the various 
sources, e.g., oral history, and archival material reflect the same story the 
reliability increases (Oinas-Kukkonen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2013). According 
to McKenney et al. (1997), contradictory evidence includes conflicting dates 
of events; changing times for hardware upgrades; differing volume figures, 
non-matching recollections of members in attendance at meetings; and 
different cost figures. It is important that the facts make the final judgements 
of credibility, not the theory.  
After categorizing the data into years, I consulted with the MSI project 
manager to examine credibility of the sources. During this process a problem 
with interview transcription file dates surfaced. Some interviews had been 
transcribed a year after the actual date of interviews; therefore, their file 
creation dates did not match the year of occurrence. I changed the timeline 
and file categorizations accordingly.  
Furthermore, I went through each document specifying who had produced the 
document (e.g., who had conducted the interview), which date was it 
collected and for which purpose. Next, I extracted events that did not agree 
with each other going through different documents and taking the events that 
most documents agree into account. I updated the timeline accordingly.  
Collected evidence in its unprocessed state is of little value but gains its 
meaning when historians interpret it for their narratives (Munslow, 1997). A 
history is a written explanation of the perceived relationship between 
different fragments of evidence that the historian puts together to organize the 
story (Mason et al., 1997b; Porra et al., 2014). Munslow (1997) presents this 
stage as:  
“The inference of meaning emerges as I organize, configure and employ 
data. It does not, I would argue, just turn up or suggest itself as the only 
or most likely conclusion to draw” (p. 8). 
9.3.5 Determine patterns 
I found coopetition dynamics interesting and important in the MSI project. 
An initial analysis of coopetition in the MSI project was illustrated in a paper 
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titled “The Tension between Stabilized Cooperation and Intensified 
Competition: Greening of Technological Frames in Practice” that I wrote as 
the first author together with Rikard Lindgren and was accepted and 
presented at the Journal of AIS (JAIS) Theory Development Pre-ICIS 2015 
Workshop. I later presented the full-fledged analysis in a paper that I wrote as 
the first author together with Rikard Lindgren under the same title. The paper 
was accepted and presented at the Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences (HICSS) 2016.  
While conducting the analysis for the HICSS study, I realized cooperation 
dynamics between competitors had been heavily affected by the changes in 
technological architectures through the years that, consequently, impacted the 
standard. As a result, I divided the project into three phases reflecting the 
three main architectural changes (Figure 7). In the first phase, the prominent 
technology that actors initially agreed on to base the shared platform 
architecture on is the OSGi. OSGi was the latest technology at the time which 
had attracted attention among logistic actors as a technology that made 
integration processes possible. The second phase is the Web Services phase; 
this technology became the core technology architecture for the shared 
platform together with the XML data type, and the last phase is about 
modularization. Next, I went through each phase and focus on relationships 
between actors and thrived to analyze, investigate and explain them through 
coopetition as the lens (Appendix 2) and the effects technology architecture 
had on coopetitive dynamics.  
As stated earlier, Gawer conceptualizes a platform as an organization or a 
meta-organization consisting of two aspects of architecture, and value 
creation network (Gawer, 2014). In each phase, I used her framework as a 
lens to present and analyze the MSI shared platform through the two concepts 
Gawer (2014) represents. I found coopetition a helpful lens for looking into 
network dynamics.  
I presented my analysis in three dissertation proposals that were accepted to 
1) European Conference on Informaiton Systems (ECIS) 2016 Doctoral 
Consortium, 2) Organizational Communication and Information Systems/ a 
division of Academy of Management (OCIS) 2016 Doctoral Consortium, and 
3) International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) 2016 Doctoral 
Consortium.  
Given the imbrication lens (Leonardi, 2011) I have chosen for my study 
because of the sociomaterial focus of my analysis, for each phase explained 
above I categorized the human to material and material to human data and 
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story separately. For each technology, I particularly looked into how 
coopetitive dynamics affect the technology and vice a versa. The coding 
process for recognizing these patterns is explained in table 9. 
9.3.6 Tell the story 
An interesting narrative supported by evidence should be provided in this 
stage. Histories include reverse history: creating narratives about the past by 
backtracking from the present circumstances (Bryant et al., 2013; Porra et al., 
2014). This narrative should be presented in an interesting way without 
jeopardizing the integrity and consistency of the evidence (Mason et al., 
1997b). 
The historian should explain the changes she is studying by putting the 
evidence into narrative form resulting into “thick descriptions” of set of 
events. IS interpretivists borrow the “thick description” concept from 
anthropology to describe organizational changes into details to be able to 
make complex concepts and dynamics understandable (Walsham, 1995). 
Historical narratives are well structured and can have three causal levels 
(Smith & Lux, 1993). At the first level of the story are deep structural causes, 
which present the continuity factor. In the MSI project these types of causes 
included the start of changing mindset between vendors through integration 
processes, rise of tech industry, the enormous success of a start-up mostly 
because of focusing on haulers’ needs instead of focusing on truck 
manufacturers’ needs, the invention of OSGi, and the invention of Web 
Services and XML. The second level of contextual causes focuses 
specifically on the temporal relationship to the event being investigated 
(Bloch, 1953). In the MSI project, these types of causes included IT strategic 
decisions, annual standard meetings, and activity reports. The third level or 
triggering causes are unique to each phase (Porra et al., 2014). In the MSI, 
One of the strongest stationary software providers leaving, letting a new 
comer taking over the initiative was triggering events, or changes of the 
technology.  
9.3.7 Write the transcript 
While composing the story, I realized that information regarding some events 
was not clear or missing. Researchers that were part of the project were not 
sure about the answers. Therefore, I conducted complementary interviews 
with some of the key actors that had been part of the MSI initiative through 
all these twelve years. I particularly searched for deeper understanding of the 
events and motives that were vague and not documented earlier. In the 
selection process of interviewees, I tried to pick a balanced group of actors. I 
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chose one of the interviewees from the customer side of the platform, one 
from the software provider and one from truck manufacturer category. These 
interviews were semi-constructed interviews; I posed questions about the 
events I needed more information of, the after math of the MSI, and how the 
MSI has helped the actors in their projects today. Also, I let them to talk 
about their views and ideas of the project, other events they wanted to focus 
on, or to express their views on what they perceived as successes or failures 
of the MSI and finally on how such shared platform initiative would have 
happened today. In general, I tried to keep a “balance between excessive 
passivity and over direction” (Walsham, 1995, p. 78) while interviewing.  
Complementary interviews were transcribed, shortly after, and further 
corrected by me. Later the interviews were sent to the MSI project manager 
for an ultimate validation to get feedback if there are conflicting views on the 
timeline or events presented by the interviewee. 
I approached my project in a double hermeneutics form inspired by Porra et 
al.’s work (2005); that is, I treated the meanings actors assigned to their past 
with the understanding that these meanings were already interpretations of 
the actual happenings. While writing the story, I also interpreted the evidence 
based on my understanding and readings. However, where applicable, I used 
primary sources to strengthen the reliability of interviews, meeting notes or 
emails (e.g., funding application).  
 “A transcript is literally something reduced to writing but for 
an historian it has a broader meaning as well: it is the placing 
of the historian’s written words in the schema of those which 
were written before.” (Mason et al., 1997b, p. 317).  
After putting together the story of each phase, I put the pieces together and 
looked into the relationship between each phase analyzing the patterns. I put 
a historical context of the project (presented as Research Setting) to describe 
the industry before the MSI started. This background was provided to help 
reader to understand the complexity of the problem the MSI thrived to solve. 
Finally, I added quotes from the data to support the story where needed.     
 While writing and interpreting the material, I tried to take the outside 
observer role other than involved researcher. However, I agree with Walsham 
(1995) that neither of these roles (i.e., observer or involved) result in pure 
objective results since researcher’s subjectivity affects different stages of the 
study. I have not been totally unbiased through the process. First, I have 
followed the data through angles that I have been interested to explore. 
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Second, I have had my interpretations of the project both because of my 
involvement and because of my perceptions of events. Moreover, my 
education and work experiences motivated me to scrutinize technological 
aspects, which meant that technological shifts became a significant aspect of 
my research. 
I put together the final analysis in a journal paper that I wrote as the first 
author together with Rikard (2nd author) and Ulrike (3rd author). This journal 
paper is invited to resubmit to the Information System Research (ISR) 
journal. 
9.4 Methodological Reflections 
Mason et al.’s (1997b) historical analysis framework is proposed in a 
sequential form. However, as Porra et al. (2014) have briefly pointed out, it is 
more iterative and complicated than presented. The knowledge gained in each 
step caused me to go back to redo previous steps or revisit the assumptions 
made before. This problem stemmed from the lack of contextual knowledge I 
suffered from in dealing with the secondary data which Heaton (2008, p. 40) 
calls “problem of not having been there”. Therefore, I believe a researcher 
should not completely distance herself from actors involved in collecting the 
primary data for the sake of objectivity. Such contacts helped me to 
understand the material properly. The challenge, however, for me was that 
many of the actors were not reachable or uninterested to help. Indeed, 
remembering the events as they unfolded many years ago was not easy for 
those people I managed to talk to. 
Another challenge I faced was that the documentation of research material 
did not follow a proper guideline and different researchers had followed 
different methods to archive. The richer the data collected by researchers, the 
easier it was for me to re-analyze the qualitative data. More illustrative data 
archiving methods in collecting qualitative data, e.g., illustrative interview 
methods presented by Schultze and Avital (2010) had been of huge help. 
Because in some cases interviewees talked about a diagram or system 
demonstration document they were showing that was not attached to either 
the voice file or the transcript.    
The problem of “data fit” discussed in secondary analysis (Heaton, 2004); 
that is when the data is not enough or appropriate for the theory lens 
remained. Although, HA specifically focuses on guiding the process with 
data. I initially chose open innovation as the theory lens, but after 6 months 
realized that it did not match my data. This problem was heavily connected to 
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the lack of contextual understanding that can misguide the researcher to the 
“wrong” theory lens. Therefore, more illustrative data, availability of 
different sources for the same events, and more available actors and 
researchers to contact could have helped to prevent me from wasting a long 
time on the “data fit” problem. 
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10 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section, I apply the imbrication lens (Leonardi, 2011) framework to 
provide a detailed analysis of the reported shared platform initiative within 
the Swedish road haulage industry. The analysis is structured into three major 
technology architecture shifts that serve as a baseline for the key phases that 
make up the narrative of my case interpretation. Each phase consists of an 
imbrication pair. For each of these imbrication moments, I identify how the 
material and human agencies reciprocally shaped the platform’s 
technological architecture and coopetitive dynamics. For each phase I have 
determined the coopetitive dynamics between key actors of each actor type. 
10.1 Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi) 
Phase: January 2002 to April 2004 
 
Imbrication #1: Human → Material  
Back in the early 2000s, Swedish road haulage firms, most of whom were 
small to medium-sized players that specialized in the material they hauled 
(e.g., tree trunks, liquids), were faced with increasing competition from 
international logistics providers (e.g., Schenker, DHL). The haulers believed 
that the digitalization of their business processes would help them improve 
their efficiency and effectiveness.  
The haulers see information technology as one of the 
opportunities in helping them to improve against other 
[international] actors. Since we are strong in IT in Sweden, if 
we use this strength the costs decreases by becoming more 
effective (Managing director of Vehco, September 6, 2004).      
 
However, they faced two key hurdles: their lack of technological expertise 
and a fragmented IT infrastructure, which consisted of a number of best-in-
class systems that had been implemented as isolated solutions over the years.  
In order to digitalize their operations, the road haulers needed to integrate 
their systems. Something as simple as calculating the cost of a delivery had to 
be done manually by downloading and matching data from stationary, mobile 
and embedded systems. Many road haulers had therefore begun investing in 
custom integration solutions, which were developed and maintained by the 
 91 
vendor tapped to provide this service. These interfaces were fragile and 
unstable, as changes in one technology partner’s systems could disrupt the 
data flow. 
Overall, as small, technologically-unsophisticated players, the road haulers 
felt they were at the mercy of powerful actors like truck manufacturers, who 
frequently made changes to their embedded systems, thus forcing changes in 
the integration solutions, in which the road haulers had invested. 
The discontent many road haulers felt towards the truck manufacturers 
contributed to the fragmentation of their technological infrastructure, as they 
sought out niche IT vendors more willing to work with them:   
“The technology vendors can be categorized into two groups. 
The big players are the truck manufacturers… they’ve 
dominated so far. Then we have small niche firms that utilize 
emerging technologies to develop novel solutions. Road 
haulers are suspicious of the truck manufacturers due to their 
brand-specific thinking so they find the smaller vendors to be 
a bit more flexible… these vendors do what it takes to 
convince the haulers to implement their specific products.” 
(Managing director of Vehco, April 26, 2002) 
Into this fractious market stepped Vehco, a university-sponsored start-up in 
embedded IT that positioned itself as a provider of technology services that 
helped road haulers improve their competitiveness and develop 
environmentally sustainable business practices. Having just completed a 
study of haulers’ IT requirements and the competitive landscape of the IT 
vendors serving the industry, Vehco had developed a prototype, called 
EcoHauler, that integrated data from stationary, mobile and embedded 
systems. This prototype was the result of three months of thesis work by a 
student at Vehco. Even though the prototype simulated order data from 
stationary software the vision was to develop a full-fledged solution that 
integrated all three islands of technology: 
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“Since Vehco does not work with order-handling system, the 
goal is that the solution gets connected to commercial systems 
that exist on the market, e.g., Hogia’s transport planning 
system… The PDA in the truck is used for handling orders, 
and at the same time to save the [embedded] parameters for 
automatic cost-tracking, e.g., fuel consumption.” (Managing  
director of Vehco, September 6, 2004) 
 
EcoHauler generated not only reports that calculated per-delivery costs, but 
also provided a calculation of emissions per delivery. In order to get 
embedded data from the truck, telematics service providers like Vehco had 
two options: rely on the Fleet Management System (FMS) standard to access 
the parameters that the truck manufacturers’ telematics applications made 
available, or derive data by reverse engineering the truck’s CAN-bus. Vehco, 
like other telematics firms (e.g., Transics), opted for the latter because the 
data provided through the FMS standard was very limited and not frequently 
updated, thus constraining the telematics vendors’ ability to innovate: 
“We looked into FMS very early [when it was released] in all 
brands: Iveco, Mercedes, Scania, and Volvo. But we got 
concerned about the errors it had especially in displaying fuel 
consumption... [Now] we have collaboration with Drivec… [a 
company that] takes the data directly from the CAN-BUS.” 
(Managing director at Transics, March 10, 2004) 
 The truck manufacturers voiced their opposition to this integration practice, 
highlighting that it compromised the integrity – and thus the safety – of the 
vehicle:  
“What [Vehco] did was actually bad installations… they were 
piggybacking on the CAN. It made the CAN network function 
improperly and in some cases this even caused accidents. We 
didn’t see this as a major problem, but still you don’t want 
someone else to play with the nerves in your heart.” (Global 
telematics manager at Volvo Trucks, April 25, 2016) 
Even though Volvo Trucks regarded Vehco’s EcoHauler prototype as a 
warranty infringement, it did not pursue legal action. Given Vehco’s start-up 
status and its commitment to helping the small road haulers in Sweden to 
increase their efficiency, effectiveness and environmental sustainability with 
IT, a law suit would have been bad for the truck manufacturers’ public image 
and customer relations. Nevertheless, the hostility between the telematics 
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providers and the truck manufacturers was palpable, especially as truck 
manufacturers were developing their own telematics offering. 
In early 2002, Vehco approached the Viktoria Institute to initiate a research 
collaboration aimed at resolving the Swedish road haulage industry’s 
technology integration challenges. By teaming up with Viktoria’s Telematics 
Group, which had long-standing ties with transport companies, Vehco hoped 
to realize its agenda of revolutionizing the industry by developing a digital 
infrastructure that facilitated inter-technology and inter-firm integration. In 
May 2002, Vehco and the Telematics Group instigated the MSI platform 
initiative. Recognizing that they needed participation from key players in the 
road haulage industry (especially truck manufacturers, software providers, 
and road haulers), its project leaders decided to present Vehco’s prototype, 
EcoHauler, to industry players in an effort to make the MSI project’s 
objectives more tangible.  
The two seminars (held in Fall 2002) in which EcoHauler was presented, 
generated interest among the members of the Swedish Road Haulage 
Association (SRHA). This translated into a commitment to support the MSI 
initiative. For the IT vendors who supplied the industry with various 
solutions, the seminars provided insight into the road haulers’ struggles with 
IT integration and the business challenges this created, e.g., difficulties with 
inter-hauler cooperation on transport assignments. The seminars further 
signaled that the industry’s IT landscape would shift significantly if Vehco’s 
vision of an integration platform were to be realized. Specifically, each 
vendor – irrespective of their domain expertise in mobile, stationary or 
embedded technologies -- would have the opportunity to offer integration 
services, thus increasing the competition among players who had previously 
seen each other as complementors.  
In anticipation of this probable future, many of the IT vendors signed up to 
collaborate on the development of the MSI platform, partly to ensure the 
compatibility of their own solutions with the evolving platform, and partly to 
remain apprised of – and possibly affect – shifts in the competitive landscape. 
By Summer 2003, about a dozen industry players were members of the MSI 
initiative. Besides Viktoria Institute, Vehco, third parties (e.g., Gatespace), 
and a number of road haulers, the founding members of the shared platform 
initiative were software vendors Hogia, Prolog, Transics, and NL Partner, as 
well as the truck manufacturers Scania and Volvo Trucks.  
Initially, the researchers analyzed available IT solutions and core vendor 
competencies in detail. Interviews and other data sources from this period of 
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time showed that systems providing IT support to Swedish road haulage 
industry can be categorized in three sections: embedded, mobile, and 
stationary. The analysis documents from the varied range of available 
software at the time showed that the vendors were very much technology-
focused and promoted their solutions relative to competitors rather than 
placing hauler requirements and added value to customers in the center of 
their business mantra. It was therefore difficult for small haulers to identify 
gaps and overlaps between different solutions, effectively hampering 
attempts to combine solutions.  
The other prominent problem was lock-in effects; that is, many providers 
tried to lock their customers to buy only their products with various policies, 
e.g., Truck manufacturers offered only brand-specific solutions. On one hand, 
fleets with vehicles from multiple manufacturers were common and 
integrating different embedded and mobile components with the stationary 
systems was prohibitively expensive for small firms.  
“Contractors of haulers develop their own tailor-made 
solutions and try to act as system integrators. They utilize 
development resources, software, and hardware in a 
completely ad hoc fashion to accomplish these proprietary 
solutions.” (A transport and logistics manager at Volvo 
Trucks, October 16, 2003) 
On the other hand, although vendors were confined within their own 
technological paradigm and unable to comprehend wider design challenges, 
they actively promoted their solutions outside their core competence to 
increase market shares. This led to a persistent problem within the Swedish 
road haulage industry with failed IT implementation projects as haulers 
attempted to implement services offered by embedded, mobile, and stationary 
technology vendors in parallel.  
Based on this initial understanding of the socio-technical factors that 
contributed to the mobile-stationary divide in road haulage firms, the MSI 
project concluded that IT vendors and haulage firms should meet to discuss 
industry concerns. This resulted in two seminars organized by the SRHA, 
Vehco, and the Viktoria Institute during fall 2002 to discuss insights from the 
researchers’ interactions with IT vendors and road haulage firms. The 
seminars were relatively well attended, but it did not trigger collaboration 
initiatives. In addition, some vendors saw it as an opportunity to promote 
existing proprietary integration solutions to road haulers and thereby make 
sure the resulting platform technology was compatible with their installed 
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base. Given the prevailing mindset among vendors, it proved difficult to 
establish a coopetitive spirit among them. 
“Vendor representatives have to avoid selling their stuff at 
these occasions. In our discussion group Volvo did that… I 
experienced that Hogia, IBS, and myself didn’t. From other 
groups I heard that Transware did, but Scania didn’t. As 
moderators you need to find ways to get rid of such unwanted 
behavior. When I discuss functionality I should do it without 
tying specific features to the participating vendors.” (Sales 
manager of Locus Scandinavia, November 28, 2002) 
At the time, Gatespace Telematics, a telematics solutions vendor, was 
promoting OSGi (Open Service Gateway initiative) as an open architecture 
that afforded integration of road hauler’s systems.  It was therefore eager to 
participate in the MSI project. At the time, Gatespace Telematics was 
collaborating with Volvo Trucks to develop a solution that used CAN bus 
data to analyze driver work time. The OSGi architecture allowed software 
vendors to deploy a large array of wide-area-network services by providing a 
framework to integrate the disparate devices that made up embedded, mobile, 
and stationary systems. This made it a suitable option to respond to the 
haulers’ integration needs. Additionally, because OSGi had already been used 
to develop some shared platform initiatives in the telematics domain, and 
specifically in Volvo Trucks, the MSI project leaders decided to adopt this 
architecture for the development of its shared platform. 
Imbrication #2: Material → Human  
OSGi’s framework ran on top of a Java virtual machine and it offered a 
shared execution environment that installed, updated, and uninstalled 
applications (aka “bundles”). For software vendors to share information with 
each other they needed such bundles to request the data from a sending 
service. The OSGi server provided an interface for each such service (i.e., a 
piece of code that offered a template of variables and functions that the 
service was supposed to have). It also registered the service that a bundle had 
requested. 
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The OSGi architecture accomplished data integration as follows (Figure 9a):  
(1) Vendors implemented the data exchange between their system’s internal 
code and the OSGi bundle. (2) They loaded and installed the JAR file that 
included the OSGi bundles. (3) OSGi bundle in the sender system reads the 
data it needed out of the vendor’s system by help of a global data structure 
and (4) sent the data to the OSGi server requesting a service to send the data. 
(5) Service registrar at OSGi server registered the service to send the data. (6) 
The service sent the data to the receiver. (7) OSGi bundle at the receiver sent 
the data to the receiver’s system via a global data structure. 
The interdependencies in OSGi, made for high synergistic specificity 
between the platform core and the extensions (i.e., IT vendors’ systems). This 
created a situation of high coupling between the core and the extensions, 
which meant that the IT vendors would have to adapt their systems to meet 
the specific requirements of the OSGi bundles, thus limiting their systems’ 
reusability in other integration efforts. The implementation of the JAR file on 
the various vendors’ technological infrastructures also raised security 
concerns, as the OSGi server would be able to remotely access and update 
this client-side file. 
Figure 9 OSGi: (a) Technological architecture (left) and  
             (b) MSI network structure (right) 
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The initial idea of a technology architecture capable of alleviating 
communication problems between IT systems (originating from different 
software vendors) was shaped by the emergence of “OSGi”. Whereas the 
shared platform initiative explored this architectural approach for almost two 
years, it was originally suggested by Vehco as a way to tie heterogeneous 
technology components together in a coherent way. The value proposition 
sought for thus concerned ‘compatibility’ between technology vendors’ 
different solutions.  
Despite that several actors recognized OSGi to be an interesting option, 
Volvo was reluctant to pursue this architectural strategy when engaging in 
technology standard development. It had previously collaborated with 
Gatespace Telematics (a member of the OSGi alliance) and believed OSGi 
required too close access to its embedded computing resources (i.e., CAN-
BUS data). Volvo thus rejected the architectural strategy proposed by other 
members of the platform initiative. The truck manufacturer instead preferred 
an architectural approach to technology standard development that could 
serve as a layer over its own embedded components with minimum 
information access needed. One of the reasons was security because Volvo 
perceived a huge risk that OSGi would make it possible for alien technology 
components to access vehicle specific parameters and possibly even change 
them.  
“Vehco will never get into that OSGi from an OEM 
perspective… simply because then they’ve to become a tier 
one supplier. It’s still Volvo that has the responsibility for 
completing the service solution and they’re just a software 
company.” (Global telematics manager of Volvo Trucks, April 
25, 2016)  
Vendors thus worried that the OSGi architecture would compromise the 
integrity of their IT infrastructure and make their systems and data vulnerable 
to manipulations by the OSGi server.  On the other hand, client side OSGi 
bundles were specific to the vendor infrastructure on which they were 
installed. The data and functions in these bundles were not standardized and 
there was virtually no guidance on how to implement the client-side bundles. 
This made for low interface conformability. The tight core-extension 
coupling and low interface conformability made OSGi a poor fit for a shared 
platform.   
Given the complexity of the OSGi architecture and the desire to present the 
road haulers with a consistent and robust user experience, it was envisaged 
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that the MSI platform would be centrally run and managed. Vehco was 
chosen as the platform provider because it was seen as having the most 
credibility with the road haulers, due to its development of EcoHauler, which 
had triggered the MSI project.  
As the MSI members contemplated an OSGi based architecture, they became 
increasingly uneasy. A centralized platform managed by one vendor, namely 
Vehco, meant that the customer-supplier relationships of all IT vendors 
whose systems were being integrated, would be mediated (Figure 9b). The 
proposed platform architecture thus threatened their market position in two 
ways: as the platform provider, Vehco had the customer’s ear and was likely 
to become the preferred vendor, and as a result of its centrality, would be able 
to exert control over the other vendors, foisting its architectural decisions 
onto them. These apparent constraints imposed on the vendors’ strategic 
options, increased the hostility the mediated vendors expressed towards 
Vehco.  
In addition, it became clear that OSGi was ill-suited for the development of 
an industry platform with heterogeneous actors, largely due to its complex 
approach to data access management: 
“You need so much control of the OSGi architectural solution. 
Standardizing things in ways that everybody can understand is 
doable for sure, but implementing OSGi across all these 
suppliers of technology you know would be like mission 
impossible… the data access aspect is so complex to manage.” 
(Managing Director of Vehco during this phase, July 1, 2016) 
Even though the OSGi architecture was abandoned as a solution for the MSI 
platform, the members of the initiative nevertheless continued to work 
towards their vision of an industry integration infrastructure. At a minimum, 
the collaborative efforts thus far had established the haulers’ problems as real 
and as worth solving.  
10.2 Web Services (WS) Phase: May 2004 to 
December 2009 
Imbrication #3: Human  Material  
The fragmentation of IT support for road haulage firms was a result of 
institutionalized vendor behavior. Most of them were reluctant to share and 
rethink their business strategy and that undermined their ability to participate 
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in some form of collective action. In that situation, it was impossible to 
initiate cooperation between competing vendors that promoted different and 
in many respects incompatible IT solutions. A critical next step was therefore 
to expand the platform initiative to start changing the relationships and 
structures that kept different technology vendors apart. Over a period of six 
months, in quest for the appropriate architecture structure, the MSI project 
focused on this challenge through explorations with IT vendors, road haulage 
firms, and truck manufacturers. In 2004, a group of dominating industry 
players was in place. Besides Viktoria Institute and Vehco, the founding 
members were Hogia, NL Partner (was acquired by Locus Scandinavia in late 
2005), Scania, and Volvo. All actors believed the arrangement was necessary 
to establish the inter-organizational processes required for continued industry 
digitalization. The platform initiative was formalized in a researcher-client 
agreement to secure commitment and specify roles and responsibilities.  
A government agency (VINNOVA) provided funding for the collaboration 
through the project “Value-Creating IT for Road-Haulage Firms” As a first 
step, the partners decided to focus on reuse and reconfigure architectural 
knowledge from already established projects that aimed at integrating 
embedded, mobile, and stationary technologies into coherent digital 
infrastructures. The researchers identified the ongoing integration projects, 
and the other platform members provided access to their cases of 
heterogeneous technology integration, in effect transcending the long-
standing tradition of vendors black boxing their integration procedures.  
The ongoing integration projects were generally quite modest in terms of 
technological innovation, and it became apparent that simply reusing and 
reconfiguring architectural knowledge from different vendors would have a 
limited effect. In fact, all projects had failed to successfully integrate the 
involved heterogeneous technologies because of lack of knowledge sharing 
suggesting that no single vendor had the capacity to develop a comprehensive 
digital infrastructure of embedded, mobile, and stationary systems. Most of 
the vendors realized their inability to handle technologies outside their core 
competency, especially in situations involving technology embedded into 
vehicles. Hence, the discussion of lessons across integration projects had 
started to move competing vendors towards closer cooperation. 
The researchers’ continued analyses of the integration projects showed that 
proprietary interfaces both supported and inhibited cooperation amongst 
vendors and haulage firms. The fact that the IT vendors had created those 
interfaces suggested they realized a need for digital infrastructures that 
integrated components from diverging sources. The vendors were not able to 
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control such development to strengthen their competitive positions. But, the 
different proprietary interfaces also adversely affected cooperation 
opportunities. These interfaces were published by stationary vendors to allow 
their embedded and mobile counterparts to connect to their solutions. So, 
embedded and mobile vendors had to comply with the interfaces if they 
wanted to help haulers establish integrated digital solutions.  
Reflecting the technological frames and market strategies of the vendors of 
stationary technology, researchers found that the interfaces offered 
comprehensive support for the stationary systems. In contrast, interface 
architecture did not support mobile and, particularly, embedded technology 
and they were therefore at the heart of the mobile-stationary divide that 
effectively separated relevant actors.  
Further explorations suggested that vendors of embedded technology also 
adopted protective strategies to maintain their competitive positions. Several 
road haulage firms were not able to evaluate truck performance via their PC-
based fleet management systems because inclusion of vehicle sensor data, 
such as fuel consumption, was hindered by proprietary interfaces truck 
manufacturers offered. As a result, it was difficult to promote sustainable 
transport solutions. Insight into these problems with proprietary interfaces 
further stimulated the members of the platform initiative to create better 
knowledge sharing opportunities amongst vendors and road haulers.  
In addition, the researchers also sought to maintain the commitment from the 
SRHA and to enroll individuals with enough architectural knowledge on the 
ongoing digital infrastructure challenge. The researchers therefore attended a 
number of meetings with the SRHA IT forum to discuss socio-technical 
issues related to technology integration. Although the expert groups within 
SRHA appreciated the insights from the researchers, the interactions did not 
lead to further support from the SRHA. To be able to scrutinize possible 
architecture candidates for the shared platform, researchers hired former 
telematics manager at Scania. He was at the time running his own business, 
ASN IT & Management, offering education about transport process 
innovation through standardized systems integration to individual road 
haulage firms and regional road haulage associations. Given his interest and 
background, he was invited to join the shared platform initiative. 
In 2004, a telematics manager from Volvo expressed Volvo’s desire to 
pursue digitalization in a presentation for various actors in the industry. Well 
aware of Volvo’s own problems to build business around embedded 
technology in its vehicles, he predicted that the already limited IT 
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investments made by road haulers could easily be reduced even more. What 
was required was a market place for service innovation that would operate 
based on modularized digital infrastructures enabled by standardized 
interfaces. He believed shared platform initiative is a good place to build that 
market place. Technology vendors also agreed that a standardized industry 
interface could help resolve the tensions surrounding integration of 
embedded, mobile, and stationary systems. Finding leaders for changes 
proved to be challenging. Researchers suggested that customers groups take 
bigger role. Therefore, the platform initiative sought support from the SRHA, 
but it turned the invitation down due to competence and resource shortages.  
Having abandoned OSGi as integration architecture for the MSI platform, the 
members of the initiative hired a consultant to identify architectural 
alternatives. The truck manufacturers (i.e., Scania and Volvo Trucks) 
emphasized that they preferred architecture based on a standardized interface, 
which could serve as a layer over their own embedded components with read-
only access to a limited set of CAN bus parameters. Because of their high 
status in the shared platform initiative, the truck manufacturers’ demands 
effectively reduced the scope of the project’s agenda. Vehco planned to help 
haulage operations with their environmental reports by combining embedded 
truck data with stationary route and order management data. The truck 
manufacturers’ refusal to make embedded data accessible beyond the FMS 
standard meant that Vehco’s visions could not be realized. At this time, 
following the decision to drop the OSGi architecture, Gatespace Telematics 
left the MSI initiative. 
Examining successful custom integration projects that MSI members had 
implemented for road haulers, the consultant identified the Pharos Mobile 
standard as the most promising architecture for the MSI platform. Pharos 
Mobile was an interface that had been developed for contractor haulers 
specializing in package delivery. These players were larger than the road 
haulers but smaller than global logistics providers such as DHL and 
Schenker. Nevertheless, they executed routine and pre-defined transport 
assignments with little variation in information needs. 
 The standard relied on XML messaging to integrate data across technologies 
and several MSI members were already familiar with it. E-Com Logistics, the 
developer of Pharos Mobile, was therefore invited to run a workshop for MSI 
members. While the members recognized the merits of a messaging-based 
architecture, they nevertheless noted that the Pharos Mobile message 
schemas (i.e., their content and structure) were likely to require significant 
modifications, as noted in a report:   
102 
“Developed by e-Com Logistics, the Pharos Mobile is a 
standard specifically intended for transports carried out by 
contractors of haulers. For us the problem is that it’s too large, 
too detailed, but yet too small… its focus simply is on 
cargo/package transports.”(Project report2, October 11, 2004) 
In the summer of 2004, the MSI members concluded that it would be easier 
to develop a standard from scratch than to adapt Pharos Mobile. However, 
they were committed to adopting XML (Extensible Markup Language) for 
their interface protocol and web services (WS) as the architecture for the 
platform core. Most of the technology providers in the MSI consortium had 
experience of WS and they were either already using XML as the data 
exchange format or were trying to comply with it. As a vendor of stationary 
technology that had considerable experience with WS-based mobile-
stationary integration, Hogia offered its XML message format to the MSI 
consortium. Hogia’s proprietary XML structure soon became the baseline for 
the platform’s standard interface. 
Imbrication #4: Material  Human  
Integration by means of a WS architecture is accomplished as follows (Figure 
10a): (1) both sender and receiver implement the code to communicate with 
the web service and to pack/unpack the XML file; (2) the sender prepared the 
XML file that contains the required data as specified by the MSI standard; (3) 
the sender sends the XML file to the MSI webserver; (4) after assessing that 
the XML file conforms to the MSI standards, the MSI web service sends an 
acknowledgement to the sender; (5) the MSI web service sends the data to the 
receiver; (6a) upon receipt of the XML file, the receiver sends an 
acknowledgement to the web service, and (6b) unpacks the XML file, 
extracting the data and transforming it into the recipient’s own data structure.  
This architectural logic meant that a vendor did not have to install and load 
any third-party modules on its infrastructure to connect to the MSI platform. 
Each vendor simply had to incorporate the send and receive tags into its 
system module so as to control what data was transmitted in and out of it. 
This decreased synergistic specificity and core-extension coupling. This loose 
coupling structure let the vendors choose to which data requests to respond 
and with what information. Also, because a vendor did not have to share a 
                                                   
2 Report’s title is Beneficial IT development for the haulage industry: 
standardization of data transport between vehicles and existing systems 
(original: Nyttoskapande IT för åkeribranschen: standardisering av 
datatransport mellan fordon och befintliga system) 
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data structure with a foreign module at runtime, changes in one did not have 
domino effect on others. 
The standardized XML message format provided the software vendors with 
an interface that was the same for every vendor.  Therefore, every vendor 
could decide internally how they wanted to design data structures to work 
with the XML file. Even though most of the vendors had worked with XML 
and had thorough knowledge of web services, this did not obviate the need 
for well documented tags and processes.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Web Services: (a) Technological architecture (left) and  
(b) MSI network structure (right) 
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The standard was assessed and revised multiple times in light of proprietary 
interfaces and ongoing integration projects. Revisions can be categorized in 
three groups: 
•To support management of working hours, initial designs 
included inter-system communication between fleet 
management monitoring services and data from vehicle 
sensors. However, members found it difficult to conceptualize 
the required mapping and management of working hours was 
removed from the standard.  
•Incorporating sensor data from embedded systems could give 
mobile and stationary vendors competitive advantages. Hence, 
concerns from embedded vendors resulted in a compromise to 
only include embedded data relevant to transport assignment. 
While fuel consumption was included, high-resolution data 
used for other purposes such as vehicle maintenance and 
engine development were excluded.  
•A context schema was developed to support terminology that 
reflected firm-specific local conditions. Based on this 
mechanism, the MSI standard could adapt to specific business 
terms in any given communication. However, this triggered a 
discussion of who was responsible for defining and managing 
the schemas. In the end, it was agreed to assign this 
responsibility to the stationary vendors. 
Due to the modularity of the architecture, which demanded fewer resources 
from IT vendors to implement, as well as the expectation that every vendor 
could now act as an integrator on the MSI platform’s community-managed 
core (Figure 10b), the MSI initiative attracted many new members from the 
industry. These included Consafe Logistics (a stationary provider), as well as 
three mobile providers, Barkfors, Cybercom, and Pocketmobile. The degree 
of comfort that the MSI members had with the WS architecture was also 
noticeable during workshops and meetings; the IT vendors were much more 
engaged and discussions were less abstract. 
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The development of the standard accelerated from early 2005. The 
researchers realized these efforts would put the cooperative spirit within the 
platform initiative to test. They therefore decided to host all meetings on 
neutral ground. Vendors, especially those with little previous experience of 
cooperative development efforts, appreciated the Viktoria Institute as the 
physical meeting place. To spur further interactions among ecosystem 
members, a forum for developers from different vendors, called “Mobile-
Stationary Online Development Forum”, was launched. It did not generate 
very active participation, but the discussions nevertheless led to significant 
design decisions. During spring 2005 there were meaningful interactions 
across vendors and haulers with a commitment to overcome the negative 
impact of proprietary interfaces. The platform initiative had grown strong 
enough to resist diverging pressures.  
However, the MSI project came to an abrupt and unanticipated halt in 
September 2005, after the MSI members had been working with its XML 
data structures for about a year. Hogia announced that it would withdraw 
from the MSI project due to infringement of its intellectual property rights. 
Additionally, Hogia threatened to sue the other MSI platform members and to 
shut down the initiative in order to preserve its competitive position as a 
system integrator. In an email sent to the Viktoria institute, Hogia expressed 
their concerns:  
“When we were asked to share our experiences of 
standardization… we assumed Viktoria was a research 
institute and therefore voluntarily shared our material with the 
group. To my knowledge, however, it wasn’t part of the 
agreed plan that Viktoria would then present a standard that 
competed with us and other providers. … Hogia would never 
give away something that someone else could further develop 
into an alternative to our own product.”(CEO of Hogia, 19 
September, 2005) 
IBS, a vendor of enterprise resource planning systems similar to Hogia, did 
not perceived the MSI platform as a threat, but saw it as an opportunity to 
increase its install base by streamlining the effort of connecting with 
disparate technologies offered by a variety of vendors. Instead of continuing 
to implement integration projects using their own proprietary integration 
solution, IBS had adopted a new mindset of simplifying system integration 
through an industry-specific shared platform in order to create more value for 
their customers:  
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“Hogia still argues like… ‘we have our own integration 
solutions and our own standard, so why would we take part in 
this effort?’ It’s simply their business model and making 
specific solutions for each and every customer firm is 
profitable for them. But then you think what a standard 
actually means… it’s a solution that many use. IBS has 
already done several integration solutions that build on MSI.” 
(Sales manager of IBS, December 5, 2007) 
Eventually, Hogia distributed a letter to the platform initiative declaring it 
had left the initiative, publicly denouncing legal action, and referring to a 
company history of a self-developed open interface and a commitment to 
applied research. The TRB spokesperson’s active role throughout this process 
had eventually made TRB the prominent representative for haulers and 
emphasized the centrality of haulers and TRB.  
The MSI initiative faced considerable uncertainty because it did not have any 
IPR policies in place. However, platform members had come to see the value 
of MSI more clearly both for the industry and their own businesses:  
“[The MSI platform] offers its members a competitive 
advantage because it serves as a mechanism that neutralizes 
competition from non-member firms. The more players are 
involved, the better it works.” (Marketing Director of 
Pocketmobile, mobile computing vendor, November 5, 2008) 
During this period, the platform initiative got funding from SWICT to 
transform the activity into a commercial standardization consortium. 
Consequently, researchers and members started to design and implement 
principles for development, maintenance, and diffusion.  
To protect individual MSI member firms against future legal action, the 
shared platform initiative was officially transformed into a commercial 
industry consortium, called the Mobile Stationary Interface Group (MSIG), 
in Fall 2007. It was financed via member fees and developed a formal 
organizational structure with a board of directors, a strategy team, and a 
technical committee. 
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10.3 Business Process Module Phase: 
January 2010 to June 2016 
Imbrication #5: Human → Material  
Following the establishment of the MSIG, the shared platform initiative 
received attention in the trade press and its members promoted it at a series of 
national road transport events.  
Increasingly the MSIG members acknowledged that the MSI standard helped 
them reduce the time and effort needed to integrate data from different 
vendors’ products. Indeed, an increasingly synchronized architectural 
understanding among software vendors meant that even integration efforts 
that did not use the MSI platform benefited from the vendors’ increased 
knowledge about each other’s’ technologies. Hogia soon realized that 
integration practices were changing and it therefore decided to return to the 
shared platform initiative.  
In addition to the technology providers, there were also major road haulage 
firms that recognized the benefits that the MSI platform provided them:  
 “The MSI standard is an absolute necessity for us to cope 
with future market requirements. It allows us to spend more 
time on increasing our market penetration, which will result in 
improved profitability for ourselves and our customers. It can 
also help to neutralize (unwanted) competition in the 
marketplace by lowering switching costs and thereby making 
technology components easier to replace.” (IT director at 
Samfrakt, a large road haulage firm, August 22, 2006) 
In early 2010, one of the largest road haulers in Sweden, LBC Frakt 
Värmland, put out a request for proposals to integrate its varied systems 
using the MSI platform. Given the size of the project, several software 
vendors bid on this assignment, but all of their offerings relied on proprietary 
interfaces rather than the MSI architecture. LBC Frakt Värmland eventually 
selected two vendors on the mobile side and Locus Scandinavia for the 
stationary part of its architecture and tasked them to leverage the MSI 
standard in the integration.  
Unfortunately, the integrators faced difficulties in large part because the 
flexibility offered by the XML context schema had encouraged the 
accommodation of too many software vendors’ specific integration needs, 
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thus bloating the interface. LBC Frakt Värmland concluded these problems 
aggravated the integration situation. They decided to abandon the MSI 
platform and rely on Locus’ proprietary interface. Nevertheless, the vendor 
was instructed to make its integration solution MSI-compliant.  
The outcome was a solution for transport order management, which 
represented a subset of the processes that the MSI standard supported. MSIG 
learned that the complexity of system integration could be managed 
effectively by dividing the MSI standard into modules that dealt with specific 
business processes. After some consideration, a decision was taken to 
decompose the standard into four modules, each supporting a different 
business process.  
Imbrication #6: Material  Human  
Applying the logic of maximum reusability, MSIG divided the MSI interface 
along horizontal and vertical lines (Figure 11a): (1) header tags specifying the 
message (e.g., type, sender, receiver), that each transmission needed, were 
moved into a ‘general’ module, which all messages had to inherit to work on 
the MSI core; and (2) XML tags specifying the parameters related to one of 
four business processes, i.e., order management, resource management, route 
optimization and reroute management ended up in separate modules. The 
order management module dealt with order fulfillment, i.e., scheduling 
deliveries so that they occurred within the customer-specified time frame and 
calculating the delivery costs of an order. The purpose of the resource 
management module was to store information about the hauler’s 
heterogeneous array of resources that needed to be tracked and accounted for 
during an order’s fulfillment (e.g., staff, trucks, gasoline). Use cases for the 
route optimization module included sequencing deliveries so that 
transportation costs were minimized, taking into consideration the delivery 
window specified by the customer as well as traffic information. An 
extension of route optimization was the reroute module, which afforded the 
dynamic, just-in-time recalculation of the optimal route as transport 
conditions changed, e.g., a road accident or mechanical problems.  
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While the MSI interface developed during the WS architectural phase 
represented the starting point for the BPM architecture, the more modular 
BPM interface was both more streamlined and more extensive. Given the 
difficulties with conformability caused by numerous, vendor-specific variants 
of parameters that were almost identical to each other, the re-design of the 
XML message templates harmonized the interface, standardizing the format 
and meaning of each variable. The simplification of the interface, coupled 
with improved documentation, significantly improved its conformability.  
Additionally, by limiting the design focus to a specific business process, the 
parameter set grew to afford a deeper, more variable and subtle 
representation of a business process. Many of these new XML tags were 
anticipatory in the sense that the need for them had not yet been expressed 
but was likely to emerge in future. Thus, the IT vendors competing for the 
integration work in any one of the four business process verticals had the 
opportunity to distinguish themselves by leveraging some of these new 
parameters. Notably, by creating a loosely coupled architecture, increased 
modularization also afforded generativity. 
The more process-oriented BPM architecture made the road haulage industry 
more appealing to new entrants that had capabilities relevant to the industry. 
While this increased competition among the players in a given business 
process vertical (e.g., order management), it also created network effects that 
made the IT vendor capable of leveraging other players’ offerings in creative 
ways. These potential network effects, made possible through the modularity 
  
 Figure 11 Business Process Modules: 
 (a) Technological architecture (left) and (b) MSI network structure (right) 
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of the interface, moderated the competition among the vendors in a given 
vertical (Figure 11b).  
One of the new entrants to the MSIG was DPS, a vendor of route 
optimization software recognized as having developed one of the best route 
optimization algorithms in Europe. The modular architecture and the 
flexibility in integration that it promised created the conditions for DPS to 
consider entering the Swedish road haulage market for the first time: 
“To be honest I think everybody in road transport should have 
tried to grab what we’re doing like fifteen years ago… But 
they haven’t so that’s why MSI appears so interesting to us. 
Given the language it offers and its focus on flexible 
technology integration, we eventually get the leverage our 
product deserves. We need this standard to reduce the barriers 
and materialize the plug and play vision… then we’re all set 
and ready to go.” (DPS managing director, August 18, 2010) 
While the order management module had been largely developed by Locus 
for LBC Frakt and was therefore considered relatively complete, and the 
resource and re-route management modules were dependent on the 
implementation of the order management and route optimization modules, 
the latter became the focus of attention during the development of the BPM 
architecture. Even though the order management module was considered the 
most crucial of the road haulers’ integration requirements, the urgency of the 
route optimization module was buoyed by renewed emphasis on 
environmental sustainability.  
Despite DPS’s newcomer status in the MSIG community, it took on the 
leadership of the route optimization module. Even though this position 
implied that DPS would have to cooperate with the participants in this 
particular vertical, its managing director explained why the company 
expected competition with these vendors to be moderate at best: 
 “We actually welcome openly sharing our expertise. It’s 
likely it would lead to potentially more business negotiations 
for us and I expect us to win them all in the end. We’ve 
learned it takes a lot of time and resources to develop an 
effective optimization engine, so I guess others understand 
they’re well behind us… We’re therefore not afraid 
competition would intensify in that way.” (DPS managing 
director, January 26, 2012) 
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Nevertheless, despite initial support from all MSIG members, the 
development of the route optimization effort ran afoul of the truck 
manufacturers’ fundamental unwillingness to make sensor data beyond the 
requirements of the FMS standard available. Thus, while DPS anticipated 
little competition from other IT vendors, the truck manufacturers did not 
strictly fall into this category. Instead, as owners of the vehicle sensor data, 
they were in a position to limit the scope of the MSI route optimization 
module thus restricting the value creation potential of the IT vendors who 
could now more easily offer services to the road haulers thanks to the 
modular architecture. Once again refusing to cooperate fully in the MSI 
platform initiative, Volvo Trucks and Scania left the MSIG this time. Before 
departure, in 2011, they had already banded together to develop an 
integration effort with similar goals to MSI with DHL.  
The emergence of “Apps” as a new architectural vision, however, 
complicated the completion of the modularization of the standard and its 
subsequent diffusion. In fact, the truck manufacturers started to phase out 
gradually. Volvo had originally joined the initiative with the ambition to 
make it more international. However, the slow progress in combination with 
the clear focus on small Swedish road haulage firms meant that Volvo started 
to question its role in it. In the midst of everything, the platform initiative 
faced yet another emerging major technology architecture shift, namely 
Apps. The proponents of this architectural idea envisioned that apps would 
resolve many of the integration difficulties that plagued the transport industry 
in the past. Consequently, trying to secure its foothold in this emerging 
market, Volvo started to move away from the strategies the ongoing platform 
initiative pursued.  
Platform members were still busy fine-tuning the modularized XML-standard 
and did not pay enough attention to the implications the new technology 
architecture shift presented to them. Eventually other software providers 
started to lose interest as well. They felt they had achieved the goal of the 
platform initiative (their objective was to be able to integrate with other 
software in the market and have a better understanding of each other’s 
software) and they realized a new technology integration landscape was 
emerging rapidly.  
Despite the truck manufacturers’ departure, the modularization effort of the 
MSI interface continued and the four business process modules were handed 
over to MSIG in late 2012. However, IT vendors’ interest in the platform 
waned just like the truck manufacturers’. They made no effort to push the 
diffusion of the MSI business process modules for the integration of the road 
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haulers’ three islands of technology; instead, they returned to the pre-MSI 
practice of building custom and proprietary interfaces to the systems being 
integrated for a given hauler. This could be explained, in part, by their 
improved knowledge of others’ systems, which made it more feasible to 
implement their proprietary integration solutions at competitive rates. 
Furthermore, given the truck manufacturers’ repeated refusal to make 
available embedded sensor data, the IT vendors had become somewhat 
disillusioned about the prospects of developing truly innovative solutions for 
road haulers, e.g., just-in-time inter-firm load sharing.      
MSIG’s attempts to reenergize its members in order to diffuse the MSI 
platform faced considerable roadblocks. Given the road haulers’ diversity and 
their lack of technological sophistication, they were unable to express their 
emerging needs. Additionally, many IT vendors were increasingly aware that 
the MSI platform was not readily reusable in other (e.g., international) 
settings, making it difficult for them to recoup their investment in the MSI 
platform, especially in light of the small size of the Swedish road hauler 
market. Given these overwhelming odds, the MSIG’s board of directors 
decided to terminate the shared platform initiative in Spring 2013.   
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11 DISCUSSION 
Industrial products and processes are increasingly enabled by computing and 
communication capabilities based on digital sensors, networks, processors, 
and software. Given that the pervasiveness of such technologies reduces the 
gap between the digital and physical worlds (Lyytinen & Yoo, 2002), 
organizations are able to store, mobilize, and interpret information sources 
unavailable in the past (Yoo, 2010; Yoo et al., 2012). Smart trucks equipped 
with a GPS chip, two-dimensional barcodes, and RFID, for example, can 
send and receive information about their states, locations, and movements. 
These newfound information sources help logistic partners reshape and 
optimize their integrated supply chains by recognizing alterations in 
inventory levels, market demands, and transport constraints. 
 Such digitally enabled capabilities create opportunities for new behaviors not 
seen in the past, ultimately changing the concept of a service. However, 
although IT-enabled services are truly intangible, their co-production relies 
on processes that involve a complex array of heterogeneous and often 
autonomous technological and social elements. Technology standards can 
facilitate co-evolution of these items and thereby help build and sustain 
shared platform initiatives that afford industry players requisite opportunities 
to create new IT-based value in service delivery (Andersson et al., 2008; 
Lyytinen & Newman, 2008). Yet, we know little about the role of technology 
standardization in the longitudinal evolution of digitalization within specific 
industries where these standards enroll organizations into dynamic 
ecosystems that energize or inhibit the emergence of innovative services.  
Against this background, my research concerns a shared platform initiative 
that led to a technology standard in the Swedish road haulage industry. From 
the start of the process back in 2002, the project aimed at diagnosing and 
resolving problems associated with the adoption of embedded, mobile, and 
stationary IT systems in road haulage firms. The main issue identified was 
the existence of proprietary, incompatible systems that were widely resisted 
by haulage firms (Andersson & Lindgren, 2005). While technology vendors 
were reluctant to transfer knowledge and power to user organizations, the 
haulage firms had difficulties to prioritize strategic considerations mainly 
because of their focus on short-term execution of everyday operations. 
Indeed, the SRHA did not have a clear idea of how to support the ongoing 
digitalization of their members, which meant that calls from the researchers 
for help remained unanswered. Emergence of OSGi provided platform 
members with interoperability opportunities. It accelerated cooperation 
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between competitor members of the consortia. However, it did not allow 
members to choose their level of data openness.  
Later, however, the platform initiative experienced a breakthrough when 
Volvo showed interest in the project and asked members to join the shared 
platform. Not only did encourage the technology vendor community; it also 
brought haulage firms to the table because TRB Sweden saw this as an 
excellent opportunity to pursue the standardization agenda it had been 
promoting for long. Consequently, given the lack of standardized ways to 
integrate heterogeneous technologies into digital infrastructures, it was 
decided that IT vendors, haulage firms, transport industry representatives, 
and action researchers would jointly develop a technology standard 
(Andersson et al., 2008). 
The introduction of the group to Web Services and XML standard 
encouraged members to work closer on the development of the platform and 
standardizing the interface. This architecture gave platform members the 
interoperability opportunities while giving providers more control over their 
openness degree. This decreased their perceived competition and accelerated 
the development procedure. 
Throughout the development process, the emerging standard served as a 
boundary object (Carlile, 2002) that allowed the involved actors to reuse and 
reconfigure architectural knowledge embedded into current practices and to 
co-create visions for digital industry infrastructures. The different versions of 
the standard embodied the latest knowledge created and enabled continued 
conversations about innovative business processes. Hence, the standard was 
shaped iteratively through an unfolding industry ecosystem in which 
individuals and organizations alike engaged in perspective making and 
perspective taking (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995) to learn from each other, while 
at the same time maintaining their own understanding (Boland, Lyytinen, & 
Yoo, 2007). That is, the process was shaped through the identities and core 
competencies of the involved actors and how that in turn reshaped the 
relationships between them. While the boundaries between vendors of 
embedded, mobile, and stationary technologies initially were anything but 
clear, the establishment of MSI Group helped create transparency and 
facilitated new patterns of cooperation. Indeed, this standardization 
consortium helped its members position themselves, ultimately creating 
better conditions for joint implementation projects. However, the knowledge 
they gained from each other’s business processes and platform architectures 
did not have desirable outcomes for all members involved, e.g., it threatened 
Hogia’s business strategy in phase 2.  
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Clearly, a key outcome of the standardization process was the establishment 
of the MSI Group. As a commercial consortium of vendors of embedded, 
mobile, and stationary transport systems as well as truck manufacturers and 
road haulage firms, the group made the MSI standard available to the 
Swedish road transport industry. While there are examples of road haulers 
that have completed MSI-based integration projects, the standard was also 
increasingly present in situations where such firms requested offerings from 
vendors.  
Modularization of platform architecture motivates higher generativity degree 
(Yoo et al., 2012) however shared platform governance should not allow for 
a third party to get control over the interface design. Such governance 
practices threaten platform’s evolution. Adopting the design for 
complementors should not take the center stage so that the design of platform 
misses the technological shifts in the industry. Such precautions are of higher 
importance for shared platform there compatibility of platforms is the reason 
of shared platform existence.  
Several IT vendors have implemented the standard in their software 
packages, and truck manufacturers have promoted it globally throughout their 
organizations. Despite the platform not being used, the MSI Group was seen 
by many as a nexus of digital innovation in the road transport industry. The 
group represented a physical and cognitive arena that operated at the industry 
level and catered for value-creating interactions that transcended structural 
boundaries previously undermining complementary approaches. 
My presented analysis of coopetitive dynamics within the MSI initiative 
suggests shared platforms can serve as a neutral arena (“trading zone”) for 
actors to cooperate with their competitors with periods where these two 
modes of interaction are overlapping and periods where one of these two is 
dominating. Shared platform members who undertook competitive behaviors 
within coopetitive activities when they sought to develop a standard that 
would create value for all involved parties characterized the platform 
dynamics. My analysis traced this coopetitive dynamic through platform 
evolution and identified the emerging technology architecture shifts that 
challenged enacted governance strategies, ultimately leading to dynamic 
patterns of coopetition in the platform ecosystem over time (Gawer, 2014; 
Tiwana, 2015).  
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My findings suggest actors in technology intensive industries need to 
strategize for the emergence of shared platforms, even before stable 
industries are formed through the diffusion of technology standards. Network 
effects (Suarez, 2004), entry of start-ups with new technologies (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990), and the influence of complementors (Teece, 2007) and 
others in institutional fields typically characterize such platforms (Garud et 
al., 2002). Here the level of uncertainty experienced by actors is likely to be 
higher than during the era of incremental change, and some have suggested 
that the speed of change is also significantly higher (Christensen, Craig, & 
Hart, 2001). My findings further suggest this era requires significant 
vigilance and agility on the part of participating actors. They need to 
continually scan and monitor their own ecosystems and other relevant 
ecosystems to learn about developments in the product market sector as well 
as the relevant technical and institutional sectors. They also need to be agile 
in their responses to their competitors to successfully embrace the inherent 
logic of platform coopetition (Gawer, 2014; Tiwana, 2015). 
The lessons I have learned also indicate that the engagement in shared 
platform coopetition requires actors to devise their strategic positions 
properly in the technological landscape. A key issue in platform initiatives is 
the timing of players’ entry into the platform or the technological field 
(Christensen et al., 2001; Suarez & Utterback, 1993; Tegarden, Hatfield, & 
Echols, 1999; Wareham et al., 2014). These actors are confronted with the 
challenge of predicting future technology architecture shifts, which is a 
genuinely difficult task given the competitive uncertainty characterizing 
technology change processes. Suarez (2004) argues very few technologies 
today can work in isolation, and some form of cooperation with other 
technologies is usually required to advance a sustained competitive 
advantage. My findings show that such platform coopetition (enabled by 
technology standards), however, can reduce resource heterogeneity in an 
ecosystem that eventually may culminate in intensified competition between 
cooperating actors. This form of competition mainly originates from 
technological changes that enhance a firm’s capability and position while 
they render one or more coopetitiors’ capabilities obsolete (Afuah, 2002).    
Adopting Gawer’s (2014) view of digital platforms as an emergent 
organizational form composed of (1) a network of actors that cooperate in the 
generation of value and compete in its appropriation (Eisenmann et al., 2011; 
Tiwana, 2015), and (2) a technological architecture consisting of a core, a 
standardized interface, and extensions (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Le 
Masson et al., 2011; Tiwana et al., 2010), I seek to theorize the entanglement 
of the social and material aspects of shared platforms. Consistent with 
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sociomaterial theorizing (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008), which has not yet been 
applied to empirically investigate the evolution of shared platforms, the 
purpose of this study is to answer the following research question: “How do 
the participants’ coopetitive behavior and the platform’s technology 
architecture reciprocally shape the evolution of a shared platform?” 
Drawing on an imbrication lens (Leonardi, 2011), my analysis of a twelve-
year initiative to develop a shared platform for the Swedish road haulage 
industry reveals insights into: (1) the opposing interests of stakeholders 
manifest in the construction of constraints and affordances, (2) archetypes of 
shared platform organizations, and (3) the materialization of architectural 
ideas during shared platform development. Finally, I conclude by articulating 
the contributions our research makes to both the theory and practice of 
managing the evolution of shared platforms. 
11.1 Opposing Stakeholder Interests 
Manifest in Imbrication Pairs 
Inspecting the sequence of constraints that triggered changes in technology 
and affordances that triggered changes in the coopetitive dynamics in the 
imbrication framework (Figure 8), I note that they alternated pairwise 
between the concerns of the IT vendors and their customers, i.e., the road 
haulers. Specifically, a constraint perceived primarily by the customer (e.g., 
propriety interfaces) motivated a material change (e.g., OSGi platform) that 
afforded road haulers the ability to source integration services from a single 
vendor (i.e., Vehco). This centrally-owned architecture, however, represented 
a constraint for the IT vendors (i.e., mediation of customer relationship) and 
the material changes to the architecture (i.e., a messaging platform based on 
web services) afforded these stakeholders the opportunity to each offer 
integration services. This was achieved, in part, by designing a bloated XML 
interface that accommodated the parameters that each vendor needed and 
previously had access to via their proprietary interfaces (rather than 
harmonizing them).  
The last imbrication set was triggered by the constraint this overly complex 
interface created for customers who sought to use the MSI platform for their 
system integration needs. The resulting BPM architecture was perceived as 
beneficial because it afforded them advanced and integrated information 
services (e.g., route optimization), but it proved challenging for the IT 
vendors who found it difficult to offer the complete suite of services given 
the market fragmentation. Additionally, based on the IT vendor’s demands 
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that the road haulers compensate them for future platform development 
(given that the size of the Swedish road haulage industry was too small for 
the IT vendors to recoup their investment), I contend that the next imbrication 
would have again reflected the IT vendors’ interests.  
This pattern of toggling between the interests of the customers and the IT 
vendors, highlights that in the development of shared platforms, it is not only 
the conflicting interests among coopetitive IT vendors that need to be 
understood and managed, but also those between customer and vendor 
groups. There is a risk of overlooking the customer-vendor tensions that are 
inherent in shared platforms (Markus et al., 2006), especially when their 
opposing interests are subtle or masked by the customer’s lack of 
technological expertise, which places them in a less powerful position during 
the development effort. Switching back and forth between privileging 
different stakeholders’ interests in each imbrication pair might prove an 
effective strategy for keeping these stakeholders engaged (Baldwin & 
Woodard, 2009).    
11.2 Archetypes of Shared Platform 
Organizations 
The development of the MSI shared platform consisted of three organizing 
initiatives, each characterized by a particular architecture. Categorizing these 
architectures according to the features of their core and their interface, I can 
distinguish them according to two dimensions (Figure 12): 1) the degree of 
synergistic specificity of the core and the extensions (Schilling, 2000), which 
I refer to here as core-extensions specificity, and 2) the conformability of the 
interface (Tiwana, 2015; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Placing each of the 
three MSI architectures (i.e., material) into this 2x2 framework and 
examining the implications of these architectures for coopetition (i.e., social), 
allows us to derive three archetypes of shared platforms as sociomaterial, 
organizational forms. 
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While the OSGi architecture was classified as having high core-extension 
specificity, the web service architectures (i.e., WS and BPM) were 
considered low on that dimension. This is because, in the OSGi architecture, 
the core and the extensions were optimized to work effectively with one 
another, making each vendor’s extension specific to the core. This high 
interdependence between the components of the core and vendors’ extensions 
demanded by the platform architecture was met with resistance by the IT 
vendors. They expressed concern about their system security with regard to 
the client-side JAR files that could be updated remotely in order to 
accommodate changes in the platform’s core. In contrast, the WS architecture 
reduced the core to a messaging service for XML files exchanged among 
platform members. This meant that there was low core-extension specificity 
(i.e., low coupling). The design of the extensions was thus highly 
independent of both the platform core and other vendors’ systems.  
The interface dimension of the platform architectures was assessed in term of 
its conformability, that is, the relative ease with which extensions can 
seamlessly coordinate with and through the platform core. A highly 
conformable interface is characterized by being clearly specified, 
unambiguous, stable, well documented, and standardized (Tiwana, 2015; 
Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). A key implication of high interface 
Figure 12 Sociomaterial configurations of the shared platforms 
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conformability is that the coordination among information-exchanging parties 
is simplified, thus encouraging larger numbers of diverse extension providers 
to join the platform and increasing its value (Boudreau, 2010). 
Both the OSGi and web service architectures exhibited low conformability, 
largely because their interfaces were non-standard and poorly specified. 
Specifically, the OSGi interface relied on data structures that were 
specifically tailored to each IT vendor’s system. The web service interface 
had low conformability as all the parameters required by different vendors 
were contained in a single XML structure without sufficient documentation 
and guidelines. This made it difficult for vendors who were expected to 
complete the XML template with data, to know which parameters to supply a 
requestor. Vendors whose systems were to be integrated were thus forced to 
engage in off-platform coordination. In contrast, the Business Process 
Modules architecture was highly conformable as the parameters outlined in 
the XML templates were not only harmonized (thus more standard and 
documented), but also limited to a specific business model, thus rendering 
them less ambiguous and allowing for better documentation.   
Locating the three MSI architectures into the 2x2 matrix that this 
dimensionalization of the platform produces, I can now theorize the 
coopetitive dynamics associated with each of them in order to develop three 
archetypal organizational forms (or sociomaterial configurations) that shared 
platforms can take. These are the centrally-controlled, distributed, and 
modularized platform.  
My analysis suggests that centrally-controlled shared platforms (e.g., OSGi) 
generate competition-dominant coopetition in large part because the vendor 
controlling the platform mediates the other vendors’ customer relationships. 
While such a centrally-controlled platform is generally attractive to the 
customer because all their integration needs are met by a single platform 
provider, it represents a significant threat to the mediated IT vendors. Given 
the competitive threat this architecture poses to the vendors, one would 
expect them to band together against the vendor that manages the platform 
core and to withhold cooperation in an effort to protect their own competitive 
position. As one would expect of a competition-dominant organization, 
innovation is likely to be low. 
The distributed shared platform (e.g., WS) is associated with dynamic 
coopetition, which is the most innovative of the organizational forms as it 
balances moderate cooperation with moderate competition (Bengtsson et al., 
2010). The architecture’s low core-extension specificity means that barriers 
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to entry are dissolved and more vendors are likely to seek access to the 
network, thereby increasing the availability of not only innovative ideas but 
also competition. In addition, as every vendor with a software installation in a 
customer’s IT infrastructure is now a potential integrator, the competition in 
the distributed architecture is likely to be fierce, further spurring innovation 
as competitors seek to differentiate themselves. 
However, the interdependence among the vendors, where one acts as the 
integrator for one customer but the integratee for another, requires that the 
vendors generate sufficiently strong bonds so that their counterparts feel 
compelled to cooperate in future. The cooperation spurred by this co-
dependence is likely to be buoyed by the need for off-platform coordination 
due to the interface’s low conformability. The inter-organizational 
relationships that develop during such coordination serve as a resource for 
innovation that improves the industry as a whole.  
Modular shared platforms (e.g., BPM) are associated with static coopetition. 
With both competition and cooperation being weakened by the material 
conditions of the architecture, this organizational form lacks the innovative 
and productive energy of the distributed shared platform. This seems counter-
intuitive, since an architecture characterized by high conformability and low 
core-extension specificity is the most desirable.  Why does it therefore not 
produce an organizational form optimal for innovation? 
Since a highly conformable interface manages data coordination among 
companies whose systems are being integrated, off-platform communication 
is made redundant, thus reducing the opportunity to build strong inter-firm 
bonds and cooperation. Additionally, competition is lowered as the 
modularized interface limits competition to the verticals created by the 
modules (e.g., route optimization). Very few vendors - if any - are capable of 
offering integration in the entire suite of business processes.  
Figure 12 includes a cell that is labelled “unlikely” because an interface with 
high conformability is typically highly modularized, making it inconsistent 
with a platform core that is tightly coupled with its extensions (Schilling, 
2000). 
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11.3 The Materialization of Architectural 
Ideas  
A key characteristic of shared platforms is that their ultimate success relies 
on producing value for a customer by aggregating a diverse and unique set of 
services in a single place. The development of the shared standard-based 
architecture requires involvement from a diverse set of actors, whose interests 
may be orthogonal to each other (Steinfield et al., 2011). A key challenge for 
the evolution of a shared platform therefore is to begin materializing design 
ideas, even if the members of the initiative are not in full agreement and are 
trying to win the platform dominance battle (Chen, Qian, & Narayanan, 
2017). Having something tangible (e.g., code, data structures) to focus the 
platform member’s attention and to align their overarching goals is 
particularly important in shared platforms, where membership tends to be 
quite fluid (cf. Nambisan, Lyytinen, Majchrzak, & Song, 2017).  
The MSI project dealt with this challenge by relying on a vendor that had 
prior experience with a candidate technology to lead the development of the 
envisaged architectural solution. For example, the OSGi architecture was 
advanced by Gatespace who had implemented some projects with Volvo 
Trucks using this integration technology. Hogia was then the source of the 
Web Service architecture design and the XML interface in the distributed 
platform architecture. Finally, DPS leveraged its expertise with data 
integration for route optimization to spearhead the modularization of the 
XML interface.  
While this approach of revolving technology leadership was effective in 
focusing the attention of the MSI members and keeping the platform’s 
development moving, it also posed considerable challenges. Given that the 
technology leader exerts some control over the integration, this affects the 
complementors’ competitive positions and evokes some kind of a response 
(Narayanan and Chen 2012). In the case of the centralized architecture, the 
vendors took a competition-dominant stance, whereas competition and 
cooperation were balanced when all vendors had an equal chance to serve as 
systems integrator, thanks to the WS architecture. Elevating one actor to 
technology leader thus introduces its own set of coopetitive dynamics, which 
I have shown to have significant implications for the likelihood of generating 
and implementing innovations that benefit the industry as a whole (cf. 
Wareham et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, the technological leader’s position in the MSI project was 
generally unstable. For example, Gatespace withdrew from the MSI project 
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after embedded technology was ruled out of scope. In the case of Hogia, its 
initial cooperation-dominant attitude suddenly swung to a more competitive 
disposition as it threatened to sue the MSI consortium over IP infringement. 
This suggests that this strategy of speeding the materialization of design ideas 
along by elevating a specific vendor’s technological solution as the starting 
point for evolving the architecture (i.e., material dimension), may short-
circuit the important work of generating a foundation of cooperation among 
group members (i.e., social dimension).   
11.4 Limitations 
This study has some limitations that pave the way for the future work. My 
study is limited to coopetition dynamics toward specific technologies within 
a particular industry. It examines the work of a single group of actors in the 
Swedish road haulage industry who focused on the development of the MSI 
shared platform. My work is thus concerned with the specific issues that rose 
in this specific context. Future research needs to consider different 
technology architectures and industry sectors to include requisite variations in 
how evolution of shared platforms manifest. 
My dissertation also focused on a shared platform that finally ended without 
being used by a large base of customers. Yet, the observed evolution path 
contains elements familiar to many evolution processes- the need to strike a 
balance between users and suppliers of technology, the challenge of 
coordinating heterogeneous stakeholders, the challenge of settling on the 
common denominator of the varied customer demands, and the difficulties in 
building relations and momentum to facilitate convergence. Indeed, the 
Swedish road haulage industry is characterized by coopetition; it is 
constituted by a plethora of players; and, because many of these represent 
relatively small firms there is scarcity of innovation resources available. In 
retrospect, these characteristics definitely affected the research findings, and 
they should therefore be treated with caution. As a result, future research 
should investigate the different ways in which industries can establish 
informal, ad-hoc organizations to effectively orchestrate innovation and 
development of shared platforms. 
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12 CONCLUSION 
Given my reliance on a single, albeit twelve-year case study of a shared 
platform’s evolution, my objective is to generalize our findings to theory, 
rather than to the population of shared platforms (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). 
With this goal in mind, I articulate my contributions to research, but also 
weave in my findings’ significance for practice. The latter is particularly 
salient as consortium-based efforts to solve an industry’s communication and 
integration problems represent the most common organizational form for 
platform development and standardization (Cargill, 2002).    
Research on platforms is the first domain to which my dissertation 
contributes. Adopting a definition of platforms as an organizational form, this 
research seeks to overcome the false separation between the technological 
and social/economic dimension of platforms that is prevalent in this literature 
(Gawer 2014). Thanks to the detailed and longitudinal data of the MSI 
platform’s evolution, I was able to demonstrate the entangled nature of these 
two dimensions. Drawing on imbrication (Leonardi, 2011) as my theoretical 
scaffold for identifying how the platform architectures and the coopetitive 
relationships among the MSI participants became entangled to form three 
types of shared platform organizations, i.e., centrally-controlled, distributed, 
and modular, my research extends recent work on the development of 
architectural platform solutions (Aanestad & Blegind Jensen, 2011; Grisot , 
Hanseth, & Thorseng, 2014; Henfridsson & Bygstad, 2013). 
While these organizational forms have not been identified and conceptualized 
before, my sociomaterial lens on platform evolution is certainly not unique to 
this study. So far, however, only a few papers have developed similar 
arguments as areas of further study. As my empirical analysis suggests, the 
development of shared platforms is a highly volatile, complex, and uncertain 
environment, which undermines participants’ ability to make strategic 
decisions based on predictive rationality. Hence, Koch, and Windsperger 
(2017) suggest that a key question to answer concerns how heterogeneous 
actors may achieve competitive advantage by actively shaping the shared 
technological platform and co-creating value that stems from the synergistic 
exchange of digital resources and services. De Reuver et al. (2017) argue, 
however, that it is not obvious how such platform evolution plays out given 
the distributed model of organization that characterizes a shared platform. I 
believe my theorizing about emerging organizational forms in shared 
platform evolution advances the IS field’s current understanding of what it 
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takes for organizations “to learn how to compete and thrive” as members of 
large-scale platforms (Yoo et al., 2012, p. 1406). 
A key implication of adopting a sociomaterial lens to research on the 
development of shared platforms is that architecture is given material agency 
(Gawer, 2014). This suggests that there are aspects of a system’s evolution 
that cannot be controlled by more careful planning and/or more intricate 
designs. Instead, what the technology, in combination with human actors, 
produces is neither entirely knowable nor controllable. For this reason, the 
notion of systems development needs to be replaced by the concept of system 
evolution in a sociomaterial study (cf. Agarwal and Tiwana, 2015).    
While I rely on imbrication theory to highlight that perceived constraints 
trigger technological changes, and perceived affordances trigger changes in 
routines (e.g., inter-organizational coordination), applying this causal logic to 
the specific context of shared platforms allows us to refine this imbrication 
change mechanism. I note a toggling between different stakeholders’ interests 
during the evolution of the MSI platform (cf. Baldwin & Woodard, 2009). I 
propose that alternating whose interests are primary across the imbrication 
pairs may constitute an effective strategy for keeping all platform members 
engaged, despite power differences among them. However, this proposition 
should be tested empirically in not only shared platform projects, but also 
other architectural initiatives. The imbrication lens should ideally be applied 
in such studies, as it provides a powerful conceptual scaffold to segment a 
development effort into significant design movements, which can then be 
inspected for whose interests they serve. 
Another refinement of imbrication’s theoretical change engine relates to the 
materialization of design objectives (human agency) in share platform 
initiatives. The strategy of adapting solutions previously implemented by one 
of the participants, proved problematic for a variety of reasons. These include 
ambiguities around intellectual property and the adverse effects of one actor’s 
elevated status on the competitive dynamics of the group (Eisenmann, 2008). 
Indeed, the identification of agile, entrepreneurial responses to clients’ needs 
without compromising the momentum of the platform as a whole, represents 
a pertinent issue in the platform governance literature (Wareham et al., 2014) 
Future research on shared platforms might examine the tradeoffs between 
materializing human agency by developing support for an existing solution 
and by building agreement among participants, from which a native 
architectural solution can then emerge.      
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The implications of these platform-related findings for the management of 
these emergent organizational forms are significant. The view that 
technology has material agency suggests that the development of shared 
platforms needs to exhibit flexibility. It therefore behooves practitioners to 
adopt agile approaches and to recognize that systems evolve despite human 
efforts to design and develop them (Agarwal & Tiwana, 2015). The strategy 
of alternating the priority of different stakeholders’ interests in each 
architecture development phase, reminds practitioners to consider the needs 
of customers, which might be overlooked in an effort to manage the 
coopetitive dynamics among the IT vendors. These coopetitive dynamics are 
easily affected by changes in the relative status of network members 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010; Ingram & Yue, 2008). Thus, people who are 
managing the evolution of shared platforms should carefully weigh the costs 
and benefits of developing a solution by adapting a (proprietary) technology 
that one of its members has deployed in the past (Eisenmann et al., 2011). 
The second domain to which this dissertation contributes is the research on 
coopetition. Regarding the evolution of a shared platform as a unique 
opportunity to explore the dynamic interplay between cooperation and 
competition, I identify the material conditions (e.g., centrally-controlled 
architecture) under which specific coopetitive configurations (e.g., static 
coopetition) emerge. Indeed, past research has largely ignored both the 
material conditions of coopetition (Gawer, 2014), as well as the dynamic 
interplay of cooperation and competition (Hoffmann et al. 2014). One 
counter-intuitive finding generated by this analysis is that an architecture that 
is technologically superior (e.g., modularized architecture) can produce 
paradoxical effects (cf. Hanseth et al., 2006; Narayanan & Chen, 2012), such 
as coopetitive dynamics that are suboptimal with regard to innovativeness. 
The social and material conditions under which such counter-intuitive results 
are produced in shared platform architectures, represents another fruitful 
trajectory of future research. 
For practitioners, the key implication of my finding that a less-than-perfect 
architecture produced a coopetitive configuration that was more conducive 
for innovation is that interfaces with low conformability, which compel 
platform participants to engage in off-platform coordination, may be 
conducive for fostering cooperation. As such, it is likely to be generative with 
respect to innovation. Whether a less-than-perfect core architecture 
characterized by high core-extension coupling, for example, will produce 
similarly generative results, represents another opportunity for future 
research. 
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Interplay between innovation and social aspects are key feature of platforms. 
This study advances our understanding of sociotechnical dynamics of shared 
platforms: The emergence and dynamics of shared platforms that is highly 
affected by the interplay between coopetition and technology architecture. 
My study shows complex, interacting, and contradicting actions by an array 
of heterogeneous actors and architectures form the design of the shared 
platform. However, this dynamism should be met with proper governance 
strategies through technological shifts otherwise it turns coopetition 
relationships into intensified competition. Previous studies on industry 
platforms have mainly illustrated homogenous milieus while I have 
contributed a detailed empirical account of how a heterogeneous ecosystem 
of players within the Swedish haulage industry created a shared platform 
initiative to exploit the commercial possibilities afforded by integrating 
embedded, mobile, and stationary IT solutions through new industry-wide 
infrastructures. This offers a contribution to existing research and offers what 
Walsham (1995) calls “rich insights” on shared platforms.     
The MSI project has been the only place for Swedish road haulage industry 
actors to cooperate in favor of customers, to this day. Although, ecosystem’s 
platforms are not using the MSI as the communication platform today it 
played a major role in accelerating integration projects by stabilizing 
cooperation between actors. However, my results show that letting 
complementors hijacking shared platform development and inability to meet 
technological shifts hindered this initiative to hit diffusion. This offers 
important implications for Innovation leaders managing such shared efforts 
or actors planning to join standardization consortia. In addition, my analysis 
shows shared platforms are result of reciprocal action between coopetition 
dynamics between heterogeneous actors, competing platforms and constantly 
changing technology and industry dynamics which if governed properly lead 
to value creation. 
This dissertation’s main objective is to gain an understanding of how shared 
platforms as organizational forms, which comprise a technological 
architecture as well as a network of industry actors that both compete and 
cooperate with each other to varying degrees, evolve as a sociomaterial 
configuration over time. Relying on imbrication theory, my analysis of a 
twelve-year action research project, whose purpose was to develop a shared 
platform to facilitate the integration of embedded, mobile, and stationary 
technology in the Swedish road haulage industry, demonstrates that the 
constitution of the organizational forms that are shared platforms occurred 
through a series of changes in the technology and the vendors’ competitive 
and cooperative relationships based on a given architecture’s constraints and 
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affordances respectively. I identify three archetypes of shared platform 
organizations and highlight that the organizational form most conducive to 
innovation, which is central to a platform’s value, relies on a technology 
architecture mediated by an interface that is deficient with respect to 
conformability. This counterintuitive result raises interesting questions that 
future platform research might investigate. 
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